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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is to examine the 
idea of creation in the thought of Plato, Augustine, and 
Brunner through a study of the nature and function of the 
root analogies underlying their systems. In the course 
of this study attention will also be given to the 
capacity of each thinker's basic analogy of creation to 
accomplish the purposes for which the analogy was designed. 
2. Previous Writings in the Field 
Nothing but cursory and insignificant work has been 
done regarding the ro0t analogies underlying the ideas of 
creation in the thought~of these philosophers. However, 
some work has been done regarding the nature and function 
of root analogies underlying philosophical systems in 
general. 
Stephen c. Pepper in his book, World Hypotheses, says 
that underlying each world hypothesis is an analogy rooted 
in some common sense experience. He. attempts to prove 
his contention through a comparison of the claims of 
scientific and positivistic hypotheses and Gf metaphysical 
1 
hypotheses. In his book, Maker of Heaven and Earth, 1 
. 
Langdon Gi'lkey contends that root analogies do not and 
cannot suggest either a perspective or a set of categories 
which will enable one to understand "how" God created the 
world. The only meaning the idea of creation. has is to 
be found in answer to the question "why" a person exists. 
A person exists because God.wills it. 2 Gilkey's work is 
valuable as a critique of philosophical analogies and a 
restatement of the idea of creationfr~m a theological 
point of view. 
Space, Time, ~ Creation by Milton K. Munitz, is a 
book devoted to the analysis and defense of analogies 
underlying scientific hypotheses and to the critique of 
metaphysical and theological analogies. Munitz deals 
cursorily and inadequately with the idea of creation in 
Plato. Flew and Macintyre, New Essays ~~ Philosophical 
Theology, in a chapter on creation, discuss the meaning 
of the idea of creation both in scientific cosmology and 
in theology. They point out that underlying the Biblical 
world view is a ttpicture1' or "image" in terms of which a 
lFor full bibliographical data of this and the 
following works, please refer to the Bibliography at the 
end of the dissertation. 
2plato's root analogy of creation is discussed in 
passing and criticized from the viewpoint of the 
inability of metaphysical root anal0gies of creation to 
provide for the experience of human freedom. 
2 
particular religious practice is justified. John Passmore 
in his book, Philosophical Reasoning, discusses fundamental 
analogies from the viewpoint of their function in argu-
ments for various philosophical positions. However, these 
works provide only background studies of root analogies. 
None deal adequately with the root analogies of creation 
in Plato '-.s, Augustine's, and Brunner's systems. 
What works of Augustine, Plato, and Brunner deal 
with the idea of creation? The major cosmolpgical works 
in Plato's writings are the Timaeus, Philebus, and Laws, 
Augustine's Confessions, On The Trinity, and The City of 
God are the major cosmological works to be considered when 
discussing his idea of creation. Brunner's two volume 
work on dogmatics, The Christian Doctrine of God and The 
Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, and his 
work, The Divine-Human Encounter, are the central works 
on his iclea of creation. 
Two secondary works, one on Plato and one on 
Augustine, are such significant works for the idea of 
creation in the thought of these men that they must be 
mentioned. Gilson's. The Christian Philosophy of Saint 
Augustine, and Demos~ The Philosophy of Plato, provide 
excellent guides into the thought of these two great 
thinkers. Both Gilson's and Demos' works are valuable 
. ' 
for understanding the place and function of. the idea of 
3 
creation in Plato's and Augustine's thought. 
3. Methodology 
The task of this work is to determine the nature, 
functien, and adequacy of the analogies of creation so 
that the meaning of the idea of creation underlying Plato's, 
Augustine's, and Brunner's system will be clear. Chapters 
II through IV will be devoted to an examination of the 
idea of creation in each man~s thought. In terms of the 
problems facing each man and the methods he employs to 
overcome these problems the categories of the idea of 
creation in each system will be analyzed. Next, the 
categories will be considered in their ~ndividual and 
composite roles so that the cosmology of each man's world 
view will be clear. After the nature and function of the 
idea of creation has been clearly delineated, the basic 
analogy underlying the view will be discussed. Through 
an analysis of the analogical underpinnings of the idea 
of creation the view of creation will be· clarified. Next, 
the idea of creation will be evaluated in terms of the 
capacity of the root analogy to suggest an hypothesis 
the perspective and structure of which allow the prob-
lems each man faces to be overcome. Finally, a comparison 
will be drawn among the views of the three thinkers. In 
4 
Chapter V an attempt will be made to draw from the thought 
of Plato, Augustine, and Brunner some conclusions which 
will serve as constructive suggestions for rendering 
meaningful the idea of creation in Biblical thought. 
5 
CHAPTER II 
THE IDEA OF CREATION IN PLATO'S THOUGHT 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify Plato's 
idea of creation by analyzing its analogical basis and by 
testing the ability of· this basis to suggest the conceptual 
hypothesis Plato employs in his doctrine of creation. In 
light of this purpose this chapter's structure will be as 
f~llows: in section two the problems confronting Plato will 
be stated. Section three will be devoted to an outline of 
the method Plato employs. The nature and.function of crea-
tion in his cosmology will be delineated in sections four 
and five. Next, in sec-tion six, Plato's idea of creation 
will be clarified through a discussion of the conceptual 
model on which the doctrine is based. Finally, in section 
seven, the conceptual model will be submitted to a critique. 
The first topic for discussion, then, is the difficulties 
Plato faces in his theory of Ideas. 
2. Difficulties Confronting Plato 
In his theory of Ideas Plato finds two major difficul-
ties: How can being and becoming be related? What is the 
nature of the relation of being and becoming? Each of these 
6 
problems will be briefly discussed. 
1) The Nature of the Relation of Being and Becoming 
For Plato the problem of the relation of being and be-
coming can be viewed from at least three perspectives: what 
is the relation of the one and the many, what is the relation 
of permanence and change, and what is the relation between 
perfection and imperfection? These three difficulties arise 
from Plato 1 s theory of Ideas. What is Plato's theory of 
Ideas? When this question has been answered the nature of 
the problems involved in the theory can be fully explicated. 
A. Plato's Theory of Ideas -- In the Middle Period of 
his thought Plato fully developed his theory of Ideas.l This 
doctrine arose from Plato's seeking to give a metaphysical 
foundation for things as they are and to find grounds for 
the possibility of knowledge. (Phaedo, 98; ~' 81.) 
Faced with the Sophistic teachings that all knowledge comes 
from sense experience and that k~owledge is relative to each 
knower, Plato states that knowledge is not relative; on the 
contrary, knowledge comes through the mind's apprehension of 
!Although there is no general agreement on the sequence 
of Plato's dialogues, A. E. Taylor's chronology is soundly 
based. Taylor, whose chronology will be adopted ~ere, 
arranges Plato's dialogues into three periods: (1} Socratic 
Period: Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Cratylus, Euthademus, 
Gorgias, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito; (2) Mid le Period: 
Phaedo, Symposium, Protagoras, Republic; (3) Late Period: 
Phaedrus, Theaetetus, Parmenides, Sophistes---Politicus, 
Philebus, Timaeus, Laws. A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and 
His Work (New York:-lMeridian Books, Inc., I958~pp:-I6=zz. 
7 
objects which are immutable, perfect, not subject to the 
vicissitudes of sense experience, and available to every 
person who seeks to possess true knowledge. The knowledge 
of these objectd comes through a recollection of that which 
is implicit to the mind. (Meno, 81;) These objects, the 
knowledge of which comes through reminiscence, are Forms or 
Ideas. 
The argument for the existence of the Forms is based 
on the possibility of making judgments of comparison. 
Without a1prior knowledge, for example, of Equality which 
exists, which is dependent only upon itself, and which is 
immutable, one could not judge that one particular object 
was equal to another. (Phaedo, 75.) 
Thus, in order to make judgments of comparison one 
has to have knowledge of reality. For Plato the Forms are 
being. Having arrived at the doctrine of the Forms pri-
marily through epistemic.arguments, P~ato finds in them a 
metaphysical function. The Forms, being unchangeable 
(Phaedo, 78), operate as final causes. In his search for 
an explanation for things being what they are, Plato turned 
from the deistic Anaxagorean Mind (Phaedo, 98} because the 
Nous of Anaxagoras did not make any difference in the 
realm of events. Thus, he turned to a teleological ex-
planation for change, the realm of eternal Forms. Sensible 
things act as they do because they participate in the Forms. 
A particular object is what it is because it realizes to 
some degree its essential nature. A bed is a bed to the 
extent it can and does function as a bed. The bed can and 
does function as a bed because it participates in the Form 
Bedness. Thus, thr0ugh the use of the Forms as final 
causes Plato gives an ontological ground for appearance. 
In his attempt to give a reason for things being what 
they are Plato develops a metaphysical dualism which be-
comes the focal point of his cosmological difficulties. On 
the one hand is a realm of changing particulars which are 
neither illusory, nor real, but which are appearances hav-
ing degrees of reality. On the other hand is a realm of 
invisible, unchanging Forms which are altogether real. The 
relation which obtains between them is called participation. 
The difficulty which Plato faced in the Early-Late Period 
is the intelligibility of the participation of beceming in 
being. The relation of these realms can be viewed from the 
perspective of the relation of the one and the many, of 
permanence and change, and perfection and imperfection. 
B. The One and the Many -- One of the objections ad-
vanced in the Parmenides is that the relation between the 
one and the many described as participation leads to a 
disintegration of the one. After Socrates agrees that 
"there'are certain ideas of which all other things partake, 
and from which they derive their names; that similars ••• 
9 
become similar, because they partake of similarity," 
Parmenides concludes: 
Then each individual partakes either of the 
whole of the idea or else of a part of the 
idea? • • • Then do you think that the whole 
idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each 
one of the many? • • • [One] and the same 
thing will exist as a whole at the same 
time in many separate individuals, and will 
therefore be in a state of separation from 
itself.l 
How can being which is one and self-identical be related to 
becoming which is many and other than unchanging being? 
Parmenides further argues that there is no reason to halt 
with a finite number of Ideas. On the contrary, what is to 
stop an infinite regress while one is searching for the 
most extensive of class concepts? 
Parmenides speaks to Socrates: 
-
I imagine that the way in whic~ you are led 
to assume one idea of each kind is as 
follows: You see a number of great objects, 
and when you look at them there seems to you 
to be one and the same idea (or nature) in 
them all; hence you conceive of greatness as 
one. • •• And if you go on and allow your 
mind in like manner to embrace in one view 
the idea of greatness and of great things 
which are not the idea, and to compare them, 
will not another greatness arise, which will 
appear to be the source of all these? , ! ~ 
Then another idea of greatness now comes in-
to view over and above absolute greatness, 
and the individuals which partake of it; 
and then another, over and above all these, 
lThe Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (2 
vols.; New York: RandOm House, 1937), II, 91; cf. 
Philebus, 15. 
10 
by virtue of which they will all be great, 
and so each idea instead of being one will 
be infinitely multiplied.~ 
Plato, thus, argues that an existent cannot partake of a 
Form as a whole or as a part for two reasons: (1) if the 
one is in each of the many then it is no longer one but 
many, but if the one is not in the many the two are separated 
and consequently unrelated; {2) because there is no reason 
to stop an infinite regress in search of the one, the re-
lation of the many to the one is unintelligible. 
c. Permanence and Change In the Sophist Plato dealt 
with the problem of the reality of change. While dealing 
with the difficulty he met the perplexities involved in 
' 
making intelligible the relation of permanence and change. 
On the basis of his definition that being is the power to 
affect and to be affected (Sophist, 247), Plato proceeds to 
show that knowledge is impossible apart from both action 
and passion. Those who would deny any motion to being 
must show how knowledge is possible. To know is action 
and to be known is passion. Thus, in so far as being is 
known it "is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in 
motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be 
acted upon.n2 If, however, there is nothing but motion, 
lrbid., pp. 92-93. 
2Ibid., P• 256. 
11 
then there is no way to explain how knowledge is possible. 
The Stranger points out: 
Then, Theaet~, our inference is, that if 
there is no motion, neither is there any mind 
anywhere, or about anything or belonging to 
any one •••• And yet this equally follows, 
if we grant that all things are in motion --
upon this view mind has no existence.l 
Seeing that both motion and rest are needed to explain 
knowledge, the philesopher has no choice but to cry, "Give 
us both."2 Once he demands both, the philosopher is met 
with the difficulty of accounting for the relation between 
them. How are they to be related? (Sophist, 24a) 
The answer to this problem Plato leaves for the 
Timaeus.3 Nevertheless, the force of the difficulty can 
easily be seen. If the unchanging is related to the chang-
ing, is not the unchanging by virtue of this relation to 
the changing itself, also changing? If the changing is re-
lated to the unchanging, is not the changing by virtue of 
its relation to the unchangin.g itself also unchanging? · How 
can both realms be kept without reducing one to the other 
and yet make their relation intelligible? 
B. Perfection and Imperfection -- Finally, Plato is 
libid., p. 257. 
2Ibid., p. 257. 
3Francis M. Cornford, Plato's TheoEI of Knowledge 
(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1957), p. 248. 
12 
' 
met with the problem of the relation of perfection and im-
perfection. The heart of this problem is this: that which 
is perfect cannot have anything to do with that which is 
imperfect else that ~hich is perfect through its relation 
to the imperfect should itself become imperfect. In the 
Par~menides Plato approaches this problem from both a 
metaphysical and an epistemic viewpoint. What is the 
metaphysical difficulty? Anyone maintaining the reality of 
absolute Forms will have to admit that they cannot be 
present in human or natural existents. Since man and 
natural things are imperfect, the Forms cannot maintain 
their absoluteness and at the same time be related t0 im-
per~ect things. To the extent that they are related to 
imperfection they are imperfect.l 
The implications of this metaphysical problem for 
Plato's world-view pierce the heart of his position. Plato 
advances the theory of Ideas to explain teleologically 
things as they are. Persons and natural objects become 
what they become because of their participation in the 
world of eternal Forms. However, if the Forms cannot be 
related to the world of sense objects without taking on 
the imperfection of the sense objects then the Forms cannot 
provide the metaphysical ground that Plato asks of them. 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 94. 
13 
For the Forms to function properly they must both be un-
changing and eternal and be related to the world of events, 
ehange, imperfection. 
The epistemic aspect of the problem stems from the 
metaphysical difficulties. If human1 .. beings cann0t have the 
Ideas without destroying the absoluteness of the Ideas, 
then the knower cannot have knowledge of the Ideas without 
destroying the absolute truth the Ideas afford. Further-
more, if the two realms are unrelated and imperfect knowl-
edge is of the realm of sense objects and perfect knowledge 
is of the realm of eternal essences, then an imperfect 
knower cannot know that which is perfect. (Parmenides, 
134.) On the other hand, if the two realms are unrelated 
and separate then the gods or God cannot have knowledge of 
human things. The implication of this is that God cannot 
be the master of men. (Parmenides, 134.)1 
Through the metaphysical angle of the problem Plato 
indicates that the relation of the imperfect and the per-
fect is unintelligible and involves grave implications for 
his cosmology. Through the epistemic side of the problem 
he shows that human knowledge cannot be of that which is 
eternal and absolute. Both in its metaphysics and in its 
epistemology Plato finds serious difficulties with the 
lThis argument seems to be directed toward that 
statement in Phaedo, 63G that the gods are good masters. 
14 
theory of Ideas. 
Three problems in the theory 0f Ideas have been dis-
cussed: the relation of the one and the many, of change 
and permanence, and of perfection and imperfection. There 
is, however, .one other major difficulty in the theory of 
Ideas. How does movement originate? Given that the Ideas 
function as final causes, what functions as the efficient 
cause of all becoming? 
2) The Cause of the Relation of Being and Becoming 
The first time in the dialogues that Plato voices his 
desire for an efficient cause to account for the relation 
of being and becoming is in Phaedo, 97. Despairing of the 
materialiststtexplanation that things are generated or 
destroyed because of the co-mingling of natural elements, 
Plato asks for a cause of the mingling of the elements. 
Turning to the Anaxagorean Mind as a possible efficient 
cause, he thought he had found a principle that "will 
order and arrange each thing in the best possible way.n1 
However, after reading further Plato finds that the Greek 
Atomist had not used Mind as a cause of things being 
ordered "in the best possible way." Anaxagoras' Mind did 
not function effectively in the world. After initiating 
motion in the world it had no function whatsoever. 
lplato, Phaedo, trans. F. J. Church (New York: The 
Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1951}, p. 50. 
1 
15 
~ 
Turning from a possible theistic cause of order and ar-
rangement, Plato followed a second best route. The route 
he chose was through the Forms. Things move and are 
ordered for the best because they participate in and have 
as their goal a realm ·of iimnutable and invisible Forms. 
(Phaedo, 100.) 
Though Plato took this tack to the problem of explain-
ing order and motion in the world, he did not sidestep the 
problem of previding an efficient cause to explain the 
origin of movement, either of generation or destruction. 
Aristotle observes in Met~physics, 991 b 2-7, that 
In the Phaedo (100 C-E) the case is stated 
in this way -- that the Forms are causes 
both of being and of becoming; yet when the 
Forms exist, still the things that share in 
them do not come into being, unless there is 
something to originate movement; and many 
other things come into being (e.g., a house 
or a ring) of which we say there are no 
forms.l 
In the Republic Plato continues to use this second 
best explanation for the order in the world. That the 
Good functions as the final cause of all becoming can be 
attested to by a quick perusal of the Republic. Plato 
points out that "the idea of good is the highest knowledge, 
and that all other things become useful and advantageous 
only by their use of this.n2 The function of the Good in 
lThe Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York: Random Hous67 Inc., 1941), p. 709. 
2Jowett, Dialogues, I, 766. 
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the1 Republic is quite clear in the passage in which Plato 
compares the Good with the Sun. Plato says: 
You would say, would you not, that the sun 
is not only the author of visibility in all 
visible things, but of generation and 
nourishment and growth, though he himself 
is not generation? • • • In like manner 
the good may be said to be not only the 
author of knowledge to all things known, but 
of their being and essence, and yet the good 
is not essence, bui far exceeds essence in 
dignity ,and power. 
The Good functions as the final cause not only of all be-
coming but also of all the Ide~s. At this point Plato's 
use of the theory of Ideas as a teleological explanation 
for, motion and the order of events in becoming reaches its 
apex. 
Plato did not, however, eliminate the gods from his 
thought. On the contrary, he kept them in his state and 
made them more intelligible by defining what the gods must 
be. (Republic, 382.) But the gods had no effectiv:e 
metaphysical function. Even though Plato attributed all 
good to the action of the gods, nowhere does he spell out 
how the gods function metaphysically. (Republic, 379.) 
Plato at this point is a theist if by theist one means a 
belief that gods exist without at the same time holding 
that they have an effective metaphysical function. Plato's 
employment of the gods in his metaphysics comes later in 
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his thought. 
In the Late Period of Plato's thought he begins to 
consider carefully a doctrine of efficient causality. In 
the Philebus Plato deals with the.question of the· cause of 
the highest good for man. Neither pleasure nor thought 
alone is the highest good; but a mixed life is man's 
summum l:>onum, one "which contains both 'thought' and 
pleasant feeling.n1 But what is the ag~nt which mixes 
these elements and causes the mixed life to be good? 
Taylor points out that: 
The real preblem ef the Philebus dialogue 
still remains. Does the 'mixed life' owe 
its goodnes·s primarily to .the presence of 
thought in it, or to the presence of 
pleasant feeling? Which i~ preponderantly 
the cause of its goodness? 
Plato employed the doctrine of the Forms as an expla-
nation of order in the realm of becoming when he determined 
that a satisfactory efficient cause could not be developed. 
In the Republic Plato fully developed his non-theistic 
cosmic teleology. Nevertheless, the need remained for an 
explanation of the origin of motion and of movement toward 
what is best, and in his late period he began to consider 
the problem anew. 
Summary -- Plato thoroughly criticizes his theory of 
lTaylor, Plato, p. 413. 
2Ibid., p. 414; cf. Philebus, 23-30. 
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Forms. At the point of the participation of th.e realm of 
becoming in the realm of being Plato was met with the 
problems of the relation of change and permanence, of the 
one and the many, and of perfection and imperfection. At 
the point of the origin of movement toward the Ideas Plato 
was met with the difficulty of accounting for this movement. 
Met with these two problems, Plato began to revise 
his world-view~ This revision takes the form of introduc-
ing into his metaphysical system an hypothesis which seeks 
to account not only for the initiation of movement toward 
the Ideas, but also for the nature of the relation of the 
worlds of being and of becoming. The hypothesis Plato 
advances is the hypothesis of creation. Before Plato's 
~heory of creation ean adequately be discussed, however, 
the method he uses to develop this theory must be dis-
cussed. What is the procedure Plato uses in developing, 
advancing, and evaluating the hypothesis of creation? 
3~. Method 
Plato's method is the dialectic. However, what Plato 
means by dialectic must be seen in light of the work he 
does. In the Early Period Plato employs elenchus, a method 
of questioning a statement until one has weeded out all 
ambiguity, and until one has found a general concept which 
is useful as a principle in terms of which one can make 
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decisions in a moral situation. In the Middle Period 
Plato's method takes on another form of the dialectic, that 
of intelligible hypothesis. When dealing with the intelli-
gible realm Plato advances hypotheses which aid him in 
understanding the ultimate nature of reality. H0wever, in 
the Late Period the methods of division, synthesis or 
collection, and sensible hypothesis became Plato's foremost 
tools of enquiry. In each of these periods Plato employs 
that method which best suits his field of enquiry, whether 
ethical, metaphysical or cosmological. (Timaeus, 29 B-C.) 
For studies in ethics he uses elenchus and intelligible 
hypothesis, in metaphysics, intelligible hypothesis, divi-
sion and collection, in cosmology, sen~ible hypothesis. 
When Plato revises his cosmology he begins to employ 
a method commensurat,e with the subject of enquiry. In 
order to understand the method he employs and the outcome 
of its use, one must grasp the pivotal point around which 
Plato's thought revolves. With this in mind one can better 
understand the method Plato uses, why he uses this method, 
and the way in which he uses it. 
1) The Divided Line 
In the ReEublic, 509-511 Plato clearly and definitely 
sets forth the position that there are two orders, the 
visible and not completely real, and the intelligible and 
real. (ReEublic, 509.) These realms are divided into 
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degrees 0f reality and truth. Two degrees are found in 
each order. The visible is divided into images and actual 
objects. By images Plato means shadowy reflections and by 
actual objects Plato means "the actual things of which the 
first (images) are likenesses, the living creatures about 
us and all the works 0f nature or of human hands.nl The 
intelligible world is divided into the realm of mathematical 
objects and Forms. Plato means by mathematical objects 
"those things which themselves had images in the visible 
world. u2 These objects are postulated "numbers, or the 
various figures and the three kinds 0f angle."3 Having 
adopted these as hypotheses, the students of geometry and 
ari tihm:.eti~~ do not give an account of the hypotheses, "but 
treat them as self-evident.n4 Mathematical objects are 
one step removed from sensible objects. Having "images of 
their own in the section below them:r mathematicB;l objects, 
"in comparison with those shadows and reflections, are re-
puted to be more palpable and valued accordingly. n.5 The 
mind uses the mathematical objects as assumptions and 
travels down to conclusions. By a Form Plato means a 
principle which is not hypothetical; rather, it is the 
lThe Republic of Plat0, trans. F. M. Cornford (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1957), P• 224. 
2Ibid. 3rbid. 4Ibid., p. 225. 5Ibid. 
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first principle of all that is. The Form is not related 
to the sensible world as is the mathematical object. On 
the contrary, these.objects are purely intelligible 
objects, an understanding of which is attained only through 
unaided reason. The power of dialectic is used by the 
reason to move from one Form to another, treating each 
Form as a stepping stone, as a true hypothesis, on its "way 
to something that is not hypothetical, the first principle 
of a11."1 That Plato divided the visible and not quite 
real world from the intelligible and real world is evident 
from his writings. In the light of this division of the 
objects of possible enquiry where does Plato put cosmolo-
gical study and what is the method he adopts by means of 
which he hopes to deal with that object of enquiry? 
2) Method for Cosmological Study 
When Plato ~egan the Timaeus, his great discourse on 
cosmology, he declared that the most likely account should 
suffice. Why does he say this? The reason is that the 
object of his enquiry is that which is becoming and un-
stable. When one is dealing with ete~nal things one can 
expect certainty. But when the words one speaks: 
• • • express only the copy or likeness and 
not the eternal things themselves, they need 
only be likely and analogous to the real 
words. As being is to becoming, so is truth 
libid., P• 226. 
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to belief. If then, Soerates, amid the many 
opinions about the gods and the generation 
of the universe, we are not able to give 
notions which are altogether and in every 
respe~t exact and consistent with one another, 
do not be surprised. Enough., if we adduce 
probabilities as likely as any others; for we 
must remember that I who am the speaker, and 
you who are the judges, are only mortal men, 
and we ought to accept the tale which is 
probable and enquire no further.l 
From this statement it is apparent that the object of 
Plato's cosmological enquiry is actual objects or like~ 
nesses, the second part of the first division of the 
objects of possible enquiry. The .problem for Plato is to 
account for the order he finds in this realm. What method 
is best suited for this field of enquiry and for finding 
an answer to this problem? 
The part of the dialectical method named "intelli-
gible hypothesis;~' used by Plato in Phaedo, 100; in 
Symposium, 209-210; and· in Republic, 511 to advance to the 
first principle and then down through the hierarehy of 
Forms, is unavailable to the study of becoming and ehang-
ing events. It is useful ~only for attaining knowledge of 
the unchanging Forms, of the first principle of the 
universe. 
The methods of synthesis and divisiqn are also appli-
cable only to a study of the intelligible realm. In 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 13. 
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Plato's Late Period he begins an intensive study ef the 
Forms and their relati0n to one another. These methods 
used in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Philebus, and Statesman are 
employed together. Synthesis is well delineated in 
SoEhist, 253D. Plato says that "the man who can do that 
(divide according to kinds, not taking the same Form for a 
different one or a different one for the same) discerns 
clearly~ Form everywhere extended throughout many, where 
each one lies apart, and many Forms, different from one 
1 
another, embraced from without by one Form." Synthesis is 
the intuiting of a generic Form which will include within 
it many other Forms. The generic Form is, thus, a complex 
unity. Having collected the Forms under one generic Form 
the dialectician is ready to begin division. Plato, in 
Sophist, 253D also outlines what he means by division. He 
says that division is "one Form connected in a unity through 
many wholes, and many Ferms, entirely marked off.n2 By 
this method Plato sought to bring "to light all the dif-
ferences that distinguish the forms.n3 Division would 
-
seem to terminate only in the species of Form in which no 
complexity c1;1.n be found, i.e., it is "entirely marked off.'/+ 
lcornford, Theory of Knowledge, pp. 266-267. 
2Ibid., p. 263. 3rbid., p. 267. 
4Ibid., p. 263. 
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If the methods of synthesis, division and intelligible 
b 
hypothesis in the realm of the Forms are not applicable 
to that realm of discourse called the phenomenal world, 
what methods are applicable? Will either intelligible 
hypothesis in the realm of mathematical objects or sensible 
hypothesis enable him to acc0mplish his purposes? 
In Timaeus, 29 Plato gives a definite clue to the 
method he will employ in his cosmological studies. There 
he points out that the account of the structure of the 
world will be only probable, possibly inconsistent in many 
places, and only trlikely and analogous to the real words.nl 
If Plato is serious when he speaks about likely and 
possible inconsistencies, and words expressing the phenom-
enal world being only analogous to words expressing the 
real world, then one can discount the method of intel-
ligible hypothesis in the realm of mathematical objects. 
Though this method leads one to no certain knowledge it 
does demand consistency among its hypothes~s and in the 
reasoning from hypotheses to conclusions. Furthermore, 
its primary concern is with unchanging objects wh~ch are 
one step removed from the sensible world. How could it 
also be concerned with objects which ch·ange, become and 
decay? But plato is seeking to give a likely account. 
0 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 13. 
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It is with giving a probable, a likely accoun~ of the 
sensible world that Plato is primarily concerned in his 
revised cosmology. Plato does not consider the object 
of his enquiry as being the third part of the divided 
line. On the contrary, it is the lower division, the 
realm of sensible objects. 1 Thus, the method of 
intelligible hypothesis in the realm of mathematical 
objects is not useful in the realm of sensible objects. 
The object of cosmological enquiry is the realm of 
appearance. Being the realm of becoming and change, it 
cannot be dealt with either by intelligible hypothesis, 
division or synthesis. The approach Plato does take to 
lsee Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmolo,~·(London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1937 , pp. 28, 
29; John Burnet, Greek Philosophy (London: Macmillan and 
Go., 1914), p. 340. Both take the view advanced above. 
Raphael Demos, The.Philosophy of Plato (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons;-I939), p. 27,-suggests that the cosmology 
of the Timaeus "belongs to the third segment of the divided 
line, which is understanding (dianoia)." Paul Elmer More, 
Platonism (3rd ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1931), p. 237, basically agrees with Demos. More contends 
that science for Plato is the.making of mathematical 
assumptions and reasoning from them down to the lawless 
unknowable flux of necessity •. In the lower levels of the 
chain of reasoning the laws become less rigorous and be-
come probable and likely. More seems to overlook the 
demarcation between the operation of the mind when dealing 
with unchanging mathematical objects and when dealing 
. with changing sensible objects. Plato is interested in de-
termining the categories of the realm of becoming and 
employing them to answer the difficulties he faces. 
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this realm is through the most likely hypoth?sis. What is 
a probable hypothesis and what is its work? 
A probable hypothesis is an instrument useful for ar-
riving at the most coherent explanation of the field of 
appearance. It is a guess, an assumption which is put 
forth as an explanatory hypothesis. If it is successful 
in its allowing the most coherent account of movement in 
the appearances toward what is best then the hypothesis 
will be maintained. The work of the probable hypothesis, 
then, is "'to save the appearance', that is to function 
as a Synoptic world hypothesis which does full justice 
to the whole of the ascertained tfactst.n~ When appear-
ances become known which are not explicable by the ac-
cepted probable hypothesis then the hypothesis must be 
modified. Though he says that it is impossible because 
of the nature of the subject matter to reach any finality 
in the understanding of physical nature, Plato contends 
that "it is fitting that we should, in these matters, 
accept the likely story and look for nothing further.n2 
Thus, the job of the probable hypothesis is to allow the 
most synoptic and coherent account for movement toward 
what is best in sensible objects. With this method 
lA. E. ~ylor, Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 00. · 
2plato's Timaeus, trans. F. M. Cornford (New York: 
The Liberal Arts Press, 1959), p. 18. 
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of synoptic hypothesis Plato attempts to account for the 
presence of order in the appearances, i.e., to work out a 
revised cosmology. 
4. The Nature of God's Creative Activity in the 
Revised Cosmology 
Beset by basic difficulties in this world-view and 
armed with the method of synoptic hypothesis, Plato begins 
to deal with the realm of appearances for the purpose of re-
constructing his cosmological schema. The result of his 
study is the hypothesis of creation. Plato asks this 
hypothesis to supply much needed answers to his metaphysical 
problems. In order to understand how the hypothesis of 
creation functions in Plato's revised system, the nature of 
creation will be considered. 
In the Philebus and the Timaeus, Plato specifies the 
nature of the creative activity of God. In each of these 
dialogues, categories of the realm of becoming are develop-
ed. These categories constitute the conditions for the 
possibility of God's creative work and the subsequent 
structure in the cosmos. Through an analysis of these 
categories the c0nditions for the possibility of God's 
creative activity will be clear. 
1) Pattern 
That to which God looks for a principle of .order as 
he introduces order into the Receptacle is the eternal 
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model. What does Plato mean by this model and what is its 
ontological status? First, what does Plato mean by the 
Pattern which God envisages as he persuades the Receptacle? 
A. The Meaning 2! the Pattern -- In the Timaeus 
Plato says that the Pattern which God envisages as he 
creates the cosmos is eternal (29A); unchanging (28C); 
"comprehensible,by rational discourse and understanding" 
(29N;l self-existent, complete, needing nothing else but 
itself to account for its own existence (30D); a unity in-
cluding all other patterns (30C). Regarding the last 
characteristic, Taylor says that "this amounts to saying 
in pictorial phrase that the model or plan which is always 
being realized but never is finally realized in the visible 
world is the complete system of the Forms.n2 Furthermore, 
the model is the principle of individuation, regularity, 
order and structure in the visible world.3 It is because 
of the Pattern, the "Living Creature", that the Creator is 
able to introduce these characteristics into the 
Receptacle. (Timaeus, 30C-D.) 
What Plato says in the metaphysical passages in the 
Philebus concerning the Limit is much the same as that in 
the Timaeus concerning the Pattern. Plato clearly states 
that he means by Limit ''the class of the equal and the 
lrbid., p. 17. 2Taylor, Timaeus, p. 80. 
3nemos, Philosophy of Plato, P• 4. 
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double, and any class which puts an end to difference and 
opposition, and by introducing number creates harmony and 
proportion among the different elements."1 The Limit is 
that which allows the introduction of c:>rder, harmony, and 
proportion into the flux of the infinite. That is, in 
terms of this principle the cause is able to realize, how-
ever imperfectly, individuals, differentiations among 
individuals, similarities among individuals, harmony and 
proportion among particulars. (Philebus, 25-26.} The 
Limit is th~t principle which unifies all of the Ideas. 
Demos says that "in this sense, the Limit represents a 
conception of greater generality than the Pattern.n2 
In summary, then, the hypothesis of creation involves 
the category Pattern. By "Pattern" Plato means that which 
allows God to introduce into the flux of becoming individu-
ality, order, structure, harmony, and proportion. That 
which is eternal, unchanging; and self-existent is able tc:> 
function in this manner because it possesses the character-
istics of the best of all possible models for the creative 
activity of God. (Timaeus, 29A.) 
Does Plato mean by "Limit" and "Pattern11 the Forms 
about which he spoke in the Middle Period of his thought? 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 358. 
2Demos, Philc:>s0phi of Plato, p. 10. 
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Burnet and Temple contend that in the Late Period, Plato no 
longer holds to the theory of Ideas, but, having refuted 
his master's position, advances a revised system.l On the 
other hand, More and Ritchie submit that Plato does not 
give up the theory of Ideas in his later thought. 2 In the 
face of authority for each side of· the question what posi-
tion is the most intelligible?· 
In the light of the following three considerations that 
Plato held to the theory of Ideas in his.Late Period seems to 
be a coherent viewpoint. First, in Timaeus, 510-D Plato does 
use the word 11Form". In this passage Plato is considering the 
intelligibility of the doctrine of Forms, and he points out 
that they must be assumed in order to distinguish between 
intelligence and true belief. Next, in Parmenides, 135 B-C, 
after rendering a heavy attack on the theory of Ideas, 
Parmenides points out that the Forms must be maintained even 
in the face of his attack. The Forms provide the conditions 
for the possibility of discourse. They provide a permanence 
upon which all men can focus their attention and about which 
all men can carry on discourse either privately or publicly. 
lJohn Burnet, Platonism (Berkeley, California: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1928), p. 34; William Temple, 
"Plato's Vision of the Ideas," Mind, XVII (1908), 511. 
2More, Platonism, p. 254; David G. Ritchie, Plato 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1902), p. 117. 
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Finally, less is heard of the Forms in the Late Period be-
cause there Plato is doing other things. Ritchie points 
this out when he says: 
Plato has not given up the doctrine of Ideas; 
but we hear less about them, partly because 
the carrying out of his great principle of 
the manifestation of the ideas has become more 
important than the mere assertion of their 
reality. The assertion·of their reality is 
not now put forward as in itself a solution. 
We hear more of1the problem of systematic classification. 
However, Ritter sums up what seems to be the most intelli-
gent view regarding this problem when he says: 
In the Republic and in the Phaedrus, which 
followed it, Plato was still essentially a 
Socratic and pursued the Socratic trend. of 
thought. But henceforward, ~e elaborates 
his own thoughts independently. However, 
I believe that the matter is not as simple 
as this. Definite proof cannot be given 
here. Only probability can be the goal 
aimed at.2 
B. The Cosmological Status of the Pattern -- What 
is the cosmolog~cal status of the Pattern in Plato's re-
vised cosmology? The answer to t~is question will be 
approached through a discussion, first, of the relation of 
the Pattern and the Limit to the Form Good of the Republic, 
and second, the relation of the Good to the God of the 
Timaeus and the cause of the Philebus. 
libid. 
2constantin Ritter, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, 
trans. Adam Alles (New York: The Dial Press, 1933), p. 34. 
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What is the relation of the Good and the Pattern? 
In Republic, 508 Plato points out that the Good is the 
ground of the Ideas. The Ideas are in so far as they par-
take of Good. It was suggested above that Plato did not 
revoke the theory of Ideas in his Late Period. On the 
contrary, he still held to the theory, but in this period 
of his thought he was concerned with other studies. If 
this is the case, then, it can be inferred that by Pattern 
Plato means the whole system of Ideas, i.e., the Good and . 
the hierarchical arrangement of Forms under it. 
One of the thorniest problems in Platonic studies 
arises at the point of rendering coherent the relation be-
tween the Good in Republic, vi. and the Demiurgos of the 
Timaeus. In Republi~, vi. the cause of all things' being 
and being known is the Good. It is the ground of all 
order in the realm of becoming. In the Timaeus the cause 
of all order in the world of appearance is the Demiurgos. 
What is the relation between the Good and the Demiurgos? 
Four alternatives are possible: (1) the Good is dependent 
on the Demiurgos, (2) the Demiurgos is dependent on the 
Good, (3) the Good and the Demiurgos are the same, and 
(4) the Good and the Demiurgos are two distinct principles 
in Plato's thought, neither dependent on the other. 
The first alternative is that the Good is dependent 
on the Demiurgos for its being. Two passages in the 
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dialogues give some basis for this theory. In Republic, 597 
Plato says that God is the creator of the "ideal bed." Al-
so, in Philebus, 28D Plato says that the "assertion, that 
mind orders all things, is worthy of the a~pect of the 
world, and ef the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars 
and of the whole circle of the heavens •1' 1 Again, in 
Philebus, 30 Plato asks, trBut in the divine nature of Zeus, 
would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a 
king, because there is in him the power. of cause?"2 The 
force of the argument of these passages comes out in the 
notion that God created the forms and orders all things 
wisely. But is this what Plato means by these statements? 
And what are the implications for Plato's metaphysical 
system if one accepts this viewpoint? 
That Plato does not mean that God created the Ideas 
is attested to by at least three considerations. First, in 
Republic, 596 Plato says of the maker of either a bed or a 
table, ttand the maker of either of them makes a bed or he 
makes a table for our use, in accordance with the ideas 
• • • but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how 
could he?u3 Second, in Republic, 597 Plato is speaking 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 361. 
2Ibid., p •. 363. 
3Jowett, Dialogues, I, 853. 
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about the work of the human painter and craftsman. The 
painter is removed from reality one more step than is the 
craftsman. The latter forms the bed from a direct apprehen-
sion of the Iciea Badness. The former, however, paints a 
bed not after the Idea Bedness but after the bed created 
by the artisan. Thus, there are three beds: the Ideal 
bed, the bed made by the artisan, and the one made by the 
painter. For the sake of symmetry, Plato says that God 
created the Ideal Bed. Thus, Plato is not speaking in a 
strictly philosophical manner about the origin of the 
Ideas but brings in the notion of God's creating the Ideas 
as a literary device for the sake of ~ymmetry.l Finally, 
the contention that God created the Ideas does not agree 
with such passages as S~posium, 211 and Phaedo, 100 in 
which Plato argues for the absoluteness .and eternality of 
the Ideas. How could that which is dependent be absolute? 
That Plato held to this alternative is highly improbabl~. 
It does too much violence to the heart of Plato's thought. 
A second alternative is that God is dependent on the 
Good for his being. 2 Two doctrines in Plato's thought give 
this alternative its basis. The first is the teaching in 
lEduard Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1888T; p:-245. 
2culbert G. Rutenbe~, The Doctrine of the Imitation 
of God in Plato (New York: King's Crown Pr~ss; 1946), 
p. 34. -
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Republic, 508 that the Good is the ground of the being of 
the Ideas, and "is not the same thing as being, but eveR 
beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.ul This 
means that everything is dependent for its order and being 
on the Good. If the Forms are dependent on the Good for 
their being, and the appearances on the Forms for their 
order, then everything is dependent on the Good for its 
being and its order. The second teaching is Platots con-
tention that God is able to bring order and goodness into 
the realm of becoming because he contemplates the Forms 
and they regulate his work. (Philebus, 30; Timaeus, 29.) 
The condition for the possibility of God's bringing order 
into the realm of becoming is the Good. The force of this 
argument is that since all being and the grounds for order 
I 
in appearance are dependent on the Good then God must also 
be dependent on the Good for his being. 
Though this alternative .is more plausible than the 
former, it presents serious difficulties for an honest in-
terpretation of Plato's thought. The primary problem with 
this view is that ~t does not take adequate eognizance of 
the differences between the doctrine of cause in the 
Republic and in the Timaeus and Philebus. The Republic 
presents the Good as the final cause of all becoming. 
lFrancis M. C0rnford, From Religion to Philosophy 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), p. 220. 
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Through becoming's participation in the Ideas becoming is 
ordered. However, Plato, being dissatisfied with this 
doctrine of causality because it does not account for the 
initiation of the participation of becoming in being, 
develops in his Late Period a doctrine of efficient cause 
-- God in the Timaeus and cause in the Philebus. The cause 
in the Republic is a static, unmoving, absolute, formal one 
toward which appearances move. However, the cause in the 
Timaeus is dynamic cause which orders becoming in terms of 
the realm of the absolute and the unchanging. In what 
sense is the unmoving cause the ground of the moving cause? 
Plato gives us no clue. Furthermore, Plato nowhere attri-
butes reason to the Ideas or to the ~ood. However, the 
Demiurgos is mind. (Timaeus, 29; Philebu~, 28.) If the 
Demiurgos, being mind, is dependent on the Good, being non-
mental, in what sense is this the case? Again, Plato is 
silent. Thus, for the~e two reasons this alternative is 
inadequate. What is the third alternative? 
The contention that God an~ the Good are the same is 
1 
advanced by some scholars. Those holding this alternative 
generally base their position on passages from the Timaeus, 
the Republic, the Laws and the Philebus. Underlying this 
lThis view is held by "Zeller, Jowett, Adam, Lovejoy, 
Lodge, Jaeger, Hardie, Ritter, Wilamowitz, Robin, 
Festugiere, Friedlander, Dies," Cocker, Ritchie, Moore and 
Boodin. Rutenber, Imitation of God, p. 8. 
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contention is the desire to find unity in Plato's thought. 
Lovejoy speaks representatively when he says: 
But if we are to assume that the doctrine of 
this dialogue is at all reconcilable with 
that of the Republic. -- to which the Timaeus 
is presented as a sort of supplement -- the . 
details of the myth, and most of the character-
istics and activities ascribed to the Demiurgus, 
cannot be taken literally; nor have they been 
so taken by most ancient and modern followers 
of Plato. In the Republic the ground and source. 
of all being, we have seen, is the Idea of the 
Good itself; and it has therefore been held by 
many interpreters that the Creator who figures 
in the Timaeus is simply a poetic personifica-
tion of that Idea, or -- as the Neoplatonists 
construed it -- an emanation, or subordinate 
divinity, through which the world-generative 
function of the Absolute and Perfect One was 
exercised. More probable than either is the 
view that the two originally distinct strains 
in Plato's thought are here fused, and the 
resultant conception tien given a largely 
figurative expression. 
~he principle of unity to which these scholars turn is the 
Good as developed in the Republic. What Lovejpy suggests, 
Ritchie makes emphatic. The central doctrine of Plato's 
work is the Good. Ritchie says: 
-
There can be little doubt that book v.- vii. 
of the Republic gives us Plato's most accurate 
statement of what may be called his middle 
periodt and they were probably written later 
than any of the other books -- perhaps later 
even than the tenth book, and very shortly be-
fore his sixtieth year (368 B.C.). In these 
books "the Idea of the Good u occupies a ;:· , · 
lAuthor o. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: The 
Study of the History of An Idea (New York: Harper and 
Brothers Co., 1960), P7 48; cf. Zeller, Older Academy, 
p .. 285. 
38 
supreme position above all the others. It is 
the ultimate unity and explanation of all 
knowledge, and it is the source pf all knowing 
and of all being, and higher even than being 
itself (Republic vi, 509B). It is Platots 
philosopfiical expression f~r the one ultimate 
principle of the universe. 
On the basis of a desire to find unity in Plato's 
thought and of a principle around which to unify his system, 
those holding that God and the Good are the same, advance 
the following arguments: there are definite similarities 
between the God of the Timaeus and.the Good of. the Republic 
which suggest that they are identical. Further, at one 
place in his writings, Plato does in fact, identify them. 
Finally, in the light of the weaknesses of the alternative 
positions, it is unavoidable to identify them. 
At least six similarities between the Good and God 
can be indicated. Both are hard to describe. (Timaeus, 
28C; Republic, 532C.) Both are called the best·of all 
causes. (.Timaeus, 29A; Republic, 532C.) Each is called 
the creator of the universe. (Timaeus, 28C; Republic, 
509B.) They are called the cause of all good in the world. 
(Timaeus, 68E; Republic 517C.) In Laws, 716C~ God is said 
to be the measure of all things; the same is attributed to 
the Good in Philebus, 64E. Finally, in Republic, x. God 
is said to be the creator of the Forms, and in Republic, 
vi. the Good is placed above the Forms and called the 
lRitehie, Plato, p. 97. 
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creator of the F.orms. Not only are there similarities be-
tween the Good and God, but also Plato says in Philebus, 22 
that they are the same. The argument is bolstered even 
more by a statement from Sophist, 2~9 in which Plato asks 
how would it be possible trto believe that motion and life 
and soul and mind are not present with perfect being. Can 
we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists 
in awful unmeaningness and everlasting fixture?"1 Finally, 
it is impossible to avoid completely identifying them. 
Gomperz says: 
If the Demiurge were not identical with the 
idea of the good, he would necessarily 
participate in it, or be copied from it; he 
would therefore occupy a lower position than 
that idea, which is contrary to his strongly 
emphasized rank as Supreme Deity. The com-
plete identification of the Demiurge with the 
idea of the good thus seems unavoidable.2 
What can be said for this position? It provides a 
central principle around which to organize Plato's thought. 
It is in keeping with the overall Platonic distinction be-
tween the realm of Forms and the realm of becoming. It 
allows for a final cause and an efficient cause. This 
theory would also. be one way of saving Plato from a 
pluralism. But, does it do violence to the tenor of Plato's 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 257. 
2Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (2 vols.; London: 
John Murray, 1913), II, 211-212. 
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thought to seek to find too much unity in it? This leads to 
the fourth alternative, 'that the Good and God are not neces-
sarily to be identified. In light of this alternative the 
weaknesses of the third possible position will become clear. 
Those1 submitting that God and the Good are not the 
same for Plato base their position on at least five argu-
ments. First, Plato is anti-monistic in tendency. Further, 
he never equates God and the Good except in one buried 
comment. (Philebus, 22.) Next, the identification destro~ 
the distinction between the Forms and life, reason, and 
soul. Finally, it destroys the doctrine of the self-
subsistency of the Forms. 
Demos contends that Plato is anti-monistic in the 
tendency of this thought. He says: 
To the writer it seems that Plato's whole bent 
is anti-monistic; Plato's mind i~-sensitive t0 
the complexity of the cosmos as disclosing a 
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plurality of phases. The world is a manifold • 
which cannot be reduced to any one category. 
In the ultimate resort there remain the factor 
of activity and that of pattern. They are co-
ordinate; we can maintain neither that God is 
an image of the forms, nor that the forms are 
ideas in the mind of God. This is the sense 
in which they are mutually independent. But 
though irreducible each to the other, they may 
both be regarded as abstractions from one ulti-
mate e0mplex fact of patterned activity.2 
lThis view is held by "Shorey, Bovet, Cornford, Demos, 
Grube, More, Raeder, Solmsen, Stewart, Taylor and Burnet."' 
Rutenber, Imitation of God, p. 10. 
2nemos, Philosophy of Plato, PPo 123-124. 
This belief is enforced by the observation that Plato never 
equates God and the Good except in one buried comment in 
Philebus, 22. Gilson, in a mood of exasperation, says: 
Yet, when all is said, the faet remains that 
Plato himself has never called the Good a god. 
To persuade his historians that since Plato 
himself does not say that the Good is a god we 
had better not make him say it would be a 
practically desperate undertaking •••• It 
should be permitted, however, to suggest that 
if Plato has never said that the Idea of Good 
is a god, the reason for it might be that he 
never thought of it as a god. And why, after 
all, should an Idea be considered as· a god? 
An Idea is no person; it is not everi a soul; 
at best'it is an intelligible cause, much 
less a person than a thing.l 
Gilson is followed in this attitude by Taylor, Hartshorne 
and Reese. 2 To identify God and the Good tends to destroy 
the distinction between theology and philosophy. More 
argues: 
It makes no great difference whether the 
terminology adopted to such an abstract 
Unity assumes a theological or a philosophical 
cast; in either case the practical discrimina-
tions of philosophy and theology and mythology 
are engulfed in the abyss of the absolute. I 
cannot see how the clear distinction between the 
Demiurge and the Ideal pattern in the Timaeus 
can be lost or glossed3over without emasculating the religion of Plato. 
lEtienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1942), p.-zo. 
2Taylor, Plato, p. 442; Charles Hartshorne and William 
1. Reese, Philosophers Spea1 of God (Chicago: The Uni~er-
sity of Chicago Press, 1953 , p. 40. · 
3paul Elmer More, The ReliTion of Plato (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1928, p. 213. 
\ 
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Further, such an identif~cation would-destroy the distinc-
tion between the Forms and life, reason, and soul. Ross 
suggests a possible source of the confusion betwe,en the 
Good and God. He says: 
The view that the Idea of good isJ,: in Plato's 
thought, identical with God is to a large ex-
tent based on a passage in the Sophistes in 
which Plato has often been thought t.o ascribe 
"movement, life, soul and reason'' ·to the Ideas. 
But • • • this is a complete misunderstanding 
(though a very natural one) of that passage) 
which concludes with the. assertion that 
reality includes both that which does n0t 
change (the Ideas) 1and that which does (souls divine and human). 
Plato understands the Ideas to be limitations on God and 
independent of him. Ross says, ttWhen (in the Timaeus) 
Plato has come to assign a serious significance to God, as 
the Artificer of the universe, the Ideas are not sub-
ordinated to God, but are represented as forming an order 
which exists independently of God and which God has to 
respect.n2 Taylor argues that since God is in motion and 
the Forms are not, how can it be maintained that they are 
the same?3 Finally, the position that God and the Good 
are the same for Plato obviates the doctrine that the Forms 
exist separately and independently of anything, but 
lwilliam D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 44. --
2Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
3Alfred E. Taylor, Platonism and Its Influence 
(Boston: Marshall Jones Company, l~)~p. 103-104. 
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themselves. In Phaedo, 100; Symposium, 211A; Republic, 508; 
Timaeus, 29A; Plato speaks of the Forms being absolute and 
self-dependent. Nowhere does he say that the Forms are 
dependent upon God. On the contrary, Plato is careful to 
assert a clear distinction Between God and the Good. 1 
The positi~n that God and the Good are not the same 
is the most adequate view of the four presented. It leaves 
room for a development in Platots thought from a non-
theistic cosmic teleology to a the~stic cosmic teleology. 
When Plato advances the categories of God's creative work 
he revises his previous doctrine. This revision is ex-
pected to aid him in overcoming the difficulties he found 
in the cosmology of the Phaedo and the Republic. He de-
velops a new principle, an efficient cause, which is dis-
tinct from the Forms. Thus, Plato's revised cosmology has 
both the principle of the Good as the final cause and the 
principle of the Demiurgos as the efficient cause. Any 
teaching tending to reduce the Good to God, God to the 
Good, or to identify the Good and God tends not only to 
undercut the development in Plato's philosophy but also 
to fuse two principles which Plato kept distinct. This· 
position also recognizes Plato's doctrine that the Ideas 
lG. M. A. Grube, Plato's T.hought (Boston: Beacon 
Press," 1958), pp. 154, 163, 168. 
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are absolute and self-dependent. To identify God and the 
Good is tantamount to s~ying that the Forms are thoughts in 
the mind of God. This cannot be su~stantiated in any of 
Plato's works. To contend that the Ideas are self-subsist-
ent and at the same time are dependent is to argue un-
intelligibly. 
Further, this position allows for the distinction 
Plato makes between two elements of reality: being and 
life, reason, soul. If God and the Good are considered 
either dependent on one or the other or they are considered 
to be the same, this distinction cannot be kept at the su-
preme levels of his doctrine of being. Nowhere in Plato's 
works does he identify Ideas and souls. Also, this position 
enables one to keep distinct the categories of the Pattern 
and the Receptacle. In any sense to identify God the Good 
would lead to a breaking down of this distinction. Finall~ 
the position that God and the Good are not the same, but 
are two distinct aspects of the realm of being, allows for 
a recognition of Plato's anti-monistic tendencies. Such 
tendencies can be seen in Plato's development from the 
Middle through the Late Period in his introducing an 
efficient cause and in his clear distinction between and 
delineation of the creative categories in the Philebus and 
th~ Timaeus. 
By Pattern Plato understood the whole complex of 
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Forms arranged hierarchically under the Go0d. This category 
is the principle of limitation, order, symmetry, and pro-
portion in the cosmos. It will become clear below that be-
cause of this principle the Demiurgos is able to introduce 
into the Receptacle order, harmony, limitation, individuality. 
The status of this category in Plato's ontology is clear 
from the discussion of the relation of God to the Good. 
The Pattern is one of three categories of God's creative 
activity. Being self-dependent, it is distinct from the 
other categories and cannot be reduced to any of them. 
2) Receptacle 
The analogous conceptions of the unlimited and the 
Receptacle introduced by Plato in the Philebus and the 
Timaeus comprise the second of the categories of God's 
creative work. How does Plato arrive at this.category, and 
what does he understand Necessity and the Infinite to be 
and what is the ontological status of this creat.ive 
element? 
A. The Meaning of the Receptacle -- In Timaeus, 29D-
47E describes the work of Reason as it persuades necessity 
toward what is best. Throughout that passage two things 
were distinguished: th~ "model, intelligible and always 
unchangeably rea1n1 and the "copy of this model, which 
lcornford, Timaeus, p. 48. 
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becomes and is visible.n1 However, in an eff0rt to delin-
eate the nature of the trc0py of this model tt Plato is forced 
·to consider a third element, na form difficult and obscuretr 
to describe. 2 It is nthe Receptacle as it were, the 
nurse -- of all Becoming.n3 What Plato must consider is 
that other aspect of appearance, that which is not ordered 
and harmonious. This aspect of appearance must be con-
sidered. In Philebus, 22 Plato assumes the category of 
the Infinite in order to render an explanation of the 
cause of the goodness of the mixed life. In effect 
Necessity functions as an hypothesis in the Timaeus as the 
Infinite does in the Philebus. What does Plato mean by 
Necessity and the Infinite? 
At the outset of the passage in the Timaeus in which 
Plato deals with the meaning and work of Necessity, he 
clearly states that Necessity is neither any one of the 
four elements of the Pre-Socratic Atomists, any combination 
of the four, nor anything seeming to have some permanence. 
(Timaeus, 49 C-D.) On the contrary, the Receptacle is 
more basic than any one or all of such things. The four 
elements constantly pass one into the other. None is 
permanent, abiding, remaining constant in its nature;" and 
none can be called "this" or "that". Plato asks: 
lrbid. 
3Ibid. 
2Ibid. 
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Since, then, in this way no one of those 
things ever makes its appearance as the 
same thing, which of them can we stead-
. fastly affirm to be this -- whatever it may 
be -- and not something else, without blush-
ing for ourselves? It cannot be done; but 
by far the safest course is to speak of them 
in the following terms. Whenever we observe 
a thing perpetually changing ; • • in every 
case we should speak of fire not as tthis' 
••• but1as 'what is of such and such a quality.' 
How should one understand the four elements~ Plato 
suggests that they are best considered qualities. When-
ever a thing is observed always to be changing, such as 
fire, "in every case we should speak of it, not as 'this', 
but as 'what is of such and such a quality.rn2 Further, 
since the elements pass into one another, one is well 
advised to speak of any of them as '"that which is of a 
certain quality and has the same sort of quality as it 
perpetually recurs in·the cycle.ru3 Regarding anything 
else usually considered to have permanence, one must not 
believe that one is "pointing out some definite thing" when 
one refers to it with "the expression 'this' or tthat.tnli-
The reason for this is "they slip away and do not wait to 
be described as 'that' or 'this' or by any phrase that ex-
hibits tham as h~v:d.ng. perm~nent .being. u5 Thus, Plato 
lrbid., p. 49. 
4Ibid. 
2rbid. 
5rbid. 
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argues that the ~eceptacle cannot be understood in terms 
of either the four elements or anything else usually be-
lieved to possess some permanence. Necessity is more basic 
than any of these. 
Rather than being the composite or the individual chaP-
acter of anything ordinarily understood as permanent the Re-
ceptacle is a plastic material free from all characters. 
This means that it is void, free from all determinations. 
Being free from all determination the Receptacle is able to 
"receive in itself all kinds 1' of determinations.l The 
reason Plato cannot allow the Receptacle to be a composite 
of "thises" is this: 
If there is to be an impress presenting all 
diversities of aspect, the thing itself in 
which the impress comes to be situated, can-
not have been duly prepared unless it is free 
£rom all those characters which it is to re-
ceive from elsewhere. For if it were like any 
one of the things that come in upon it, then, 
when things of contrary or entirely.different 
nature come, in receiving them it would re-
produce them badly, intruding its own features 
alongside, Hence that which is to receive in 
itself ~11 kinds must be free from all char-
acters. 
Being plastic the Receptacle is able to remain the same 
even though it allow_s determinations to take place in it. 
The words "this" and "that" Plato reserves not for things 
commonly understood t0 have some permanence but for "that 
lrbid., p. 51. 
49 
in which all of them are always coming to be, making their 
appearance and again vanishing out of it.n1 
The character of "that in which all of them are al-
ways coming to be" Plato likens to a mass of gold out of 
which many figures are constantly being produced.2 How is 
the nature of the figures identified? The figures' nature 
is not their particularity because it is constantly chang-
ing. One would be correct in saying that gold is the 
fundamental nature of each one. That which ne.m.ains the 
same is the gold. No matter the form it assumes it is 
still gold. Likewise, Necessity, Plato says, 
must be called always the same; for it never 
departs at all from its own character; since 
it is always receiving all things, and never 
in any way whatsoever takes on any character 
that is like any of the things that enter it; 
by nature it is there as a matrix for every-
thing, changed and diyersified by the things 
that enter it, and on their acco~t it appears 
to have different qualities at different times; 
while the things that pass in and out are to 
be called copies of the eternal things, impres-
sions taken from th~m in a strange manner that 
is hard to express.J 
Other characteristics of the R~ceptacle are movement 
and spatiality. The Receptacle is constantly in an ·. ·· 
lrbid., -p. 49. 
2cornford correctly notes regarding this simile that 
"the figures are made out of gold and consist· of gold; but 
the contents of the Receptacle are not made out of it. 
This is a point where the illustration is inadequate." 
Ibid., p. 50. 
3rbid. 
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111r101M.a-ed and violent shaking motion. When describing "the 
nurse of all Becoming" Plato says, 
Because it was filled with powers that were 
neither alike nor evenly b.alanced, there was 
no equipoise in any region of it; but it was 
everywhere swayed unevenly and shaken by 
these things, and by its motion shook them 
in turn. And they, being thus moved, were 
perpetually being separated and carried in 
different directions; just as when things 
are shaken and winnowed by means of win-
nowing baskets and other instruments for 
cleaning corn, the dense and heavy things go 
one way, while the rare and light are car-
ried to another place and settle there.l 
By "motion" Plato does not mean "mo~ion, or the principle 
of motion, regarded as a calculable, continuous~ operation, 
for such motion is the property of soul."2 On the contrary, 
Plato means by motion passage.3 It is the fact.or we speak 
of when we say an object is "tainted with death."4 Upon 
this indefinite stuff "God engrafts order so far as pos-
sible, and thus creates the rhythmical movement of the 
heavenly bc:>dies, of living things, of time itself.n5 Move-
ment is also the factor of novelty in things. Demos ob-
serves, 
lrbid., p. 54. By "powers" Plato means qualities 
such as the four elements: fire, earth, air, and water. 
These elements were separated into groupings of like kind 
through the violent shaking of the Receptacle. Cf. 
Timaeus 53A. 
2More, Religion of Plato, p. 215. 
3nemos, Philosophy of Plato, p. 36. 
4rbid. 5rbid. 
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It is eternal creativity issuing into particu-
larized motions, that is, impulses, lives, 
processes. Thus it is the vital force in all 
things, passive like the female principle, 
probably unconscious, inexhaustible in its 
creative power, since, while all creatures 
come to be and perish, it remains; yet inert, 
becoming creative only when activated by the 
forms.l 
Further, Plato says that the Receptacle is spatial. 
What does he mean by this? There are at least two possible 
interpretations. First, space is "a pattern of definite 
positions.n2 Second, space is "an undifferentiated extend-
edness on which definiteness" can be imposed.3 Which is the 
more cogent position when considered in terms of Pl~to~s 
writings? In Timaeus, 49E Plato argues that the things 
usually considered permanent, such as fire, earth, air, 
water, constantly pass into one another, that is, they 
change into their opposite. The words "this" and nthat" 
must be reserved· for "that in which all of them are always 
coming·to be.n4 Thus, in the light of this passage, the 
first interpretation of space is untenable. By the 
Receptacle Plato does not mean "a pattern of definite posi-
tions." However, by the same reasoning the second inter-
pretation is acceptarnle. Space is that in which the 
Demiurgos imposes "a pattern of definite positions." Demos 
libid., p. 37. 
3Ibid. 
2Ibid .. , p. 32. 
4cornford, Timaeus, p. 49. 
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notes, "Measurable space presupposes an undifferentiated 
extendedness on which definiteness has been imposed."l It 
follows from this consideration that measurable space is a 
creature like measurable time. 
By the same argument in which the two kinds of space 
were differentiated and in which measurable space was under-
stood to presuppose "an undifferentiated extendedness" it 
is possible to differentiate two kinds of time and to say 
that creaturely time presupposes "a primordial state of 
affairs on which measure has been impressed. This state 
of affairs is sheer passage.n2 Demos follows the pre-
ceding chain of reasoning to support the hypothesis rrthat 
the receptacle is not simply space, but space-time.n3 
Thus, not only is the Receptacle the principle of move-
ment and spatiality, but also it can be conceived as the 
space-time continuum in which measurable space and measur-
able time are realized. 
In summary, the Receptacle in the Timaeus is under-
stood by Plato not only as being spatial and in motion, 
but also as being ninvisible and characterless, all-
receiving, partaking in some very puzzling.way of ~e 
intelligible and very hard to apprehend. "4 
lnemos, Philosophy of Plato, p. 32. 2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 4cornford, Timaeus, pp. 51-2. 
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In the Philebus Plato develops the doctrine of the 
Infinite. By the Infinite Plato means a qualitative in-
determinateness •. Plato asks in Philebus, 24, 
When you speak of hotter and co,lder, can you 
conceive any limit in those qualities? Does 
not the more and less, which dwells in their 
very nature, prevent their having any end? 
for if they had an end, the more and less would 
themselves have an end •••• Ever ••• into 
the hotter and the colder there enters a more 
and a less. • • • Then, says the argument, 
there is never any end of them, and being end-
less they must also be infinite.l 
That which has the character of limitless is to be classed 
under the Infinite. The Infinite is also that into which 
number is introduced. (Philebus, 25.) It is the realm of 
pure potentiality. Finally, it is that in terms of which 
the cause must work. (Philebus, 25.) Thus it sets limita-
tions on the work of the cause. 
Are the doctrines of the Infinite and the Receptacle 
analogous? More and Demos.think that they .are. 2 That 
they are is attested to by comparing'Philebus, 25 with 
Timaeus, 51. In Philebus, 25 Plato speaks of the Infinite 
as being generic to all indeterminate qualities. It can-
not be reduced to any one character or to the compqsite 
qualities; it has "one nature ••• set upon it.n3 Being 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 356. 
2More, Platonism, p. 228; Demos, Philosophy of 
Plato, p~ 9. 
3Jowett, Dialogues II, 257. 
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indefinite the Infinite is that into which Limit is in-
troduced. (Philebus, 25.) In Timaeus, 51 A-B Plato says 
that the Receptacle c.an be called na nature visible and 
characterless, all-receiving, partaking in some very 
puzzling way of the intelligible and very hard to 
l 
apprehend." Let it be agreed then that the Infinite and · 
the Receptacle are essentially the same notion and that 
for sake of clarity they be called ttReceptacle". 
B. The Cosmological Status of the Receptacle 
What is the\status of the Receptacle in Plato's "Cosmological 
system? Two alternatives have been presented by various 
scholars regarding the place of the Receptacle in Platots 
cosmology. The first is that the Receptacle is dependent 
on God, and the second is that it is set over against the 
Forms and has independent status. Each possibility will 
be briefly discussed. 
Ritter argues that the ~eceptacle.is dependent on 
God. 2 Following from his contention that the G.bdd and the 
Demiurgos are one and the same is the contention that 
everything is dependent on the Good. Ritter's argument 
takes two directions. First, he advances the argument 
that if God is being and everything is dependent on being. 
for its existence then the Receptacle, if it is in any 
lcornford, Timaeus, pp. 51-52. 
2Ritter, Plato's Philosophy, p. 377. 
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sensetOobav~ a meaningful ontological status, must like-
wise depend on God. The great Platonic scholar states, 
An understanding which grasped everyth~ng at 
one glance and apprehended the whole universe 
(this is physically impossible for our sense-
perception) in its unlimited perfection would 
also deduce material Being and its principle 
from God; it would see in this physical Being 
the realization of a divine purpose and so 
would eliminate its apparent defect; it would 
also see that space and time are part of the 
beauty and the perfection of the world and 
that it is, in fact, impossible to conceiye a 
more perfect world than the existing one. 
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It is but a short step to Ritter's second line of reasoning. 
He advances the proposition that "God cannot have conflict-
ing and contradictory purposes~·t! 2 Following from .this pre-
supposition, Ritter argues, 
Nature is determined by a purpose,. and in 
this determination it cannot at the same 
time serve an entirely different purpose. 
If and in so far as the one purpose is 
limited or excluded by the divinely-posited 
realization of some other purpose, it is 
only the confused, defective human concep-
tion which still insists on thinking of and justifying this purpose as part of God's 
plan.3 
What Plato means, then, according to Ritter, when Necessity 
is spoken of as interfering with and hindering the creative 
and purposive activity of God is not that there actually is 
a matter of factness imposing limitations on God. To coh-
tend that anything limits God is to argue with a confused 
lrbid., p. 377. 
mind and human inexactness. Nothing limits God. What 
Plato calls the Receptacle is only one category in the 
Absolute. It is the sensuous manifestation of the divine 
purpose in self-realization. 
The strength of Ritter's interpretation is also his 
weakness. That he follows through f~om the identification 
of the Good and God to the position that since everything 
.is dependent on being then the Receptacle is also dependent 
that he is consistent is admirable. Rigorous adherence 
to his demand for unity in the Platonic system, however, . 
has led him into a drastic and disastrous interpretation 
of the Receptacle. That Platq does not believe the 
Receptacle to be dependent on the Good is easily shown. 
In the Timaeus Plato constantly speaks of the Receptacle 
as that in terms of which the Demiurgos does his creative 
. 
work. (Timaeus, 30A, 4BA- 53C, 69B.) Furthermore, the 
Demiurgos is said to be limited in his work. He must 
work in cooperation with matter of factness. The Demiurgos 
realizes "good as far as possible~~l From these considera-
tions it is clear that Ritter's desire for unity in the 
Platonic body of. thought has led him to a wholesale mis-
interpretation of Plato's doctrine of the Receptacle. 
If the contention that the Rec~ptacle is contingent upon 
the Good is untenable is the alternative position tenable? 
lnemos, Philosophy of Plato, p. 43; cf. Timaeus, 
30A, 32B, 3BB. . 
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The alternative is that the Receptacle is that con-
dition under which the Demiurgos must work. This means 
that the Receptacle cannot be reduced either to God or to 
the Forms. It has a being all its own. More says: 
In its active capacity, considered not 
merely as a blank recipient of the forms of 
matter but as an ev~restless power imposing 
9ertain inevitable conditions upon creation, 
this dark substratum of existence, set over 
against and in a manner opposed to the active 
element of the divine, is called more specifi-
cally Necessity (ananke), a necessity which, 
having in itself no purpose or des~gn, being 
in fact the last irreducible resistance to 
design, is virtually synonymous with Ghance.l 
Demos, in basic agreement with More, says 
To grasp the receptacle in its full 
significance is to realize that any account 
of Plato as a rationalist is inadequate. 
The receptacle is the factor of brute fact; 
it accounts for the failure of the forms as 
causes in the worl~ of generation. In crea-
tion there is something not in accordance 
with the eternal pattern. And even to the ex-
tent that order is established, this order 
may be overthrown; laws come and go. The 
receptacle £unctions as a principle of 
entropy in nature. It is the cause of the 
perverse ~'· whereby nature disintegrates. 
Beyond a po~nt, the natural processes are 
unpredictable and contingent. Science is 
faced with objective chance and therefore is 
not science; accounts of the world can be 
no more than probable at best. Similarly, 
no exact description of an individual thing 
is poss~ble. Thus· the world is opaque to 
reason. 
lMore, Religion of Plato, p. 216. 
2nemos, Philosophy of Plato, p. 46. 
What are the advantages of this interpretation? It 
stays close to the Platonic t~t. Violence to the clear 
meaning of Plato must be avoided at all costs. This inter-
pretation allows room for the basically anti-monistic 
tendency in Plato's thought. No unity is forced on the 
Greek thinker's system where none is to be found. These 
observations highly recommend the position offered by 
More and Demos. 
Thus, the second category of God's creative activit~ 
the Receptacle, is not-being, a plastic material in which 
the Demi~rgos introduces determination, a space-time 
continuum, the principle of ttpl.urali ty in the world of 
generation) '! 1 and the "principle of relatedness among 
the many concrete things~'! 2 Further, its ontological 
status in Plato's nebulous system is that of otherness 
from the viewpoint of being. It is an independent matter-
of-factness which sets limitations on the creative activity 
of the Demiurgos. 
3) ~qd 
The third category of God's creative activity is God 
himself. How does Plato arrive at this category, what 
does he mean by God, and what is the ontological status 
of God in Plato's system? 
lrbid., p. 35. 2rbid. 
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A. Argument for God advanced }2r. Plato -- Two argu-
ments for the category "God" are these: the argument from 
design and .the arggment from change. In Timaeus, 28A -
29A Plato seeks to give an account of appearance. One of 
the central characteristics of appearance is that it is 
constantly changing. That which "becomes must needs be-
come by the agency of some cause; fo~without a Qause 
nothing can come b9 be."1 Thus, in order to account for 
the movement of appearance Plato advances the category of 
cause, and this cause he calls God. Not only is appearance 
constantly changing but also it bears the charac~eristics 
of order, pattern, and goodness. How are these traits to 
be accounted for? Earlier it was shown that the Ideas 
are necessary but insufficient causes. Thus, Plato looks 
to an efficient cause "which, by grasping the structure of 
abstract order, impresses it upon things.n2 Plato brings 
God into his system as the efficient cause to account for 
the order and structure in appearance. (Timaeus, 29A.) 
Thus, the order and tendency toward the best which Plato 
finds in the realm of becoming demands an efficient cause 
which.brings this situation into existence. Plato argues 
for the c_ategory God with the cosmological and teleological 
arguments. But what does Plato mean by God? 
lcornford, Timaeus, p. 16; cf. Philebus, 26. 
2nemos, Philosophy of Plato, p. 102. 
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B. The Meaning of God -- Th~ primary characteristic 
of God is that he is an agent, a cause. From the begin-
ning of Timaeus' discourse on physics in Timaeus, 270 
through the rest of the dialogue, Plato constantly speaks 
of God as a cause. In Laws, 896 D-E, 967A, and 897 Plato 
says that the source of movement is God. Again, in 
Philebus, 28 D-E points out that the cosmos is governed 
by a divine cause. That cause is the essential trait of 
God is evi~ent. But what is it about this cause that 
allows- it td bring about motion and order, i.e. to func-
tion as cause? 
God is able to function as the cause of change and 
order in the realm of becoming because he is divine reason. 
Thus, the second trait of God is that he is the divine 
mind. God as reason is dealt with in Plato's Late Period. 
However, ~he doctrine that God is mind is rooted in 
Plato's teaching regarding the soul. What Plato says 
about the soulsis to be found in every period of his 
thought. What is Plato's doctrine of the soul, how does 
his· concept of God as reason arise from the soul· doctrine, 
and what does Plato mean when he says that God is mind? 
The earliest reference to the soul as a cause is in 
the Cratylus, a dialogue of the Socratic Period. Here 
Plato makes a reference to the soul as the source of 
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m0vement and life in the body. (Cratylus, 400.) The soul 
is also called "the cr>rdering and containing principle of 
all things.nl Here is the beginning of Plato's late 
doctrine that God like a human soul causes change and 
brings about order in the realm of appearances. 
In the Middle Period Plato despairs of soul as an 
effective ontol<r>gical cause. (Phaedo, 97.) Nevertheless, 
in the ReEublic one finds Plato unable completely to re-
mcr>ve from h~s thought the notion of God as an efficient 
cause. In Republic, 507 Plato speaks of "the artificer of 
the senses. u2 A divine craftsman who is said to have made· 
all things is spoken of in Republic, 596. Further, in 
ReEublic, 530 Plato speaks of a creator having formed the 
"heaven and the things in the heaven • • • in the llJ.OSt 
perfect manner.n3 Finally God is said to have created the 
Form Bed. (Republic, 530.) Thus, even though Plato did 
not develop the doctrine of efficient causality in the 
Middle Period but instead resorted to the Forms as a 
sufficient explanation for change and order in the appear-
ances, the doctrine seems to be present in his thinking.4 
In his Late Period Plato fully develops ·a doctrine 
of God as the cause of change and order in the cosmos. 
lJowett, Dialcr>gues, I, 190. 
2Ibid., p. 760. 3Ibid., P• 789. 
4Ross, Theory of Ideas, p. 236. 
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Plato discusses the nature of the soul in Phaedrus, 245. 
First, he distinguishes the immortal soul -- "that which 
moves itselflf -- from that which is m0rtal -- "that which, 
though it moves something at one time, may yet have its 
motion transmitted to it by another at another time.n1 
Then, he draws the logical conclusion. If the soul is 
self-moving then it is the first cause of all movement. 
Plato argues in this way, 
Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that 
which is begotten has a beginning; but the 
beginning is begotten of nothing, for if it 
were begotten of something, then the be-
gotten would not come from a beginning. But 
if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; 
for if beginning were destroyed, there could 
be no beginning out of anything, nor anything 
out of a beginning; and all things must have 
a beginning. And therefore the self-moving 
is the beginning of motion; and this can 
neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the 
whole heavens and all creation would collapse 
and stand2still, and never again have motion or birth.--
From the contention that the soul, being self-moved is the 
source of all movement, it is· a short step to the doctrine-
of the reality of "change, life, soul, understandingn found 
in Sophist, 249.~ The soul is not only self-moved and real 
lplato, Phaedrus, trans. w. c. Helmbold and W. G. 
Rabinowitz (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), 
P• 27. 
2Jowett, Dialogues, I, 250. 
3Ross, Theory of Ideas, p. 237. 
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but also it "participates in birth.n1 This means that the 
s0ul is a derived existent "whose being depends on something 
more ultimate.n2 Being contingent do~s r1:ot necessarily 
mean that the soul is something created in time. The type 
of contingency meant is ontological dependence. Thus, 
though the soul is the self-moved cause, and real, it is de-
pendent upon something greater than itself for its existence. 
Finally, the soul has capacity for ordering itself. 
This capacity is called reason. Through the rational 
function of the soul the soul not only apprehends the 
Forms and thus the soul's highest good but also it intro-
duces order into the soul by ordering the 0ther aspects 
of the soul according to the highest good of each aspect 
and of the soul as a whole. (Republic, 434-440; and 
Phaedrus, 253-254.) In the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Timaeus 
Plato develops the nature of the soul. In the Philebus, 
Timaeus, and Laws Plato works out the implications of the 
doctrine of the soul for the doctrine of cosmic causality. 
During the Late Period of his thought Plato reworks 
his cosmology. Realizing that if he is to account for the 
initiation of movement and order in the appearances and to 
specify the nature of the relation of being and becoming 
he must develop a doctrine of efficient causality, he 
lR. Hackworth, "Plato's Theism," Classical Quarterly, 
XXX (Jan., 1936), 4-9. 
2Ibid; cf. Timaeus, 36. 
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turns to the doctrine of the soul and works out its meta-
physical implications. In the soul Plato finds two 
capacities which provide a basis for his cosmological 
speculations: self-movement and reason. 
In Philebus, 28 Plato suggests that the cosmos in the 
work of mind rather than the result of change.1 trEvery-
thing which comes into being, of necessity comes into being 
through a cause,n2 and this cause is mind. Plato also 
says that mind is that which introduces order, proportion, 
symmetry into the Infinite. (Philebus, 28, 30.) Thus, 
mind is the cause not only of movement but also of order 
in the cosmos. 
In Timaeus, 47E - 48A Plato speaks of Reason intro-
ducing into the Receptacle order and arrangement. He 
advances the creative category of God to account not only 
for motion but also for order in the cosmos. What iti his 
own experience is self-moyed and orders? The only thing 
is the soul. Thus, Plato develops the doctrine .of the soul 
to explain on a cosmic scale the motion and order in the 
realm of becoming. (Timaeus, 28, 47E- 48A.) · Both motion 
and order in the universe can be attributed to the activity 
of divine reason. 
The development of the doctrine of the soul in its 
metaphysical implications is clearer in the Laws than in 
lJowett, Dialogues, II, 361. 2Ibid., p. 359. 
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either th·e Philebus or the Timaeus. Having reviewed ten 
types of motion in Laws, 893-B94, Plato concludes that the 
superior one is that which is capable of self-movement. 
Being capable of self-movement, spontaneous motion is the 
source of all motion and is the first in a series of 
motions. What is the essence of the soul if not the 
capacity for self-movement? Being the source of all 
.motion the soul is prio~ to all' things, even the body. 
(Laws, 896.) If the soul is prior to and the cause of all 
things it must be "the cause of good and evil, base and 
honorable, just and unjust."1 (Laws, 896.) The soul must 
also be the initial cause of the order in all mov~ng 
things including the heavens. (Laws, 896.) There is, 
then, a world soul which is the first cause of order in 
the heavens and in the earth. When the world soul orders 
"all things rightly to their happiness" she has received 
this ability from "the divine mind, '! "but when she is the 
companion of folly, she does the very contrary of all 
this.n2 
What is this order like when "the best soul takes 
care of the world and guides it along the good path"?3 It 
is like "the movement and revolution and calculation of 
mind, and proceeds by kindred lawS!'"4 Thus, there is in 
libid., p. 638. 
4Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 639. 
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the ~ not only a world soul but also a divine mind. 
Upon the cosmic mind the world soul depends not only for 
its capacity to move the earth and the heavens but also 
to order them for the best. 
In the doctrine of the soul Plato finds a conception 
which, when employed on a cosmic scale, enables him to 
account for the initiation of motion and order in the 
realm of becoming. However, one difficulty is present 
in his development of the soul doctrine. In Laws, 897 
Plato asks, "Of what nature is the movement of mind?"l 
In the Phaedrus and Sophist Plato makes it quite clear 
that the soul is that which initiates motion and change. 
In none of these dialogues does Plato disGuss the capacity 
of mind apart from soul to initiate change. But in the 
Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws Plato says that mind is the 
supreme cause initiating movement and introducing order 
into the world. How mind can function in this manner 
Plato nowhere discusses. It is no help to turn to 
Philebus, 30. There Plato speaks about "the universe, 
not of its creator or cause, of that which has ~' not 
of that which is ~~'1 2 That Plato speaks of a cosmic 
mind and nowhere connects it with a soul brings out a 
libid. 
2Hackforth, Classical Quarterly, p. 7. 
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further difficulty. How can mind exist without a soul? 
Plato himself says that they cannot exist apart. 
(Philebus, 30.). Nevertheless, Plato calls the cause of 
the mixture of the Infinite and finite a mind, and he 
fails to show how this mind can function as a cause. 
Underlying this problem is Platots teaching that the soul 
is dependent upon something greater than itself for its 
own existence. (Laws, 897, 904.) God, who is not de-
pendent upon anything else for his own being, thus, can-
not be a soul. The soul is subject to generation, but 
God is not. Thus, Plato is unable to attribute to God a 
soul. 
Plato builds his doctrine of God as reason and first 
cause upon the idea of the self-movement and ordering 
power of the soul. God is able to introduce order into 
the Receptacle because he is mind. Plato says that God 
is also the first cause of the universe. But, in what 
sense God, being mind, can function as a principle of 
movement is not a topic with which Plato deals in his 
writings. 
Plato conceives God as being the first cause of the 
universe and the ordering principle in the cosmos. The 
God of Plato is also a limited God. God is not the supreme 
principle of the universe. Rather, he is one of three 
68 
such principles. In Timaeus, 48 and in Philebus, 25 - 26 
Plato makes it clear that God is a category of creative 
activity along with the Pattern and the Receptacle. God 
is not "to be equated with the one God of the Bible, who 
created out of nothing~'!l On the contrary God persuades 
the Receptacle to take on definiteness which is ordered 
for the best. (Timaeus, 4&) The success of God in this 
·venture is clearly determined by his use of the capacity 
of the elements wlith which he works. Thus, God is not 
greater than either the Pattern or the Receptacle, He is 
one of three ontological factons necessary to account for 
the world of becoming. 
Though God is one of the categories of creative 
activity he is not dependent on anything else for his 
existence. On th~ contrary Plato conceives of God as 
being complete within himself. He -laeks neither beauty, 
excellence, nor perfection. (~imaeus, 29E- 30A.) Plato 
says that God lacks nothing. God 
was good; and in the good no jealousy in any 
matter can ever ar~se. So, being without jealousy, he desired that all things should 
come as near as possible to being like him-
self.2 
Furthermore, God is timeless. Being external to the 
· world of becoming, God is not subject to the change which 
lcornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 35. 
2cornford, Timaeus, p. 19. 
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is measured by time. In fact Plato said that God created 
time·. {Timaeus, 37C- 38C.) Thus, time is subject to God 
and God remains above it, timeless. 
Finally~ the God of Plato can be conceived of as a 
person. According to More the two essential character-
istics of personality are self-consciousness and self-
determination.1 A perusal of Laws, X and Timaeus, 29E, 
30A, 41A -B will indicate that Plato understood the 
Demiurgos to possess these two characteristics. 
What is the nature of Plato's God? He is primarily 
the principle of cause and order in the universe. God for 
Plato is limited. He is not the supreme principle of the 
universe. His limitation is seen also in that he must 
use the materials available to him in accomplishing his 
purposes. The nature of these factors and his handling 
of them determine the success of his ordering activity. 
God is also complete and self-dependent. Furthermore, 
God is timeless. Finally, being self-determined .and self-
conscious, God possesses the essential traits Df personal-
ity. If these are the characteristics of God's nature, 
what is t~e ontological status of God? 
c. The Cosmological Status of God -- The status 
God has in Plato's system can be determined through a 
lMore, Religion of Plato, p. 123. 
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discussion of three possible alternatives. The first 
alternative is that God, being mind and not a soul, is 
the mind side of the world-soul. 1 The second alternative 
is that God, being a soul and a mind, is separate and 
distinct from either the Pattern, the Receptacle or the 
created cosmos.? The third alternative is that God, 
though a mind and not a soul, is distinct from the world-
soul as well as from the Pattern and the Receptacle. 
If the first alternative is accepted then Plato is 
a pantheist. However,. this is repudiated in Laws, X. 
Furthermore, Plato says that Reason created the world-
soul. (Timaeus, 34-35.} This means that th~ universal 
reason is not dependent on the world-soul. On the con-
trary, the world-soul is dependent on God for its being. 
Thus, God is independent of the world-soul. 
To accept the second alternative is to force Plato 
into a position which would be incoherent with his doc-
trine of the nature of God. Plato says, as was indicated 
above, that the mind cannot exist without a soul and that 
the soul participates in becomi~g. (Timaeus, 30.) God, 
however, does not undergo the pangs of generation or de-
cay. Thus, soul cannot be ascribed to him. The second 
position is untenable. 
lco;nford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 197. 
2More, Religion of Plato, p. 123. 
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The final alternative is the most tenable one in the 
light of Plato's teachings regarding God, soul, Pattern 
and the Receptacle. God is a mind. He is not a sGul. 
Soul is unintelligible apart from the realm of becoming, 
and God is not subject to the realm of change. God's re-
lation to the Receptacle and to the Pattern is one of 
equality in cosmological status. His relation to the 
created world is one of creator, agent, and sustainer. 
In summary, God is an efficient cause, a mind, a 
person; he is also timeless, self-dependent, and limited. 
The place God occupies in Plato's cosmology is one of 
equality in status with the other categories of creation 
and cannot be reduced either to the Receptacle, to the 
Pattern, or to the world-soul. 
4) Summary 
Through the.method of probable hypothesis Plato 
develops three creative factors: Pattern, Receptacle, and 
God. These categories specify the nature of creation. 
They outline the structure of the hypothesis of creation. 
In order to render P.lato's cosmology complete one must 
indicate the way in which these categories function. In 
terms of the function of these categories it will become 
clear how and to what extent this revised cosmology will 
enable Plato to answer the problems of the nature and 
cause of the relation of being and becoming. How do the 
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categories of creation function in Plato's revised 
cosmology? 
5. The Function of Creation in the Revised Cosmology 
The two problems confronting Plato as he develops his 
revised cosmology are how to make intelligible the nature 
of the relation of being and becoming and where to find a 
cause sufficient to account for the initial and continuing 
tendency of appearance toward what is best. The idea of 
creation is advanced to answer these problems. Three cate-
gories, Pattern, Receptacle, God, specify the nature of 
creation. But how do these categories of creative activity 
function? This question will be answered in terms of the 
motive and method of creation. After the function of 
creation has been stated it will be indicated how Plato 
employs the·idea of creation to answer his two central 
problems. 
1) Motive for Creating 
Why does God creat.e? The motive for creation arises 
from the nature of God and the nature of the Pattern. In 
Timaeus, 29 D-E Plato concisely states the motive which 
arises from the nature of God. Plato says of God, 
He was good; and in the good no jealousy in 
any matter can ever arise. So, being without jealousy, he desired that all things should 
come as near as possible to being like 
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himself. That this is the supremely valid 
principle of becoming and of the order of 
the world, we shall most surely be right to 
accept from men of understanding.l 
God, being perfect, self-sufficient and complete created 
not from a lack in himself, but from a completeness. 
Lovejoy points out that in Plato's God "the concept of 
Self-Suffering Perfection • • • was converted into the 
concept of a Self-Transcending Fecundity. 1t2 Lovejoy ex-
plains his meaning when he says, 
The 'best soul' could begrudge existence to 
nothing that could conceivably possess it, 
and 'desired that all things should be as 
like.himself as they could be'. tAll things' 
here could consistently mean for Plato nothing 
less than the sensible counterparts of every 
one of the Ideas •••• In the Timaeus ••• 
he insists upon the necessarily complete trans-
lation of all the ideal possibilities into 
actuality ••.•• It is because the created 
universe is an exhaustive replica of the World 
of Ideas that Plato argues that there can be 
only one creation; it includes the copies tof 
all other intelligible creatures', and there-
fore there is, so to say, nothing left over 
in the model after which a second world might 
be fashioned.J 
Oreating from completion, God desired that trall things 
should be good and, so far as might be nothing imperfect.n4 
lcornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 33. 
2Lovejoy, Chain of Be~ng, p. 49. 
3Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
4cornford, Timaeus, p. 19. 
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Thus, he 
••• -took over all that is visible-- not 
at rest, bat in discordant and unordered 
motion -- and brought i~ from disorder in-
to order, since he judge~ that order was 
in every way the better. 
Also, he deemed that 
• • • among things that are by nature visible, 
no work that is without intelligence will ever 
be better than one that has intelligence • • • 
and moreover that intelligence cannot be · 
present in anything apart from soul. In 
virtue of this reasoning • • • he fashioned 
reason within soul and soul within body, to 
the end that the work he accomplished might 
be by nature aB excellent and perfect as 
possible.2 
God's motive for creating arises from his nature. He is 
complete and desires everything to be like himself. Thus 
he introduces order, intelligence, and soul into nall 
that is visible.n3 
The motive of God's creating aris~s also because of 
the nature 0f the Pattern. God created "in order that 
this werld may be as like as possible t.o the perfect and 
intelligible Living Creature.n4 In Laws, 716 Plate says 
that God moves "in a straight line towards the accomplish-
ment of his end.n5 The end in terms of which God creates 
libid. 2Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
3Ibid., p. 19. 4Ibid., p. 32. 
5Jowett, Dialogues, II, 487. 
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is determined by the Pattern. Regarding the Pattern Plato 
asks, 
What was the living creature in whose likeness 
he framed the world? We must not suppose that 
.~twas any creature that ranks only as a species; 
for no copy of that which is incomplete can 
ever be good. Let us rather say that the world 
is like, above all things, to that Living 
Creature of which all other living creatures, 
severally and in their families, are parts.l 
Commenting on this Pattern which functions as the goal to-
ward which God persuades the Receptacle to move, Qornford 
says, 
Plato looks upon the whole visible universe 
as an animate being whose parts are also 
animate beings. The intelligible Living 
Creature corresponds to it, whole to whole, 
and part to part. It is the system of Forms 
that are,. together with the Forms of the four 
primary bodies, relevant to a physical dis- · 
course, because they are the patterns of 
which the things we see and touch are sensible 
images, coming to be and passing away in time 
and space.2 
The motive for Godts creating thus arises not only 
from his nature but also from the model to which God looks 
as he persuades the Receptacle to take on limitation, 
specificatioh~ and·individuality. By saying that the motive 
for creation arises from God's nature and from the Pattern 
to whicn God looks as he creates, Plato has clearly given 
the efficient and t.eleological m0:t?_ives. behind God's creating 
lcornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 39. 
2rbid., p. 41. 
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acti~ity. This is the motivational basis in terms of 
which Plato's God in his cr,eative work will be able to 
relate the world of being and becoming in such a manner 
that their relation will be intelligible. How are these 
motiV-es carried out in the creative work of God? 
2) Method of God's Creative Activity 
Craftsmanship is the method God employs in his creative 
work. This conception of creative activity ~s best under-
stood in te.rms of the meaning of artistic persuasion. When 
this has been clarified the answers the hypothesis of 
creation provides for Plato's metaphysical problems will 
be considered. 
What does Plato mean by artistic creation? The crea-
tive activity of God in the Philebus is described by Plato 
as the introduction of determinateness into the realm of 
the Infinite. The Limit (quantitative definiteness and 
determination) th~ough the power of the efficient and first 
cause (God) is introduced into the realm of the Infinite 
(qualitative indefiniteness). (Philebus, 26.) The result 
is a mixed realm having degrees of order, symmetry, and 
harmony. This realm of mixture is not only a compound but 
also a generation, a coming into being. (Philebus, 27.) 
God's relation to the created world will be discussed below. 
First, what is meant by the "introductionn of quantitative 
determination into qualitative indeterminateness? 
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In the Timaeua Plato clarifies what he means by 
"introduction" in the Philebus. The central statement of 
the Timaeus regarding the creative act is found in 48A. 
Plato says, 
For the generation of this universe was a 
mixed result of the combination 6f Necessity 
and Reason. Reason overruled Necessity by 
persuading her to guide the greatest part 
of the things that become toward what is 
best; in that way and on that principle this 
universe was fashioned in the beginning by 
the victorl of reasonable persuasion over 
Necessity. 
The Demiurgos has two materials in terms of which he 
creates the world. These are the Receptacle and the Pat-
tern. Motivated by a desire to bring order into the chaos 
of the Receptacle, the Demiurgos fashions in Necessity 
geometrical proportion. Persuasion is the process by 
which Ne.c.essi ty voluntarily submits to the purpose of the 
Demiurgos and takes into itself movement toward what is 
best, i.e. the likeness of the Forms. Thus, by nintroduc-
tion" Plato means (1} that God functioning as an efficient 
cause began order and movement toward what is best by 
artistically persuading the ~eceptacle to take into itself 
determination and ordered movement, and (2) that the model 
envisaged by God as he introduces ordered movement into 
the Receptacle is the Forms. God's creative act involves 
lcornford, Timaeus, p. 47. 
efficient and teleological causality. God's act is pro-
ductive only in the sense that he ~rings about along with 
the teleological function of the Forms an order which was 
not before God and the Forms caused it and the receptacle 
allowed it. 
However, the Demiurgos is not able to realize per-
fect order in the mixed world. The agent of creation works 
under the conditions the other two categories of creation 
impose upon him. These conditions are the natural capac-
ities of each element. No greater order can be achieved 
in the Receptacle than that which the Receptacle is able 
to receive. Likewise, no order other than that supplied 
by the Pattern can be -imposed upon the Receptacle. Work-
ing under these limitations, the Dem'iurgos employs as 
fully as possible the capacity of each element. Only 
thr0ugh the fullest development of the capacity of each 
element will the Demiurgos be able to realize the best 
possible world. 
Craftsmanship, thus, in the process of artistic per-
suasion. God is the efficient and first cause, the Divine 
Craftsman, persuading artistically the Receptacle to take 
into itself determination and movement toward what is best. 
Persuasion is the artistic process by which the 
Demiurgos utilizes the natural capacities of each category 
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of creation as fully as possible in order to cause the 
formation of a cosmos that will be as far as possible 
orderly, harmonious, proportionate, and complete. 
Plato says that the cosmos comes about through the 
Demiurgos' persuasion of the Re9eptacle to take into it-
self the limitations of Pattern. But, does Plato teach 
that this cosmos had a beginning? This problem, which 
arises from an attempt to render the process of creation 
intelligible, is pointedly stated by Taylor when he asks, 
Are we to take seriously the representation, 
which runs through the Timaeus, of God's ac-
tion as the imposing of order on a pre-existing 
chaos? Does Plato mean that the world was 
formed out of pre-existing materials11 
Plato gives no answer to this problem. However, at 
least three possible answers to this problem can be ad-
vanced. The first is that Plato really did mean that God 
formed the cosmos from materials existing previous to the 
creating process. The second is that the "world is a co-
ordinate with God.n2 The third answer is that Platonic 
creation is neither a creation from pre-existing materials 
nor a meaningless conception, but that the cosmos is 
dependent on God for its existence. 
The strength of the first answer is that Plato talks 
about a Receptacle and a Pattern with which the cosmos is 
lTaylor, Plato, p. 442. 
2nemos, Philosophy of Plato, p. 107. 
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created by the Demiurgos. The weakness of this answer lies 
in its inability to make intelligible how God can create 
at or in or before time. By time Plato means an ordered 
and measured series of events. (Timaeus, 37D.) The 
cosmos cannot have been created at or in or before this 
type of time. All of these notions presuppose a measured 
ordered series of events. Furthermore, Plato says that 
time as an ordered and measured series of events comes 
about when the Demiurgos imposes measure on the Receptacle. 
(Timaeus, 37D.) On Plato's own ter-ms, then, it is impos-
sible to conceive of a time when the cosmos wa~ not. Thus, 
it is unintelligible to say that the cosmos was created 
out of pre-existing materials. 
Does Plato mean that the world is "co-ordinate with 
God"'? To say that God and the world are co-ordinate is 
to render meaningless Platonic creation. Plato obviously 
means something by cr~manship. If his meaning is 
neither that God created out of pre-existing materials 
nor that the world is co-ordinate with him, does Plato 
mean by creation that the cosmos is dependent on God'? 
I 
Realizing that Plato gives no answer to the problem 
of the beginning of becoming, Demos says, 
The world depends on God: he is the creator 
of the world in the sense that the world is 
in a timeless dependence on God. God is the 
cause, and the world is the effect; that is 
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to say, the world is an everlasting re-
velation of God. God is.the principle 
necessary to account for the relatedness 
of the ideal pattern to tpe receptacle.l 
The view Demos takes, then, is that the cosmos is depend-
ent on God. Does this perspective have support in Plato's 
works? In the Tima~us,28C Plato calls the Demiurgos "the 
maker and father of this universe~~2 God is also called 
"the best of c.auses~ ~3 In his address to the gods in 
Timaeus, 41 A-B God says that the cosmos is·"indissoluble, 
save with my consent•·'!4 Again, God tells the gods that 
. 
his ''will" holds them together. (Timaeus, 41B.) Thus, 
Plato's God is the causal condition for the possibility of 
the cosmos' haying any existence whatsoever. Apart from 
God the·world would not be. 
Which of these three alternatives gives the greater 
meaning to the process of creation? The first is un-
intelligible. The second renders creation meaningle·ss. 
The final alternative does not involve the difficulties 
of the first two positions and lends meaning to the pro-
cess of creation by viewing the relation between the 
Creator and creation as dependence of the latter on the 
former. 
lrbid., p. 107. 2cornford, Timaeus, p. 17. 
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 36. 
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3) · Results of God's Creating Activity 
The result of craftsmanship of God is a cosmos whose 
structure is the best possible image of the realm of eternal 
Pattern. In the act of creating the cosmos God is limited 
by the capacities of the elements he employs. As he per-
suaded the Receptacle to take on determinatio~ he is success-
ful to the degree that the material with which he works is 
able to take on definiteness. Thus, two principles govern 
the order of the structure God is able to realize in the 
universe: (1) That which is able to be most like the 
Pattern is higher in the structural hierarchy than that· 
which is least like the Pattern (Timaeus, 36E, 37E.) and 
(2) the higher order rules the lower order. (Timaeus, 
34E, 43C.) 
Governed by the Ideas, the principles of structure, 
the Demiurgos creates first the world-soul and sets it 
over his second creation, the w~rld-body. (Timaeus 34B -
c.) The reason for this is that the soul has the greatest 
likeness to the creator God and is the cause of motion 
and order in the cosmos. {Timaeus, 36E, 37E.) Out of the 
material from which the world-soul is created God created 
human souls. (Timaeus, 41D.} At this point the Demiurgos 
turns over the work of persuasion to the lesser deities. 
All other creative work, though given to the lesser gods, 
is under the watchcare of God. (Timaeus, 41; Politicus, 
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271.) They form human bodies from the four elements which 
compose the world-body and place the God-created human 
souls into the bodies. (Timaeus, 42E- 43A.) The human 
soul, though made from the stuff out of which the world-
soul was created, has not the degree of order and pro-
portion which the world-soul possesses. (Timaeus, 41D.) 
The human body is made from the world-body and composed of 
the same elements. Resulting from this creative activity 
is a world-soul with a world-body. These are closely 
resembled by human souls and human bodies. Lower than 
human bodies are compounds created from the four primary 
bodies by the lesser gods. Finally, lowest in the structure 
of created beings are the four primary bodies, fire, earth, 
air, and water. (Timaeus, 31- 34.) Each stage is the 
result of the craftsmanship of the Demiurgos and of the 
lesser divinities. (Philebus, 61B.) Each stage, also, 
realizes some degree of reality. The greater likeness t0 
the forms possessed by a level in the structure, the 
greater degree of reality that level possesses. The more 
that a level is able to realize in itself harmony, order 
and sameness the more it is real. 
After the Demiurgos has created the world with the 
aid of the lesser deities, he stays in a providential re-
lation to his created world. (Timaeus, 41 A-B.) 
Providence in the Christian sense must not be confused with 
the Platonic meaning of it. The Demiurgos is "the continu-
ing cause of creation.u1 Demos says regarding the providence 
of God in Plato, 
The cosmos endures because God wills that 
it should. (Tirnaeus 41A) God cares for 
the least equally as for the greatest of 
his creatures; he lavishes attention on 
the minutest details of the cosmos.2 
What is the nature of God's providential relation to 
the created world? .Does God order the gods to create 
continuously after they·and God have completed an initial 
phase of creating the· world, or dees God sustain that which 
. was created "in the beginning" by him and the gods? Plato 
is silent about this point. However, it is consistent 
with Plato's discussion of Godts relation to the world to 
contend that God functions as an efficient first cause in 
the imitation of the universe and then bestows upon lesser 
gods the responsibility of continuously functioning as 
efficient causes in the artistic pensuasion of the 
Receptacle to take into itself movement toward what is 
best. God sustains both that which the gods have ordered 
and their causal and artistic activity. This theory allows 
for the possibility of "new" order being realized in the 
lDemos, Philosophy of Plato;;~ p ~ l07. 
2rbid. 
world, that is, for generation. 
Plato conceives of a cosmos wpich comes about 
through the Demiurgos' persuasion of the Recept~cle to 
take into itself the limitations of the Pattern, which 
has levels of the realization of reality structured hier-
archically, and over which God continuously presides. The 
hypothesis of creation was developed to meet certain dif-
ficulties in the theory of Ideas. In the light of the 
foregoing elaboration of the nature and function of crea-
tion in Plato's cosmology how does this doctrine answer 
the problems in Plato's theory of Ideas? 
4) Solutions to Metaphysical Problems 
When Plato began to evaluate in his Late Period the 
theory of Ideas he located two major difficulties which 
needed solutions: What is the nature of the relation of 
being and becoming and what is the cause of this relation? 
The answer he proposed was the doctrine of creation. How 
are these two problems solved by this hypothesis? 
A. The Nature of the Relation of Being and Becoming 
There is a cluster of difficulties involved in the nature 
of the relation of being and becoming. What is the re-
lation of the one and the many, permanence and change, 
and perfection and imperfection? How the idea of creation 
functions to solve the problem of the nature of the re-
lation of being and becoming can best be viewed from the 
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perspective of each of the problems. In Parmenides, 130 -
132 Plato contends that the one and many cannot be related 
in any intelligible fashion for two reasons: {1) since 
the one would have to be related to many the one would no 
:.loi!gel!' be one but would be many, i.e. the one would dis-
integrate; and (2) in the search for the most extensive of 
class concepts there is nothing to stop one from entering 
into an infinite regress. Plato solves these problems by 
means of the Demiurgos. The one is related to the many by 
means of the Demiurgost envisaging the Pattern and persuad-
ing the Receptacle to take into itself the likeness of the 
Pattern. Thus, the one is not broken up·into pieces as 
the argument of Parmenides would suggest. On the contrary, 
the one functions as a pattern in terms of which the 
Demiurgos creates. Furthermore, the Pattern in the revised 
cosmology is understood by Plato. as being unique, one, and 
not in need of a more extensive concept in terms of which 
it is to be understood. If the Pattern is unique, one, 
same, complete, then, there is no need for, and indeed 
impossible to have, a Pattern which is more unique than it. 
The category of Pattern in the hypothesis of creation also 
allows Plato to answer the second difficulty. 1 Plato 
r 
answered the so-called "third-man" argument in Republic, 
lJowett, Dialogues, I, 854. 
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587 when he said that God 11created a bed which is essen-
tially and by nature one onlY•'~l Thus, Plato, through the 
hypothesis of creation, is able to make intelligible the 
relation of the one and the many. 
The force of the difficulty of making intelligible 
the relation of permanence and change is this: if the un-
changing is related to the changing what is to keep the 
unchanging from changing? Will not the unchanging by 
virtue of this relation itself change? Plato solves this 
problem in the doctrine of the Demiurgos and his relation 
to the Pattern and to the Receptacle. In the creating pro-
cess the Demiurgos envisages the unchanging Pattern and 
persuades the changing Receptacle to become like the 
Pattern. The Demiurgos functions as a go-between. It is 
in terms of the mediating or creating work of the Cosmic 
Creator that the nature of the relation between the un-
changing and the changing is to be understood. 
The third problem is much like the second. How can 
that which is perfect have anything to do with that which 
is imperfect without becoming itself imperfect? Again, 
the Demiurgos functioning as a Cosmic Mediator in Plato's 
solution. Through the envisagement of the Pattern the 
Demiurgos conceives perfection and through his persuasion 
libid. 
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he introduces into the Receptacle a likeness ofillns per-
fection, i.e. imperfection. 
In the idea of creation Plato found solutions to the 
problem of making intelligible the relation of being and 
becoming. The solution to another prob~em is also te be 
found in this hypothesis. What is the cause of the re-
lation of being an~ becoming? 
B. The Cause £f the Relation of Being and Becoming 
' In Phaedo, 97, and 100 Plato despaired of developing an 
efficient cause on a cosmic scale and resorted to the 
doctrine of Forms to account for the movement in becoming 
toward what is best. Nevertheless, he had·not thereby 
accounted for the origin of this movement. The hypothesis 
of creation furnishes a solution to this problem. The 
Demiurgos is the efficient cause in Plato's revised 
cosmology. All movement in becoming toward what is best 
is dependent on and owes its origin to the Demiurgos. 
Thus, in the hypothesis of creation Plato advances 
solutions to the problems not only of the nature of the 
relation of being and ~ecoming but also 0~ the cause of 
this relation. 
5) Summary 
Confronted with basic and serious difficulties in 
his theory of Ideas Plato advances the hypothesis of 
creation to make intelligible the nature of the relation 
of being and becoming and to account for the origin of the 
movement of becoming towar~ the Good. Analyzing the realm 
o~ becoming Plato finds that three notions are categorical 
to it: Pattern, Receptacle, and Demiurgos. Each of these 
categories is distinct from the other and is dependent 
only upon itself for its being. Functioning in their re-
spective roles, these elements form the realm of becoming 
through the cosmic synthesis of creation. God initiates 
all movement in becoming toward the True, the Good, and 
the Beautiful by artistically persuading the Receptacle 
to take into itself likenesses of the Pattern. The result 
of this creative activity is not only a world which has 
levels of reality and over ~hich God presides but also, and 
more fundamental, a world which is a mixture of permanence, 
one, perfection and of change, many, imperfection. Opera-
ting as a Divine Mediator the Demiurgos relates the realms 
of being and becoming. Thus, the hypothesis of creation 
functions as Plato's answer to the problems confronted in 
his theory of Ideas. 
The nature and function of the hypothesis "creationn 
in Plato's revised cosmology has been outlined. Creation 
has been defined as Divine Craftsmanship. It has been shown 
that craftsmanship involves not only three categories: 
Pattern, Receptacle, and God; but also God's artistic per-
suasion of the Receptacle to take into itself order, life · 
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and movement toward the Pattern. However·, can the 
hypothesis "creation" be clarified? Can it be tested with 
regard to its ability to provide a perspective and a 
system of categories such that Plato can answer his major 
metaphysical problems? The hypothesis."creation" can be 
clarified and tested through an examination of the ex-
periential foundation of the hypothesis. 
6. The Root Analogy of Creation 
1) _Introduction 
Undergirding Plato's revised cosmological super-
structure is an hypothesis, and basic to this hypothesis 
is a root analogy which is based on a common sense ex-
perience. Functioning as the experiential foundation of 
the idea of creation, this analogy suggests an hypothesis 
possessing a perspective from which Plato views his world 
and the germinal notions for the nature and function of 
the categories of the hypothesis of creation. The ability 
of this hypothesis to do what Plato asks of it is depend-
ent on the capacity of its root analogy to sumgest not 
only the cosmological categories but. also an intelligible 
functioning of these categories in their individual and 
composite roles such that they will allow Plato to settle 
his metaphysical difficulties. What, then, is the nature 
and structure of the root analogy of the Platonic doctrine 
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of creation, the function of the analogy, and the adequacy 
of the metaphor to do the work Plato asks of it? .From 
this discussion one will be able better to understand the 
meaning of Plato's hypothesis "creation" and to grasp the 
ability of this hypothesis to do the work Plato asks it 
to do. 
2) Nature and Structure of the Root Analogy 
A. Nature of the Root Analogy -- The experiential 
foundation of Plato's doctrine of creation is the common 
experience of human craftSmanship. However, this analogy 
is a working out of the implications of an even more basic 
analogy underlying Plato's whole system. Upon the original 
analogy Plato builds another analogy which allows him to 
overcome the inadequacies of the former analogy. The second 
analogy is the foundation of the hypothesis of creation. 
First, what is a root analogy? What is the analogy on 
which Plato's whole metaphysics is based? How does the 
root analogy of creation arise from it? Finally, what is 
the nature of the root metaphor of creation? 
What is the nature and function of a root analogy? 
A root analogy iS:a figure taken from some area of common 
sense experience which suggests an hypothesis that can be 
advanced to provide a perspective and a structure in terms 
of which data can be interpreted and related. An image of 
this sort is a basic analogy, a root metaphor. The root 
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analogy has two functions: it suggests a perspective on 
the basis of which an hypothesis can be advanc~d, and it 
suggests a structure in terms of which the categories of 
the hypothesis can be developed. Pepper outlines the 
nature and function of a root analogy in this way, 
A man desiring to understand the world 
looks about for a clue to its comprehen-
sion. He pitches upon some area of common-
sense fact and tries if he cannot under-
stand other ,agrees in terms of this ene. 
This original area becomes then his basic 
analogy or root metaphor. He describes as 
best he can the characteristics of this 
area, or, if you will, discriminates its 
structure. A list of its structural 
characteristics becomes his basic concepts 
of explanation and description. We call 
them a set of categories. In terms of 
these categories he proceeds to study all 
other areas of fact whether unariticized 
or previously criticized. He undertakes 
to interpret all facts in term~ of these 
categories.l 
A root analogy is the experiential foundation of a con-
ceptual hypothesis. Such an analogy suggests a perspective 
and a structure in terms of which an hypothesis can be 
developed. 
Is there a difference between a root analogy and a 
conceptual hypothesis suggested by that root analogy? A 
root analogy suggests a way in which data could be inter-
preted. As a suggestion the root analogy is an unrefined 
common sense experience. An hypothesis suggested by a 
lstephen c. Pepper, World lirEQthesis (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1948), p. 91. 
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root analogy, on the other hand, is theoretical or con-
ceptual and not tied .to sense experience as is the root 
analogy. The essential difference between a root analogy 
and a theoretical hypothesis based on that root analogy 
is that the root analogy suggests and is a common sense 
experience. While the hypothesis is a conceptual 
specification of and refinement of the perspective and 
categories suggested by the root analogy. Thus, the 
difference between them is one of function and of re-
lation to sense experience. The root analogy suggests an 
hypothesis while the hypothesis is ai1uheonetical exten-
sion of the perspective and structure suggested by the 
root analogy. The root analogy ·is tied to sense experi-
ence while the hypothesis is conceptual and not tied to 
sense experience. 
What is the analogy which functions as the ex-
periential foundation of Plato's metaphysics? F. M. 
Cornford points to the soul as the clue Plato follows as 
he attempts to understand the world. Cornforq says, 
The point we seek to bring out is that 
Plato's development obeys the general rule 
we have seen at work throughout pre-Socratic 
philosophy -- the rule that the view taken 
of the 'nature of things' reflects and is 
determined by beliefs about the nature and 
destiny of the soul.l 
lcornford, Religion to Philosophy, p. 243. 
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What Cornford p0ints out is developed by Paul E. More. 
More submits that Plato's metaphysical dualism in the 
Timaeus is based on the dualistic structure of the soul. 
More says of the dualism in the Timaeus, 
In both the grand divisions of the argument. 
the starting-point is the immediate con-
sciousness of that dualism within the soul 
itself which, intellectually, appears as 
knowledge and opinion; and from this the 
assumption is made that the world of which 
we are members must conform in some way to 
this double operation of consciousness. If 
we have reason, a certainty of knowledge, 
there must exist in the universe at large a 
sphere of changeless, eternal objects which 
can thus be known, the Ideas, and these 
must be absolutely different in kind from 
the objects of physical perception which 
haye_the1changing, ephemeral nature of op~n~on. 
Analogous to the experience of permanence and hhange 
in the soul are the realms of permanent and eternal Ideas 
and of changing and temporal physical objects. That Plato 
reasons from the dualism in the soul to the dualism in the 
universe is attested by such passages as 81 in the Meno, 
75, 78, and 98 in the Phaedo. In these passages a meta-
physical dualism develops from Plato's theory of knowledge 
and both develop in terms of the root metaphor of the 
dualism in the soul. 
In Phaedo, 75 Plato suggests that there are two ·· 
lMore, Platonism, pp. 224-25. 
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experiences which a person has: the experience of changing 
sensible objects and permanent rationally conceived 
objects. Rational objects must be assumed before one can 
make distinctions between the sensible objects such as 
equality. Indeed, these rational objects, ideas, must be 
given to one before one can begin to use one's senses. 
It would have been imp0ssible to render sense experience 
meaningful had not the ideas preceded them. No knowledge 
can be obtained threugh the senses unless first the know-
ledge has been given to the mind in terms of ideas. What 
else are these ideas but what is called the real?. Thus, 
Plato reasons from the experience of permanence, equality, 
to the realm of the Forms, i.e. reality. Indeed, these 
Forms must be assumed to render intelligible the experi-
ence of permanence. But why does Plato take this approach 
to his search for reality? What is that which guides his 
reasoning? He assumes from the beginning the experiences 
of change and permanence in the soul. From this per-
spective he reasons to a realm of eternal objects and to 
a realm of changing particulars. Thus, the dualism of 
the soulCprovides both a perspective from which the world 
" can be rendered intelligible and a structure in terms of 
which categories can be developed. 
How does .the analogy ncraftsmanship" arise from the 
analogy "soul"? The structure of the soul undergirding 
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Plato's metaphysical dualism has two parts; the experi-
ence of permanence and the experience of change. Upon 
this soul dualism the metaphysical dualism of the theory 
of Ideas is constructed. But when the metaphysical 
dualism was found inadequate to acco~t for not only the 
initiation of becoming toward what is best but also the 
nature of the relation between the two realms, Plato ex-
panded his original root metaphor. Plato developed a 
root metaphor which is based on the dualism of the soul, 
and which would on the one hand allow for the introduction 
of an efficient cause into his world view and on the other 
make intelligible the nature of the relation between be-
ing and becoming. To an expanded root analogy Plato looks 
for help in overcoming the difficulties of the theory of 
Ideas and the conceptual model on which it is based. The 
revised and broadened analogy Plato introduces in his 
Late Period is human craft~mansh~p. 
What is the nature of the analogy "human craftsman-
ship!!?' This root metaphor involves three concepts. If 
it lacked any one of them the root metaphor would be 
meaningless. The three essential notions are artistic 
cause, mediation, and purpose. First, cr~snanship means 
that there is a craftsman who acts artistically and that 
there are results of his actions. What does it mean to 
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say that the Craftsman acts artistically when functioning 
as a cause? He forms materials into a likeness of that 
which he apprehends rationally. (Republic, 595-601.) As 
he works with materials he uses their capacities to their 
fullest. He does not ask them to become what they are 
incapable of becoming. He does, however, have an obliga-
tion to the materials with which he works to persuade 
those materials to become all that they are able to become. 
Second, craftsmanship means that there is a craftsman who 
stands as a mediator between the pattern to be eopied and 
the material to be persuaded into a likeness of the pattern. 
The craftsman is the indispensable link between the 
material and the pattern. Through his action as an 
artistic cause the craftsman relates these two elements. 
Finally, craftsmanship involves purpose. When the crafts-
man applies h.is art he has a purpose in mind. He wants 
to fashion his material as much as possible like the 
pattern. The craftsman's personal purpose is to make a 
bed, .say for his own use. He also desires to make a bed 
as much as possible like the Ideal Bed. The article he 
fashions bears the marks of purposive ability. The bed 
is like Badness. It is a bed to the degree that it can 
function like a bed ought to function. 
Craftsmanship is based on the soul's dualism, but 
craftsmanship goes beyond its founda~ion through the 
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introduction of an efficient cause. It is because of the 
efficient cause that this expanded root analogy is signif-
icant. The efficient cause mixes and relates the two 
elements by persuading the plastic element to become as 
much as possible· like the permanent element. Central to 
the notion of craftsmanship are artistic cause, purpose 
and mediation. What are the elements which are necessary 
to the notion of craftsmanship? 
B. .Structure of the Root Analogy -- There are 
I 
three characteristics essential to the structure of the 
analogy of craftsmanship. (Republic, 595-607.) These are 
mind, material, and pattern. What is involved in each of 
these structural elements? Mind involves not only the 
ability to act, to do something, but also the ability to 
act in any orderly manner. This means that the mind has 
the capacity to order, to arrange data into a harmonious 
and proportionate system. Material involves not only a 
malleable stuff but also a stuff which has the potentiality 
of becoming what the craftsman asks it to become. Finally, 
pattern involves an ideal which is unique and permanen~. 
When the craftsman apprehends the ideal of that which he 
seeks to create a likeness he grasps that which is unique 
and permanent. If he worked according to the pattern of 
a sensible object he would be following a model which is 
changing and particular. Platocalls those who do this 
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painters. What they paint is three times removed from 
reality. But what the craftsman produces is only twice 
removed from reality. The craftsman creates according to 
the ideal pattern. That the distinction between the paint-
er and the craftsman is important for an adequate under-
standing of the root analogy of creation will become clear 
when the function of the root analogy of creation is dis-
cussed. Nevertheless, the pattern which the craftsman 
apprehends is the form, the ideal pattern of that which:he 
seeks to make a replica. How do these structural elements 
function in the work of craftsmanship? 
In the Republic, 595-607 Plato describes what becomes 
in his Late Period the conceptual foundation of creation. 
The craftsman creates a bed, a particular one and not the 
ideal bed. In doing so he takes materials external to 
himself and forms them according to an Ideal Bed which he 
rationally apprehends. The Ideal, though apprehended by 
the craftsman's mind, is not dependent on it. Rather, 
the Ideal is eternal and immutable. The mind grasps the 
Ideal Form and guides the craftsman as he introduces the 
order of Bedness into the material with which he is crea-
ting. The result of the craftsman's creating is an image 
oftheJideal Bed. Two motivations prompt the craftsman to 
do his work. On the one hand is the desire to create for 
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some purpose of his own. On the other hand is the desire 
to create. a bed like the Ideal Bed. Thus, the craftsman 
creates an . i·mage of the Ideal Bed by means of plastic-
like materials because he has a personal purpose and be-
cause he desires to make a bed like the Ideal Be~. 
(Republic, 596.) 
3) Function of the Root Analogy in Plato's Cosmology 
Confronted with the failure of the theory of ldeas 
to account for the beginning of becoming toward what is 
best and to account for the relation of becoming to the 
Forms, Plato sought a perspective from which he could in-
troduce an efficient cause into the universe and make 
intelligible the nature of the relation between being and 
becoming. In the root metaphor of the craftsman he found 
a suggestion for both a perspective from which tb view 
the cosmos and a set of characteristics in terms of which 
he could develop a set of categories. In tqe Timaeus 
Plato views the world from the viewpoint of the hypothesis 
"craftsmanship~'! Using the characteristics of this model 
as a root analogy, Plato advances the hypothesis that the 
world of becoming has three categorical elements: the 
Receptacle in which it was created, the Pattern in terms 
of which.the cosmos was created, and God or Mind who per-
suaded. the Receptacle to take on the likeness of the 
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Pattern because he was complete and wanted the cosmos to 
be as like him as possible and because he wanted the 
cosmos to be as like the Forms as possible. From the per-
spective of this hypothesis and the categories involved in 
it Plato proceeds to interpret all facts as a product of 
the interaction of these three creative elements. 
(Timaeus, 48.) Furthermore, in terms of these categories, 
the facts are interpreted and related to one another so 
that the most probable account of all the facts can be 
given. 
4) Summary 
Through the delineatio~ of the nature, structure, and 
function of the root analogy underlying Plato's hypothesis 
"creationn, the doctrine of creation is clarified. It has 
been shown that a root analogy is an experiential founda-
tion of a world hypothesis. As ·one views the facts to be 
interpreted one looks for a·key to unlock the meaning of 
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the facts. The key is a root metaphor. The root metaphor 
suggests an hypothesis possessing both a perspective and a 
set of categories which will help interpret and relate data. 
As Plato sought a perspective which would allow him not only 
to maintain the metaphysical dualism of his Middle Period 
and its conceptual model, the dualism of the soul, but al-
so to introduce efficient causality.into his system, he 
found in the common sense experience of craftsmanship 
what he needed. This root metaphor allows Plato not only 
to keep the analogy undergirding the theory of Ideas but 
also to build on it. It also suggests to him a perspec-
tive and a group of structural characteristics in terms 
of which he could develop a world hypothesis and inter-
pret and relate the facts in his experience. 
Plato employs craftsmanship as his root analogy 0f 
creatio~. From this perspective and in terms of the 
structure of this root metaphor Plato develops an hypoth-
esis in terms of which he attempts· to account for the 
relation of being and becoming and for the movement in 
becoming toward what is best. From the perspective of 
the common sense experience "craftsmanship" one is able 
to grasp the meaning of Plato's doctrine of creation. 
Is this hypothesis successful? Does it allow Plato 
to give the most probable account of the world of becoming? 
One success of the cosmological hypothesis depends upon 
the ability of the root analogy to suggest a perspective 
and a structure upon which the hypothesis can be based. 
Thus, the question is how well the root analogy allows 
the hypothesis to interpret and relate the facts of 
experience. 
?. Critique of Idea of Creation 
It has been shown that a world hypothesis is based 
upon the perspective and structure suggested to it by a 
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root analogy. The success of a hypothesis is, thus, 
dependent upon the root analogy undergirding it. If 
the analogy suggests the right perspective and struc-
ture then the hypothesis built upon it will be suc-
cessful in interpreting and relating the facts of ex-
perience. Ultimately, then, the test of an hypothesis 
is also a test of the root analogy which undergirds 
it. However, the way in which a root analogy is 
tes.ted is to test the hypothesis. If the hypothesis 
is successful then the analogy is likewise successful. 
If the hypothesis is not successful, then, the 
analogy has not suggested the right perspective and 
structure for developing the hyp0thetical super-
structure, and the analogy must either be expanded, 
reduced, or discarded. Is Plato's hypothesis of 
creation able to do all that Plato asks of it? An 
answer to this question involves setting up the 
criteria for testing a world hypothesis and applying 
these criteria to the hypothesis. 
1) Criteria of a World Hypothesis 
Platro is seeking to give an account of the world 
of becoming through hoisting the most probable cos-
mological hypothesis. Even though he contends that 
no cosmology can be expected to allow complete knowl-
edge Plato does contend that a cosmology giving one 
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probable knowledge of changing particulars is possible. 
What criteria can be applied to determine the adequacy 
of a probable cosmological hypothesis to do its work? 
It is obvious throughout the Timeaus that PlatG is 
erecting an hypothesis which he contends will both 
apply to the data of the Bxperience of ·the world of 
becoming and interrelate as much data as possible. 
Thus, Plato asks of his probable hypothesis both 
applicability to and synopsis of the data under consid-
eration. 
The criteria implicit in Plato's Timaeus is 
discussed explicitly by Pepper. Pepper suggests that 
there are two tests: precision and scope.l Pre-
cision in an hypothesis is the close reference of the 
hypothesis to the facts to be related. Pepper points 
out that the precision of a world hypothesis is in-
creased by nmaking it exactly fit, conform to, apply 
to, describe or in any other way strictly refer to 
the facts under consideration."~ This is accompl~shed 
on the one hand by discriminating the facts "in ever 
greater detail" and on the other hand by accumulating 
more facts and submitting them to careful scrutiny.?. 
lpepper, World Hypotheses, p. 76. 
2Ibid. 3Ibid. 
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Having accomplished this to a greater or lesser degree, 
one can determine the success of the hypothesis by 
viewing its ability to interpret and relate the care-
fully scrutinized facts. Scope in an hypothesis is 
the ability of the hypothesis to interpret and relate 
an increasing number of facts if not all of them. 
When the precision of a hypothesis is sharpened the 
scope is likewise increased. 1 vfuat are the strengths 
and weaknesses of Plato's hypothesis of preation in 
terms of the criteria of precision and scope? 
2) Strength of the Idea of Creation. 
The hypothesis of craftsmanship and the three 
creative elements involved in it allow Plato to over-
come some of the difficulties present in the theory 
of ttdeas. By applying the criteria of precision and 
scope to the hyp~thesis one is able to ind~cate the 
strength of the hypothesis to interpret and relate 
data. How much precision and scope does the 
hypothesis possess? 
Plato has four areas of data which he seeks to 
interp~et and relate: change, permanence, efficient 
cause, and the relation of permanence and change. On 
the basis of the suggestion of the root analogy of 
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human craftsmanship Plato develops the hypothesis that 
the cosmos is dependent upon divine craftsmanship. 
Three categories in the hypothesis suggested by the 
root analogy are: God, Pattern, and Receptacle. 
Throughout the Timaeus Plato attempts to indicate that 
the hypothesis of craftsmanship applies to these areas 
of data and is able to relate them to one another. 
Pattern is the condition for the possibility of 
permanence, God of cause, a~d the Receptacle of change. 
Furthermore, the interrelationship of God, Pattern, 
and Receptacle that comes about through God's artis-
tically persuading the Receptacle to take into it-
self the image of the Pattern is categorical to the 
experience of change amid permanence and permanence 
amid change. The mixture of Pattern and Receptacle 
'is categorical to the experience of the mixture of 
permanence and change. Finally, God as efficient 
cause working purposively as he creates is the ground 
of the experience of orderly and purposive change in 
the cosmos. 
The hypothesis Plato advances is categorical to the 
experiences of permanence, change, and efficient cause. 
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Also, because divine craftsmanship involves the mixture by 
God of the Receptacle and the Pattern, it applies to the 
experiences of the mixture of permanence and change, and 
the orderly and purposive movement in the cosmos. Thus, 
the hypothesis Plato develops possesses both precision and 
scope. Further, with this hypothesis Plato is able to 
find answers to the problems he faces. With this hypothesis 
Plato develops a doctrine of efficient cause and makes 
more intelligible the relation of being and becoming. It 
would seem then, that Platots hypothesis is strong. Does 
it have any weaknesses? 
3) Weaknesses of the Idea of Creation 
Are there any data which cannot be understood in 
terms of the hypothesis of divine craftsmanship? One area 
of data is not made completely intelligible by this 
hypothesis: the nature of the relation between permanence 
and change. Although the hypothesis of creation clarifies 
the nature of the relation between these two realms it 
does not completely overcome the difficulties found in 
the theory of ideas. At this point the hypothesis lacks 
both precision and scope. 
The nature of the relation of being and becoming 
involves the problems of the nature ·of the relation of 
the one and many, permanence and change, perfection and 
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imperfection, time and eternity, and good and evil. What 
specifically is the nature of the relation of these realms? 
In the theory of Ideas Plato called it nparticipation. '! 
From the discussion of the way in which the doctrine of 
creation functions to overcome the difficulties of the 
theory of Ide~s, it was shown that God stands between the 
Pattern and the Receptacle as a sort of Cosmic Mediator. 
He envisages the Pattern and persuades the Receptacle to 
take into itself the likeness of the Pattern. This is a 
mythological way of saying that the Divine Mind mixes these 
two realms. As permanence and change, good and evil, per-
fection and imperfection, time and eternity, one and many 
are related in our min~ and the relation is that which we 
have in our minds, so are the Receptacle and the Pattern 
related in the Divine Mi~d. What exactly is the nature 
of this relation in the mind? To say that the relation 
takes place in the mind does not say what the nature of 
the relation is. 
Are there any categories or system of categories in 
' . 
Plato's revised cosmology which would allow him to make 
intelligible the nature of the relation of being and be-
coming? There are none. At this point the hypothesis 
of creation is unable to interpret and relate the data in 
one's experience. The hypothesis allows Plato to specify 
the cause of the relation of being and becoming. But the 
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hypothesis neither has a category, a group of categories, 
nor allows a relation of its categories such that the 
nature of the relation of these realms can be specified. 
4) Summary 
Plato's root analogy, human craftsmanship, suggests 
to him an hypothesis whereby some difficulties in his 
system can be overcome. The hypothesis is both precise 
and broad in scope. The Pattern refers to the data of 
permanence, the Receptacle to change, the Demiurgos to 
efficient cause, and the artistic activity of the 
Demiurgos to the mixture of permanence and change. How-
ever, the hypothesis has its weaknesses. No category or 
group of categories allows for the interpretation of the 
relation of being and becoming ·and the problem implied 
in this data. Because the hypothesis is based on the 
root analogy of human craftsmanship, the weaknesses and 
strengths of the hypothesis are ultimately the responsi-
bility of the root analogy. Plato's root metaphor is, 
thus, successful to the extent that the hypothesis built 
on it is capable of interpreting and relating the data 
of permanence, change, cause, and the mixture of per-
manence and change. It is weak to the extent that the 
hypothesis built on it is incapable of making comprehen-
sible the nature of the relation of permanence and change. 
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8. Transition to Augustine 
Plato's view of creation, though valuable to him in 
answering his problem, bequeathed to subsequent Christian 
·philosophers difficult problems. Foremost among these was 
the limitations the Ideas and the Receptacle placed upon 
God's creating activity. Whatever else Plato's view 
meant to early Christian Philosophers like Augustine it 
meant at least that God, the Ideas, and the Receptacle 
are co-eternal and that God is limited in his creating 
activity by the Ideas and the Receptacle. Such a 
flagrant denial of the Biblical statements, accepted as 
~uthoritative by Augustine, that God created the world 
ex nihilo and that everything depends upon God for its 
existence called into philosophical battle the best 
minds of the early church, foremost among which was St .. 
Augustine. Regarding God's creating activity Augustine 
developed a creation view which attempted both to 
preserve the theistic monism held by the early church 
to be orthodox and to render meaningful Biblical 
statements about creation. In the next chapter 
Augustine's view of' God's creating a·cti vi ty will be 
articulated and then evaluated through an examination 
both of its empirical anchorage and of its capacity to 
answer the problems Augustine faces. 
111 
CHAPTER III 
THE IDEA OF CREATION IN AUGUSTINE'S THOUGHT 
1. Introduction 
Augustine's view of creation is the supreme attempt 
of early Christian philosophers to make intelligible 
Biblical statements about God's creating activity. Though 
he accepts Biblical statements as authoritative he has con-
fidence in the capacity of reason to make intelligible that 
which he has accepted by faith. Faced with the problems 
bequeathed to him by Platonic philosophical reflection re-
garding creation Augustine attempts to answer them through 
accepting by faith the authority of what the Bible says 
about God's creating activity. Then he builds a view of 
God's creating activity by which he seeks to make intel-
ligible Biblical statements about creation and to answer 
the metaphysical problems he faces. 
What is Augustine's view of God's creating activity? 
It has been shown that basic to Plato's idea of crea-
tion is a basic analogy and that through an examination 
of this analogy the idea can be clarified and evalu-
-
ated. Likewise, underlying Augustine's creation 
theory is a root analogy which functions as the ex-
periential foundation of the doctrine. It is in terms 
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of this fundamental analogy that he develops his doctrine 
of creation. Thus, through an examination and application 
of this root analogy what Augustine means by creation will 
be clarified and how his root analogy functions in his 
cosmological system will be evaluated. In order to reach 
this goal, however, the discussion will begin with a 
delineation of the problems confronting Augustine which 
the idea of creation was designed to answer and continue 
with discussions o£ the methods Augustine employs in 
dealing with his metaphysical problems, of the nature and 
function of the idea of creation as the solution to these 
problems, of the root analogy to the idea 0f creation, of 
the strengths and weaknesses of Augustipe~ idea of 
creation, and finally of the similarities and differences 
between Plato 1 s and Augustine's view of creation. 
2. Problems Confronting Augustine 
Three problems are dealt with by Augustine as he 
attempts to construct a Christian doctrine of creati0n. 
These problems are: (1) the meaning of history involve~ 
in a cyclical view of history, (2) a metaphysical dualism 
involved in the doctrine that the creature is co-eternal 
with God, (3) a metaphysical monism involved in creatio 
ab;Deo. Each of these problems will be explained and 
then the methods Augustine employs to overcome these 
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problems will be discussed. 
1) The Meaning o£ History 
In the City o£ Qod Augustine states succinctly the 
cyclical view o£ history. The notion o£ an eternal and 
cyclical recurrence o£ history was designed by Stoic 
philosophers to overcome a £ormidable di££iculty in-
volved in the question "what was God doing be£ore He 
created heaven and earth?"1 On the one hand,to say that 
God created the world is to say that he was idle be£ore 
he created, a mani£est absurdity since God is good and 
his goodness could never have been idle. 2 On the other 
hand, i£ one assumes that the infinite cannot be compre-
hended even by God and that the £inite only is compre-
hensible, then God could not have been before the £inite 
creature. For God to have existed before the beginning 
of time would be the same as saying that God can in some 
sense comprehend the infinite. Thus to speak of an 
eternal God who created the world at a time is to speak 
unintelligibly. 
Regarding these difficulties involved in the re-
lation of an eternal God to a temporal world, the Stoic 
lEtienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy o£ Saint 
Au~ustine, trans. L. E.-M7 Lynch (New York: Ranaom House, 
19 0) pp. 190-9l;.cf. Whitney J. Oates {ed.), Basic 
Writings of Saint Augustine {2 vols.; New York: ~ndom 
House, 1948), I, 190. -
2Ibid., p. 191. 
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philosophers 
• • • have seen no other approved means of 
solving than by introducing cycles of time, 
in which there should be a :constant renewal 
and repetition of the order of nature; and 
the~ have therefore asserted that these 
cycles will ceaselessly recur, one passing 
away and another .coming, though they are n0t 
agreed as to whether one permanent world 
shall pass through all these cycles, or 
whether the world shall at fixed intervals 
die out, and be renewed so as to exhibit a 
recurrence of the same phenomena--the things 
which have ~een, and those which are to be, 
coinciding. 
Thus, the Stoics point out, "the only solution to the prob-
lem of such a universe would be to suppose that the world 
always existed but that the finite number of beings compos-
ing it constantly follow one upon the other and disappear 
only to return once more in a fixed cycle."2 
What· are the implications of the cyclical view of 
history? Augustine finds two unsatisfactory implicati0ns. 
On the one hand,he argues that the notion of eternal cycles 
cuts the ground from under any possibility of meaning and 
hope for happiness or blessedness for the soul. On the 
other hand,he contends that it is not the case that the 
infinite is incomprehensible, and consequently the notion 
of eternal cycles is not a necessary one. 
lAugustine, The Gitr of God, trans. Marcus Dods 
(New York: The Modern Library~950), p. 393. 
2Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 191. 
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If one admits that the world is involved in eternal 
cycles and that all that is in the world is subject to the 
vicissitudes of this recurrence, then one must admit that 
it is imp0ssible for the soul to achieve any real happiness. 
Augustine says, 
And from this fantastic vicissitude they e~mpt 
not even the immortal soul that has attained 
wisdom, consigning it to a ceaseless trans-
migration between delusive blessedness and 
real misery. For how can that be truly called 
blessed which has no assurance of being so 
eternally, and is either in ignorance of the 
truth, and blind to the misery that is approach-
ing, or, knowing it, is in misery and fear?l 
Further, if one admits that the soul is subject to eternal 
recurrence and continues to hold that the soul is able to 
attain eternal blessedness then one admits that something 
new has come into the endless cycle. This is unintelligible 
from the viewpoint of the ve~y meaning of an eternal cycle 
in the order of history.2 Thus, the cyclical view of 
history involves ene in an awkward position regarding the 
possibility of the soul's achieving meaningful happiness. 
Further, Augustine contends that since one of the 
assumptions underlying cyclicism is unsound, it is not 
necessary that one adhere to the solution offered by the 
Stoic philosophers. What is this assumption? The 
lAugustine, City of God, pp. 393-94. 
2Ibid., p. 394. 
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cyd,licists assume that it is impossible to comprehend the 
infinite. Neither man nor God has this ability. In 
at~acking this assumption Augustine says, 
As for their other assertion, that God's 
knowledge cannot comprehend things infinite, 
it only remains for them to affirm, in order 
that they may sound the depths of their 
impiety, that God does not know all numbers. 
For it is very certain that they are infinite. 
• • • Does God, therefore, not know numbers . 
on account of this infinite; and does his 
knowledge extend only to a certain height in 
numbers, while of the rest He is ignorant? 
••• The infinity of number, though there 
be no numbering of infinite numbers, is yet 
not incomprehensible by Him whose understand-
ing is infinite.l 
It, is no help to assert that because they are known infinite 
numbers are curiously made finite. This is the case with 
human knowledge. When man understands, he limits, that is, 
he interprets. Because man does interpret his experience, 
his understanding of his experience is thus limited to.the 
interpreting capacity of the finite mind. But the subject 
under consideration is God's comprehension. God does not 
comprehend in the same way that man does. God intuits, 
comprehends all things at once.2 Gilson summarizes this 
point admirably when he says, 
To think of His understanding as a discursive 
faculty which moves from one given quantity 
to another larger quantity and so on 
libid., pp. 400-401. 
2Ibid., p. 401. 
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indefinitely is to forget that God sees 
everything in a simple intuition and that 
for Him, consequently, the infinite must 
be encompassed in one knowledge to which 
we have no right to set limits.l 
Thus, confronted with the cyclical view of history 
Augustine works out the implications of the view and shows 
not only that the status of the soul in an e~ernay cycle 
is unacceptable but also that it is not necessary to hold 
to the cyclical view because it is the case that God does 
comprehend the infinite and thus could exist before the 
world began. If the cyclical view is unacceptable and not 
the only view that one might intelligently hold, how is 
one to provide for the possibility of happiness and to 
account for both the beginning of the world and for God 
before he created the world? It is to these questions 
that Augustine addresses himself as he works out his idea 
of creation. 
2) Metaphysical Dualism 
The second major problem confronting Augustine is 
involved in the doctrine of the co-eternal creature. The 
adherents of this doctrine contend that it is impossible 
to conceive of a time when the world was not. Further, 
the world of orderly change is dependent upon somethJng 
other than itself for its existence. Thus, the world of 
lGilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 192. 
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becoming is eternal and a creature, that is, dependent on 
something other than itself for its own existence. When 
discussing the question of the eternality of the soul, 
Augustine nicely states the case made by the Platonists. 
He says, 
Pl~ • • • in writing concerning the world 
and the gods in it, whom the Supreme made, 
most expressly states that they had a be-
ginning and yet would have no end, by t~e 
sovereign will of the Creator, would endure 
eternally. But, by way of interpreting 
this, the Platonists have discovered that 
he meant a beginning, not of time, but of 
cause. 'For as if a foot,' they say, thad 
been always from eternity in dust, there 
would always have been a print underneath 
it; and yet no one would doubt that this 
print was made by the pressure of the foot, 
nor that though the one was made by.the 
other, neither was prior to the other; so,' 
they say, tthe world and the gods created . 
in it have.always been, their Creator 
always existing, and yet they were made.tl 
The Platonists who contend for the doctrine of the 
c~ternal creature pose for Augustine two problems: on 
the one hand how is one to conceive of a trbefore" the 
world was, and on the other hand if God and the creature 
are in fact heterogeneous beings and have two kinds of 
duration how are they to be related? Will not the two 
realms of being and d~ration be irreconcilably separated? 
How is this ontological dualism to be overcome? 
lAugustine, City of God, pp. 339-340. 
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3) Metaphysical Monism. 
The third and final problem Augustine faces is the 
one which occupied most of his attention.l Augustine 
constantly waged war against the doctrine of creatio ~ 
~· Essentially, this doctrine teaches that God created 
the universe out of himself. This means that God and the 
world are one. 2 To speak of God's creating without pre-
existing materials is to speak uniRtelligently. Now God 
is and what is is solely dependent upon him. If God 
created, God had to create out of himself. Augustine, thus, 
faces an ontological monism. How can this ontological 
monism be overcome? 
In summary, Augustine is confronted with three prob-
lems. The difficulties in the cyclical view of history 
bequeathed to Augustine the problem of rendering the life 
of the soul meaningful, i.e., giving meaning to history, 
and the problem of offering a meaningful alternative to 
the doctrine that the infinite is incomprehensible and 
consequently that God could not conceive of an eternity 
during which the universe was not. The Platonic teaching 
that the universe is co-eternal with the Creator gave to 
Augustine the difficulty of rendering intelligible the 
lGilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 189. 
2oates, Basic Writings, I, 217. 
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relation between two modes of duration and being: time 
and eternity, being and existence. Finally, how to over-
come an ontological monism is the problem Augustine faces 
in the notion of creatio ab ~· Augustine's answer to 
these problems is his doctrine of creation. Through this 
doctrine Augustine attempts to relate time to eternity 
and change to immortality. What are the methods he uses 
in developing his idea of creation? When Augustine's 
methodology is clear we shall be able to see it function 
in his development of the nature and function of creation. 
3. Augustine's Methodology 
The Bishop of Hippo's approach to these problems is 
first to take a perspective and then attempt to justify it 
through a search for and a clarification of the conditions 
for the possibility of the world-view involved in the per-
spective. What, then, is the perspective he takes and by 
what methods does he attempt to give credence to this per-
spective? 
1) Augustine's Cosmological Perspective 
Faced with the problems of making history meaningful, 
and of overcoming the difficulties involved in a radical 
ontological monism and dualism, Augustine takes the per-
spective of Biblical faith regarding the beginning of the 
world and the relation of God to the world. In the 
121 
Confessions he says, 
Let me hear and understand how in the 
beginning Thou didst make the heaven and 
the earth. Moses wrote this; he wrote and 
departed--passed hence from Thee to Thee • 
• • • As, then, I cannot inquire of him, I 
beseech ••• forgive my sins; and do Thou, 
who didst give to Thy servant to speak 
these things, grant to me also to under-
stand.l 
Involved in Augustine's taking a perspective is his atti-
tude regarding the relation of faith to reason. In the 
light of this attitude one is better ab~e to see why he 
first takes a perspective and then attempts to make it 
intelligible. 
Essentially, the Augustinian view of the relation 
of faith to reason is that faith precedes reason. What 
does he mean by this maxim? In the Enchiridion Augustine 
says, 
At the 
Moreover, when the mind has been imbued 
with the first elements of that faith which 
worketh by love, it endeavors by purity of 
life to attain unto sight, where the pure 
and perfect in heart knew that unspeakable 
beauty, the full vision of which is supreme 
happiness. Here surely is an answer to 
your questio~ as to what is the starting-
point, and what the goal: we begin in faith, 
and are made perfect by sight. This also is 
the sum of the whole body of doctrine.2 
outset of his work, On the Trinity, Augustine says, 
libid.' p. 185. 
2Ibid., p. 659. 
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It is now our purpose, .so far as the Creator's 
own wonderful mercy may assist us, to address 
ourselves to the same theme as before, but by 
a more inward method of approach: still ob-
serving the same rule, that the truth which 
has not yet become luminous to our understand-
ing be still held fast by faith.l 
D'Arcy, in the book, ! Monument to St. Augustine, inter-
prets Augustine's maxim that faith prece.des reason by 
saying, 
Eaith, [Atigustine] insists, does'not ex-
clude reason, nor does wisdom exclude £aith. 
In every branch of learning we begin with 
authority; the child learns from his parents 
and the schoolboy from his master. As time 
goes on, no doubt, reason justifies or re-jects belief, but even in mundane beliefs it 
is of the first importan·ce to accept pro_-
visionally another's point of view. Reason 
without interest or, sympathy takes us such 
a little way. And if docility be requisite 
in all brancheS of knowledge, will it not be 
essential in what concerns Wisdom itself and 
Happinesa? Here all is at stake, and for 
our own part we are not immutably wise, but 
only feeble participants in what is far 
greater than ourselves •••• St. Augustine 
does not, therefore, appeal to faith as a 
counsel of despair:; but as the beginning of 
wisdom.2 
Does this mean that Augustine is trying to show 
what one must believe in order to maintain on~s faith that 
. 
Bimlical statements are true? On the contrary, Augustine 
would have maintained his faith in the truth of Biblical· 
lAugustine, Later Works, trans. John Burnaby 
{Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955), p. 39. 
2M. c. D'Arcy et al., Monument to Saint Augustine 
(New York: The Dial-press, 1930), p.-r61. 
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statements whether or not he could have rationally 
corroborated those statements.l It is possible that 
Augustine would have changed his rational world view if 
he could have been convinced that a more comprehensive 
viewpoint could have been developed. However, that is 
only speculation. The significaRt point here is that by 
faith Augustine accepted the statements· of the Bible as 
true and then sought to corroborate their truth through 
the development of a metaphysics. This means that 
Augustine accepted by faith the truth of the Biblical 
-
statements of Genesis 1, that is, that God created the 
world. Having accepted the statements of the Bible as 
true, Augustine sought to corroborate their truth through 
the development of a perspective based on common sense 
experience. He developed his perspective through a 
delineation of the nature and functioa of the categories 
of that perspective, that is, the conditions for the 
possibility of that perspectives being what it is. Using 
this perspective as his metaphysical vision Augustine seeks 
to work out a world view which will enable him to answer 
the difficultie~ he faces. 
The perspective of Biblical faith regarding the 
creation of the world Augustine investigates and clarifies 
lAugustine, Later Works, p. 39. 
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through the methods of introspective analysis, induction, 
and synopsis. What does he mean by each of these and how 
are they employed? 
2) Methods Augustine Employs 
A. Introspective Analysis -- Augustine begins his 
search for being and consequently for happiness thr0ugh an 
analysis ef introspective data of the mind. Through this 
method he seeks to understand the mind of man believing 
that here is a pathway to:b.eing. In .Q!! ~ Trinity he 
says, 
Concerning the creature that God has made, 
we have done our best to encourage seekers 
after a reasoned knowledge to perceive the 
invisible things of him, being understood: 
in the measure possible through the things 
that are made; and especially through the 
rational or intellectual creature that is 
made im the image of God.l 
Again, in the Confessions he says, 
And being thence warned to return to my-
self, I entered into my inward self, Thou 
leading me on; and I was able to do it, for 
Thou wert become my helper. And I entered, 
and with the eye of my soul {such as it was) 
saw above the same eye of my soul, above my 
mind, the Unchangeable Light.2 
Why does.Augustine take·this approach in his search for 
.being? 
lAugustine, Later Works, p. 168. 
2oates, Basic Writings, I~ 101. 
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Whatever else being may or may not be it must be. 1 
Being is that which is self-dependent and on which every-
thing else depends for its existence. How is being known? 
Two avenues are open to the investigator: the physical 
senses and the inner senses. Regarding that which he 
experiences through the physical senses, Augustine says, 
And I viewed the other things below Thee, 
and perceived that they neither altogether 
are, nor altogether are not. They are, in-
deed, because they are from Thee; but are 
not, because they are not what Thou art. 
For that truly is which remains immutably. 
It is good, then, for me to cleave unto 
God, for if I remain not in Him, neither 
shall I in myself; but He, remaining in 
Himself, reneweth all things.2 
The information one gains through the physical senses is 
limited to the mutable and temporal. This means that the 
cognitive categories applicable to the physical world do 
not lead one to being; they enable one to have knowledge 
of nature but not of being itself. Does the avenue of 
the inner sense allow one to find being? In the treatise 
On the Trinitz, Augustine indicates that it does. He 
says, 
Although the human mind is not of that nature 
which belongs to God, yet the image of that 
nature which transcends every other in excel-
le~ce is to be sought and found in the element 
libid., PP· 102, 104. 
2Ibid., p. 102. 
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which in our own nature is the most excellent. 
But first we have to consider the mind in it-
self, before it has participation in God, and 
discover his image there. We have said that 
it still remains the image of God, although aa 
image faded and defaced by the loss of that 
participation. It is in virtue of the fact 
that it has a capacity for God and the ability 
to participate in God, that it is his image! 
(p. 109) only because it is his image can so 
high a destiny be conceived for it. Here 
then is the mind, remembering itself, under-
standing itself, loving itself. Perceiving 
this, we perceive a trinity--a trinity still 
less than God, but already an image cf God.l 
Continuing, Augustine is careful to point out that 
the soul does not possess this knowledge or idea of God 
' because of external stimulation of the senses. Rather the 
soul possesses this knowledge for the reason that the 
soul participates in God. The soul is to the extent that 
it participates in the ideas in God's mind. One can say 
that the soul is a resemblance, a likeness of the idea 
"soul". To the extent one knows oneself to that extent 
one knows God. It is through the structure and nature 
of inner experience· that God is to be known if known at 
all. This is not to say that God can be known completely 
by the finite mind. On the contrary, the finite mind can-
not fully comprehend the relationships involved in the 
Trinity. Nevertheless, the infinite can be comprehended 
to some extent.2 As Windelband suggests, 
lAugustine, Later Works, pp. 108-109. 
2oates, Basic Writings, I, 101. 
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The essential thing in this is the insight; 
that the categories acquired in knowing Nature 
are inadequate for the peculiar nature o~ 
spiritual synthesis (according to which the 
divine essence should be thought). The new 
categories of internality are, however, With 
Augustine £nly in the process of coming into 
existence. 
Thus, distrusting the ex~ernal senses to lead him to being, 
Augustine takes the avenue provided by the categories o~ 
inner experience. Through an analysis of the data gathered 
by introspection he intends to uncover and delineate the 
nature and structure of man's mind through which he can 
know the nature and stru.cture of God, i.e_. .'Being. 
B. Induction Besides analysis 0f introspective 
data Augustine employs the method of reasoning from the 
known to the unknown, the certain to the uncertain in his 
attempt to give eredence to his perspective. In the 
treatise, On the Immortality .2f. the Soul, he says, 
Without science [diseiplina] nobody reasons 
rightly. For thought is right reasoning 
moving from things certain to the investiga-
tion of things uncertain, and there is 
nothing certain ~n an ignorant mind. All~ 
that the mind knows, moreover, it contains 
within itself, nor does knowledge consist in 
anything which does not pertain to some 
science. For science2is the knowledge of any thing whatsoever. 
lw. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. 
James H. Tufts (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908), 
p. 31 • 
. 2oates, Basic Writings, I, 301. 
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The movement of Augustine's mind in his search for the 
conditions for the possibility of being and consequently 
of his experience is aptly clarified by Gilson when he 
says, 
[What] do we find as the necessary starting-
point of our search? Facts, and nothing but 
facts. These facts may be, and often are, 
facts of inner experience, they may be ideas--
but as ideas taken not as principles of de-
duction, but as the basis of induction. • • • 
Like being, like life, like sensation, like 
thought, truth is a fact; like other facts, 
it is presented to our empirical observation; 
like other empirical observations, it clemancls 
of metaphysics the discovery of its sufficient 
. reason; and if God alone can furnish its 
sufficient reason, we shall have proved the 
existence of God. • • • The primum oognitum of 
St. Augustine is not God, it is man within the 
universe, and, within this universe and this 
man, the experience of a true judgement. But 
it must be added that this primum cognitum is 
not even the primum reale; on the contrary, 
it becomes intelligible only on condition of 
finding its sufficient reason in a trans9end-
ent fact which provides its explanation.~ 
Thus, Augustine employs the method of induction in order to 
advance from that of which he is certain, the date delin-
eated by introspective analysis, to that of which he is 
uncertain but which nevertheless provides a sufficient 
condition for that about which he is certain. 
C. Synopsis -- Finally, the method of synopsis is 
used by the Bishop of HiPP9 in his search for the nature 
and function .of the eategories o~ .creation. Synopsis is 
ln•Arcy, Monument ~Saint Augustine, pp. 305-306. 
used but is not explicitly recognized. This aspect of 
Augustinian method comes into play when he allows the 
categories of creation to function in their respective 
and composite roles. Having determined the nature of these 
categories, Augustine allows them to operate in their 
respective capacities and as a whole and observes the kind 
of world that can come into existence and remain in ex-
istence. How Augustine uses this method will become 
clearer when the function of the categories of ereation 
is discussed in section five of this chapter. 
In review, Augustine, po·ssessing a strong sc·epticism 
regarding the capacity of the physical senses to 'lead to a 
knowledge of being, follows the avenue of the inner senses. 
Believing that the categories of the inner senses will 
allow knowledge of tieing, he investigates the mind through 
introspection and analysis. Next, induction is used to 
determine the sufficient conditions.of that about which 
Augustine is certain. Through this method he intends to 
uncover the categories of being and consequently of crea-
tion. Finally, synopsis is employed to determine the 
sufficiency of the categories of creation to account for 
empirical fact. Through the delineation of the categories 
of creation and their functioning in Augustine's meta-
physical system the meaning and function of these methods 
will become progressively clearer. 
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3) Transition to the Nature of Creation 
Faced with the problems of rendering history meaning-
ful and of making intelligible the relation of being to 
becoming and of time to eternity, Augustine, taking the 
perspective of Biblical faith regarding creation and ad-
vancing by means of introspective analysis, induction, 
and synopsis, seeks to account for empirical facts by 
means of the idea of creation. What Augustine means by 
creation can best be understood, first, .bY examining the 
nature and function of creation in his cosmology and, 
second, by delineating the conceptual basis of his idea 
of creation. Then, Augustine's view of creation can be 
evaluated to see if it allows him to overcome the problems 
he faces. First, then, what is the nature of creation in 
Augustine's cosmology? 
4. The Nature of Creation 
The nature of creation in Augustine's system can 
adequately be understood through a discussion of the 
arguments for the existence and nature of God, and through 
a delineation of the categories of creation which are 
involved in the nature of God. What, then, are the 
arguments for the existence of, and for the nature of, God 
in Augustine's metaphysics? 
1) Arguments for God's Existence 
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Distrusting the physical senses as adequate avenues 
to bsing, Augustine seeks tiecertain, the immutable, the 
ultimately real through an introspective analysis of the 
mind. The senses lead only to what is mutable and in-
constant. However, through an analysis of inner experi-
ence one can find certainties which suggest not only that 
God is but also what God is. Following this approach 
Augustine puts forth arguments that God exists. How does 
Augustine argue for the existence of God? 
A. Argument from the Nature of ~nner Experience 
In the first argument for God's existence Augustine analyzes 
the mind to find that of which he is certain. Proceeding 
from the basis of this certainty he attempts to account 
for it inductively. He argues from the ce~tainties of 
inner experience to their sufficient condition, that is, 
God. How does this argument progress? Following an 
analysis of introspective data Augustine finds that he is 
intuitively certain that he exists. He argues, 
I am most certain that I am, and that I know 
and delight in this. In respect of these 
truths, I am not at all afraid of the 
arguments of the Academicians, who say, What 
if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I 
am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; 
and if I am deceived, how am I deceived in 
believing that I am? for it is certain that 
I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, 
the person deceived, should be, even if I am 
deceived, certainly ± am not deceived in this 
knowledge that I am. 
lAugustine, City Q! God, p. 370. 
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Through further analysis of the data uncovered by intro-
spection the philosopher finds that he has intuitive 
knowledge not only that he exists but also of universal 
and unchangeable norms. 
These ideas, or universal and changeless norms,are 
determined when the mind seeks norms in terms of which it 
can judge. In On the Trinity Augustine says, 
But it is the part sf the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according 
to incorporeal and eternal reasons; whieh, 
unless they were above the human mind, 
would certainly not be unchangeable; and 
yet, unless something of our own were sub-joined to them, we should not be able to 
employ them as our measures by which to judge of corporeal things. But we judge 
of corporeal things from the rule of 
dimensions and figures, 1which the mind knows to remain unchangeably. 
Not only, then, is Augustine intuitively certain that he 
exists, but also he is intuitively certain that he knows 
norms which are unchangeable. What else can be said of 
·these norms? 
The immutable principles in terms of which judge-
ments can be maae are also universal. The philosopher 
reasons thusly, 
Well, listen now, and tell me whether any-
thing can be found which all who reason see 
' 
lphilip Schaff (ed.), A Select Library~ the Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (14 vels.; 
Buffalo, New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1887), 
III, 155. 
133 
in common, each with his own reaso~ and 
mind. An object which is seen ia present 
to all and is not changed for the use of 
those to whom it is present, l;lEk in the 
case of food or drink, but remains in-
corrupt and entire, whether seen or not 
seen •••• I see there are many examples, 
though it.is enough to mention one. The 
law and truth of number is present to all 
who reason. All calculators try to grasp 
their truth by reason and understanding; 
one man can do so more easily, one less 
easily,. one not at all. However, their 
truth presenti itself equally to all who 
can grasp it. 
Through analysis of the mind and its judgmental process 
Augustine finds that there are norms whieh are unchangeable 
and universal. That this is the case is illustrated by 
number. What does be mean by the law of number? He clari-
fies his meaning when he says, 
By the light of my mind I check the man who 
reaches a wrong division or addition of 
numbers. By the light of my mind I check 
the man who reaches a wrong result in addi-
tion or subtraction. Whatever I become 
aware of with hy bodily sense, whether 
heaven or earth or any bodily thing they 
contain~ how long they will last I do not 
know. ~ut seven and three are ten, not 
only now, but always. There has never been 
a time when seven and three were not ten, 
nor will there ever be. Therefore I have 
said that this incorruptible truth of number 
is common to myself and to everyone who 
reasons.2 
. 
!Augustine, The Problem £! ~ ChoiceJ trans. by 
Dom Mark Pontifex (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman 
Press, 1955), PP• 97-98. 
2Ibid., p. 99. 
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Thus, through analysis of inner experience Augustine is 
certain that he exists and that there are universal and 
immutable mathematical norms in terms of which he 
judges.1 
Besides himself and mathematical norms is there any-
thing else about which one caa claim certainty? What 
about wisdom; are there many wisdoms, one for each 
individual, or one universal applicable to everyone?2 
Though it is difficult to say exactly in what wisdom 
consists, it is the case that wisdom is shared in common) 
Hence, the truth that wisdom is shared in common is a 
truth which is universal, common to all people.4 Further~ 
more, certain principles like, "· •• we ought to live 
justly; the better should be preferred to the worse; like 
should be compared with like; every man should be given 
his due, n ane. held in common and possessed solely by no 
one.5 No one will deny this. Thus the principles of 
wisdom are universal·and unchangeable like the principle 
of numbers. 6 
What are these universal and immutable principles 
but truths, the common denominator of which is Truth? 
Augustine says, 
lrbid., p. 102. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 105. 
4Ibid., p. 107. 5Ibid., pp. 107-1€>8. 
6rbid., p. 110. 
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Therefore you would by no means deny that 
there exists unchangeable truth, containing 
all those things which are unchangeably true. 
Yeu could Bot call this yours or mine or any 
man's, but it is present and offers itself in 
common to all who behold unchangeable truths, 
like a light which in a wonderful fashion is 
both secret.and pu'b>lic. No one could say 
that anything which is present in common to 
all who have reason and understanding belongs 
to the nature of one individual.l 
It has been shown that truths are the object of a non-
discursive rational contemplation. In the light of the 
demonstration that truths are contained in Truth one is 
able to conclude·that Truth is also the object of 
rational contemplation. What is the status of Truth? 
Is it on the same level with our minds, below them, or 
above them? 
Augustine contends that Truth is higher than our 
minds. His argument centers around the notion that Truth 
is not subject to the vicissitudes of finite minds •. He 
points this out in his treatise, The Problem 2£ Free 
Choice, when he says, 
When a man says that the eternal is superior 
to the temporal, or that seven and three are 
ten, no one asserts that it ought to be so, 
but, knowing it is so, we rejoice to make the 
discovery without scrutinizing aBd trying to 
correct it. 
If this truth were on an equality with 
our minds, it would itself be subject to change. 
S0metimes our minds see it more clearly, . :··"- · 
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sometimes less clearly, and as a result they 
admit themselves to be subject to change. 
The truth, however, abiding in itself, gains 
nothing when we see it more clearly, and loses 
nothing when we see it less clearly, but, 
whole and sound, it gladdens with its light 
those who turned away from it. Again, we judge about our own minds according to the 
truth, though we can by no means judge about 
the truth itself •••• Hence if the truth 
is neither inferior to nor equal to our minds, 
it can only be higher and more noble.~ 
Thus, Truth is universal, immutable,' and superior to finite 
minds. What can be inferred from the demonstration that 
Truth exists and is universal, i~utable, and superior to 
finite minds? 
The assumption is made by Augustine that if he can 
prove that there exists something superior to reason then 
he has proven that God exists. He believes that he has 
proven that Truth fulfills these characteristics. Thus 
God exists. He concludes his argument by drawing an 
inference from the argument that Truth is, is immutable, 
and is universal. He ~ays, 
If I showed there was something above our 
minds, you admitted you would confess it to 
be God, provided there was nothing else higher. 
I accepted your admission, and said it was 
enough that I should show this. For if there 
is anything more excellent, it is this which 
is God, but, if there is nothing more ex-
cellent, then truth itself is God. Whichever 
is the fact, you cannot deny that God exists, 
and this was the question we set ourselves to 
debate.2 
libid., p. 115. 2Ibid., p. 120. 
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From the certainty of " ..his own existence to the further 
certainties of the universality and immutability of truths 
Augustine moves to the certainty that Truth exists, that 
Truth is superior to reason, and finally that Truth is God. 
This logical movement is inductive in th~ sense that 
Augustine moves from limited class concepts to more 
generic classes. It is able to progress because through 
an analysis of introspective data Augustine claims as 
certain his '.intniti ve knowledge that he is and that there 
are norms in terms of which he makes judgements. 
B. Argument From Design in Nature -- The second 
argument for the existence of God proceeds along the lines 
of induction from the facts of physical experience to God 
as the sufficient condition for these facts. From his 
experience of order, proportion, and harmony in nature 
Augustine infers that their sufficient condition is God. 
He says, 
Even towards bodily creatures, far lower than 
spiritual creatures even when sinful, He has 
shown such profusion of goodness that no one 
can reasonably contemplate heaven and earth 
and all visible things so harmoniously formed 
and ordered according to their natures, with-
out believing God to be their author, and 
confessing that He deserves ineffable praise.1 
Further, Augustine contends that everything possesses some 
lrbid., p. 177; cf. Ibid., pp. 125-26. 
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form. How is one to account for the presence of form in 
mutable things? Aagustine finds in God a sufficient 
reason for the presence of form in mutable objects. He 
submits, 
Every changeable thing must necessarily 
be able to realize its form •••• Nothing 
can give its form to itself, since nothing 
can give itself what it does not possess, 
and indeed a thing is given its form, that 
it may possess its form. Renee, if any-
thing possesses a form, there is no need 
for it to receive wh.at it possesses, but, 
if it does not possess a form, it cannot 
receive from itself what it does not 
possess. Nothing, then, as we have said, 
can give itself a form •••• So we con-
elude that body and soul are given their 
forms by a form which is unchangeable and 
everlasting.l 
How God gives to objects their form will be discussed 
under the typic of the function of creation in Augustines 
thought. Suffice it to say at this poimt, h<:>wever., that 
Augustine appeals to his doctrine of seminal reasons. 
The significant point here is that since .all forms reside 
in God, to the extent an object has form or determination 
that determination is given to that object by God. Finally, 
that which is mutable is not self-dependent; it is 
contingent upon something else. From the fact of muta-
bility Augustine argues to an immutable being. He con-
tends, 
lrbid., p. 126. 
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We underst~ncl that all things are ruled by 
providence. If everything which exists 
would eecome nothing, were the form wholly 
withdrawn, the unchangeable for.m itself is 
their providence. For it makes all change-
able things subsist, and realise themselves 
and act through the numbers pr0per to their 
ferms. !hey would not be, if it were not 
present. 
Thus, from the fact of order, proportion, harmony, form, 
and change Augustine argues to a providential God which 
provides the ontological basis o£ their existence. 
That God exists Augustine contends he has proven 
by using the methods of introspective analysis and induc-
tion. However, that God is does not shed much light on 
what he is. Specifically, what is the nature of God for 
Augustine? When God's nature has been carefully con-
sidered the categories of creation will be explicated. 
It is significamt to advise one at this peint to observe 
in the following discussion the place Augustine gives to 
analogical reasoning when Augustine argues for:. the nature 
of God. The importamne of what Augustine is doing .. here 
will come to light when the analogical underpfunUrngs of 
his idea of .creation are discussed and evaluated. 
2) Argument'.· for God's Nature 
A. Argument from the Nature .2£ Being -- The proofs 
of God's existence have indi.cated some of the nature of 
lrbid., p. 127. 
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God. They have imdicated that universal norms exist, that 
these· norms compositely are Truth, and that it is of the 
essence of Truth to exist. It was inferred that since 
Truth is universal, immutable, and superior to finite 
reason, it is God. Whatever else one may say about God 
it is the case that Truth is God. Implied in Truth are 
other characteristics such as these: God is immutable, 1 
eternal, 2 self-same,3 Good, True,_ and Beautiful.4 These 
characteristics are involved in Augustine's doctrine of 
JJeing, and they c·larify somewhat the nature of God. How-
ever, the great philosopher means much more than this 
when he speaks of the nature of God. Such a God as this 
is nothing more than ~eing, important as tha~ may be. It 
is void of personality and consequently of the character-
istics essential to the God of Biblical faith. Windelband 
suggests that Augustine seeks to preserve the Biblical 
teaching that God is a person through his contention that 
"insofar as a comprehension of the divine essence is at 
all possible fer man, it can be gained only after the 
analogy of human self-knowledge.n5 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 207-209. 
2Ibid., PP• 189, 190. 3Ibid., P• 207. 
4Augustine, Problem 2f Free Choice, p. 121. 
5windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 280; cf. OateSj1. 
Basic Writings, I, 233-234, and Augustine, Citz of Ged, 
p. 17~-
B. Argument from the Nature of Finite Mind 
Following directly from his reasoned acceptance of inner 
experience as the only avenue to the knowledge of God, 
Augustine argues that man can know the nature of God, how-
ever faintly and imperfectly, only by reasoning from the 
certainty .and str~cture of the finite person to God him-
self. It has been shown that through reasoning from the 
certainty of norms the existence of Truth is proved to 
Augustine's satisfaction. Another approach to a knowledge 
of God is through analogical reasoning. This method is 
based on the assumption that the categories of inner ex-
perience are sufficient to allow knowledge of the nature 
of God and consequently the nature and function of God's 
creative activity. Augustine says regarding this point, 
"Yet in ourselves beholding His image, let us, like that 
younger son of the gospel, come to ourselves, and arise 
and return to Him frQm whom by our s.ins we had departed. nl 
Through an analysis of the soul Augustine delineates 
the categories of inner experience. Then, reasoning 
analogically, he puts these categories on a metaphysical 
plane and suggests that they are "the fundamental deter-
minations of all reality,rr2 and consequently the conditions 
!Augustine, City of God, p. 373. 
2windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 280. 
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for the possi~ility of God's creative activity. What are 
the categories of inner experience in terms of which 
Augustine intends to gain knowledge of the nature of God? 
An analysis of the mind reveals that its categories 
are membny, understanding, and will. In his search for 
the categories or conditions for the possibility of the 
mind, the "powers" of the mind, Augustine argues, 
We are concerned now with the nature of the 
mind; and we have to exclude from our con-
sideration everr.thing which enters our 
acquaintance from outside by the bodily 
senses, and concentrate our attention upon-
the points which all minds know with certainty 
about themselves. Whether the powers of life, 
recollection, understanding, will, thought, 
knowledge, judgment, and properties of air, 
or of fire, or of brain, or of blood, or of 
atoms, or of some tfifth body' distinct from 
the familiar.four elements; or whether they 
could all be produced by the composition or 
harmonization of our fleshly substance -- ~s 
to all this men have doubted; and one has 
attempted to affirm one theory, another 
another. But no-one can possibly doubt that 
he lives and remembers, understands, wills, 
thinks, knows, and judges. For even if he 
doubts, he lives: if he doubts what has 
made him doubt, he remembers; if he doubts, 
he understands that he is doubting; if he ·· 
doubts, he wishes to. be certain, if he 
doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows 
that he is ignorant; if he doubts, he judges 
that he ought not to he hasty in assent'ing. 
A man may doubt everything else, but he should 
not doubt any of these facts; for if they were 
not so, he could doubt of nothing. 
Thus, it is obvious that Augustine considered the sine 
qua non of the mind to be memory, understanding, and will. 
lAugustine, Later Works, pp. 85-6. 
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What does he mean by these? 
Continuing with his introspective analysis, Augustine 
delineates the nature and function of his psychical trilogy. 
By memory the Bishop of Hippo means the retentive dimension 
of the mind.l The memory is a "hidcl.en storing place of 
knowle<ilge. rr2 That which the memory nstores'' is either re-
collected by the mind when jostled by sensation or is 
implicit to every mind such as the idea of God.3 In 
either case, what the memory retains is ideas.4 Ideas 
form the content of memory when the ideas are. "not thought 
upon.rr5 Additional insight into what Augustine means by 
memory and-its function can be seen in a statement by 
Augustine from ~he Confessions. Regarding the ideas or 
knowledge which one possesses, he says, 
But truly, when I hear that there are 
three kinds of questions, 'Whether a thing 
is--what it is--of w.hat kind it is?' I cl.o 
indeed hold fast the images of the sounds 
of whieh these words are composed, and I 
know that those seunds passed through the 
air with a noise, and now are not. But the 
things themselves which are signified by 
libid., p. 105. 2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 108; cf. Oates, Basic Writings of Saint 
Augustine;-I, 389, 394; Augustine, Later Works, pp. 65, i0~ 
4schaff, Select Library, III, 155; cf. Oates, Basie 
Writings, I, 304-5. 
5Augustine, Later Works, p. 106. 
these sounds I never arrived at by any sense 
of the body, nor ever perceived them other-
wise than by my mind; and in my memory have 
I laid up not their images, but themselves, 
which, how they entered into me, let them 
tell if they are able. For I examine all 
the gates of my fleshi but find not by which 
of them they entered. 
Thus, the ideas not only are in the memory when they are 
not being thought, but also they logically and temporally 
precede the mind in its attitude of trunderstandingn in 
which the ideas are explicitly contemplated. This means 
that the condition for the possibility for having knowledge 
is the presence of the ideas in the memory. 2 For Augustine, 
then, the memory is the storehouse of knowledge, that is, 
of "reproducible ideas" as Windelband calls them.3 The 
memory retains the ideas when they are not being thought 
and forms the sufficient condition for the possibility of 
the mind's having explicit knowledge. 
What is the nature and function of understanding? 
Augustine contends that the mind has two rational functions: 
the lower part which apprehends the da t.a supplied to it by 
the inner sense (which has apprehended the raw data of the 
physical sen~es and prepared it for the apprehension of 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 155 .• 
2Augustine, Later Works, p. 107. 
3windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 280. 
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the lower reason) 1 and interprets them according to the 
ideas present to the higher reason,2 and the higher reason 
which contemplates the immutable ideas.3 It is the higher 
function of the rational dimension of the mind th~t 
Augustine calls "understanding." He says, 
When we seek~ the trinity in the mind, we seek 
it in the whole mind, without separating the 
action of the reason in things temporal from 
the contemplation of things eternal, so as to 
have further to seek some thiwd thing, by 
which a trinity may be completed. But this 
trinity must needs be so discovered in the 
whole nature of the mind, as that even if 
action upon temporal things were to be with-
drawn, for which work that help_ is necessary, 
with a view to which some part of the mind 
is diverted in order to deal with these in-
ferior things, yet a trinity would still be 
found in the one mind that is no where parted 
off; and that when this distribution has been 
already made, not only a trinity may be found, 
but also an image of God, in that alone which 
belongs to the contemplation of eternal things; 
while in that other which is diverted from it 
in the dealing with temporal things, although 
there may be a trinity~ yet there cannot be 
found an image of God.~ . 
The understanding is the contemplating activity of the 
mind. That which it contemplates is the immutable ideas. 
In On the Trinity Augustine says, 
So the image is to be discovered rather in 
the three functions of memory, understanding 
and will--'understanding' being here taken 
1Augustine, Problem of Free Choice, p. 87. 
2schaff, Select Library, III, 155. 
3Ibid., p. 156. 4Ibid. 
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to denote the faculty by which we come to 
understand in the process of thought: that 
is to say, when our thinking takes form 
through the 'bringing forth' of what was 1 present to the memory but not thought of. 
It is clear then that "to 'understand,' ••• is simply 
to 'see with the mind,' to 'apprehend' rather than 'compre-
hend,' and the act of understanding is intuitive, not dis-
cursi~e.n2 
Finally, what is the nature and function of the will? 
Augustine defines the will as that dimension of the mind· 
which pursues and embraces nan object of enjoyment.n3 The 
will is that which gives dynamic to the mind.4 It is that 
which causes the mind to search and strive for knowledge. 
Indeed, it is the searching and striving itself.5 In a 
sense the will has for its source the mind. However, in 
another and m0re fundamental sense the will is "the essen-
tial element in all: omnes nihil guam voluntates ~.n6 
In On the Trinity Augustine points this out when he says, 
lAugustine, Later Works, p. 108. 
2~., p. 35; cf., Ibid., p. 65. 
3rbid., p. 1o6. 4rbid., P• 70. 
5Augustine uses "will" and "love" as if they mean 
the same thing. Essentially, they have the same meaning. 
However, whereas will denotes the conative aspect of the 
mind, love denotes both conation and feeling. Thus, when 
Augustine uses love he means will with the overtone of 
feeling. For further clarification cf •. Augustine, Later 
Works, p. 36. 
bwindelband, HistoEZ of Philosophy, p. 281. 
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But ••• there is good reason_£or not calling 
this love 'begotten' of the mind, like the 
knowledge by which it knows itself, because 
knowled~e is a thing discovered, and the dis-
covery ~s often preceded by a search which 
aims at resting in its object. Search is a 
striving for discovery, which is the same 
thing as finding; and things found are as it 
were 'brought forth' -- we remember the con-
nection between the.Latin words partus and 
repertus -- and so comparable with an off-
spring. The bringing forth can only be in the 
knowledge itself, where they are (as we may 
say) shaped and formed. The actual things 
we seek and find, already existed; but the 
knowledge did not, and the knowledge is the 
'offspring' which we count as being 'born.' 
On the other hand, the striving which appears 
in the search proceeds from the seeker, re-
maining in a kind of suspense, and only 
coming to rest in the desired end, when the 
object iought is found and coupled to the · 
seeker. 
From this statement the implication is clear that the will 
is free. This means that it is compelled by nothing other 
than itself to search and strive for the object or objects 
of its desire. 
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Howeve;r-, the will does possess "the knowledge of 
purposive seeking, which involves memory and understanding.'f 
This does not necessarily mean that the will is memory· and 
understanding as well as searching. But it does mean that 
unless the will owned some understanding of the purpose 
'or the why of its seeking nit would be ignorant of its own 
lAugustine, Later Works, p. 70. 
2Ibid., p. 169. 
proper 0bject."1 From this it is clear that the will is . 
the dynamic aspect of the mind, that it is free, and that 
it is not "begottenn of the mind. 
From the foregoing analysis of the mind one is able 
to see that the memory is both the abiding place of the 
ideas which are not being thought and the sufficient 
condition for having knowledge. The understanding is the 
contemplative dimension of the mind. That which the mind 
contemplates is the world of immutable ideas. Finally, 
the will is the dynamic aspect of the mind. The will 'is 
that factor in the mind which causes it to search for 
knowledge, to grasp and hold "an abject of enjoymeri.t.n2 
From this explication of memory, understanding, and will 
the nature and function of each is clear. But what is 
their composite function? How are they related to one 
another? 
Augustine outlines the essential aspects of the intev-
relation of memory, will, and understanding when he says, 
According we may say that mind's tbringing 
forth' is preceded by a kind o£ striving, 
by which, in the se~king and finding of 
what we desire to know, knowledge is·born 
as offspring. It follows that this striv-
ing, whereby knowledge is conceived and 
brought forth, cannot properly be called 
!brought forth' or 'offspring.' This same 
striving, or eager pursuit of the thing 
yet to be known, becomes love of the thing 
libid. 2rbid:, p. 1G6. 
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known, when it holds in its embrace the 
offspring, the knowledge, in which it ~elights, and joins it to the begetter.l 
It was indicated above that the memory is a condition for 
the possibility of knowledge. In order to have knowledge 
of oneself there must be in the memory an idea of oneself. 2 
How does knowledge of oneself arise?. Knowleage of one-
self arises through self-love.3 To ask what causes this 
love by which one loves the knowledge of oneself is to 
ask for a cause more basie than the will. For Augustine 
the_will is the highest cause in each individual finite 
mind.4 Thus knowledge of oneself arises because of the 
desire of the mind to know itself.' What is the result 
of the striving of the mind to know itself? When the 
mi~d embraces itself, finds that for which it seeks, that 
which was latent in the memory becomes explicit in 
remembrance.6 In the aet of remembering "something is 
brought to birth, in the person who thinks, of the same 
kind as what was in him as the possessor of memory be-
fore the thinking process.u!7 The result of the desiring 
and remembering process is the "word " , the offspring of 
lrbid., p. 71. 2Ibid .. , P• 107. 
3~., P• 66~ 4Ibid., P• 70. 
.5rbid., p. 77. 6rbid., p. 1®7. 
7Ibid. 
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the memory. What is the "wG>rd'.'? Augustine defines the 
meaning G>f the WG>rd when he says, 
We must distinguish three senses of 'word.' 
First, the word temporally extended in syl-
lables, whether spoken al0ud 0r.only thought. 
Second, anything known and fixed in the mind, 
so long as memory retains it for production 
and definition, though the thing itself be 
displeasing. Third, that in the m~ntal con-
ception of which we take pleasure.l 
The third meaning is the one Augustine attaches .to trword.n2 
Does this mean that the knowledge of faults is pleasing? 
This is exactly what Augustine means. He says, "It is not 
the knowledge of faults that displeases us but the faults 
themselves.n3 Thus, in the searching for oneself and in 
the remembering of oneself ~ne attains unto a knowledge of 
oneself, and this knowledge is the offspring of the search-
ing and the remembering mind. Thus, the "'word' is knowl-
edge together with lave. n4 What is the rei.atio~ship be-
tween the "word" and the mind? The mind possesses "a 
certain likeness of the object known."5 In this case the 
"word" is like the object known. Augustine aptly summarizes 
this point when he says, 
We conclude that when the mind knows and 
approves itself, the knowledge as the mind's 
"word" is entirely and CCi>nstantly correspGind-
·ent and adequate. to the mind; being knowledge 
libid •. , p. 67. 
4Ibid. 
2rbid., p. 68. 
5rbid. 
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neither o£ a lower essence like the body, 
nor of a higher, like God. And while all 
knowledge has a likeness to its object, that 
is to the thing known, the likeness in this 
knowledge, by which the knowing mind is known 
to itself, is perfect and adequate. Accord-
ingly it is bot~ image and word, being 
moulded upon the mind to which in the act of 
knowing it is equated; and tha thing begotten 
is equal to the begetter.l 
Furthermore, the word which is "spoken by the mind," 
realized through self-lave and rememberance, is an "inward" 
word in contrast t0 the "outward" we>rd. The "outward11 is 
that which is spoken by the mouth. The "inward11 is spoken 
by the "heart," that is the mind. 2 That which is spoken 
by the mouth is the sign of the "inwardn word, i.e., the 
sign of what we know. Thus, the basis of the "outward" 
ward is the inward "word." Finally, the finite mind is 
able to do no work without the presence 0f se~f-knowledge, 
the word. The basis of work is knowledge and this knowl-
edge is the word. How c0uld one work unless ~ne under-
· stood what to do and how to do it?3 The importance of 
the "word" as well as will and memory for Augustine will 
become clear in following discussionsof God's nature and 
his creative activity. 
In conclusion, then, through the striving and search-
ing will and the remembering of the memory understanding 
lrbid~, PP· 68-9. 
3Ibid., p. 148. 
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ar knowledge is brought forth from the inner heart. The 
knowledge the mind gains of itself and in Which knowledge 
the mind takes delight is a perfect expression of itself, 
a perfect resemblance. Work ca~ be done by the finite 
mind because of the "word." Thus, the memory is the b a-
getter, the understanding (knowledge or "word") is the 
begotten, and the will is.that which binds together the 
begetter and the begotten th~ough the love of the be-
getter for the begotten and the begotten for the begetter.1 
In these categories of inner experience Augustine 
finds an aaalogy of the Trinity. In On.the Trinity he 
says, 
In our image of the Trinity, the human 
memory, especially as distinguished from 
that of beasts by containing ideas not 
conveyed to it through the bodily senses, 
offers in its own measure a likeness, hol>T-
ever inadequate, of the Father. The human 
understanding which reeeives.form t~erefrom 
in the effort of thought, when.the thing 
known is spoken as an inward word belonging 
to no language, offers in all its disparity 
a certain likeness of the Son. The human 
love, which proceeds from knowledge and is 
a link between memory and understanding, as 
being common to parent and offspring -- so 
that it cannot be identified with either --
offers in that image a likeness, even if an 
inadequate likeness, of the Holy Spirit.2 
This image in man of the Trinity breaks down at the point 
of the precise nature of, and relationship ·o~ each category 
libid., p. 108. 2rbi d. , p. 170 • 
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to the other. The memory, will, and understanding.are 
climensions of one finite mind whereas the Father, the Son, 
>tani the Holy Spirit are three persons who !!:! God.l 
Furthermore, the mind is changeable while the Godhead is 
unchangeable, otherwise it would be unable to be moulded 
into a more perfect image of the Godhead. 2 Also, memory, 
understanding, and will cannot be confined to God, Son, 
and Holy Ghost, respeetively. These dimensions are not 
interchangeable in the finite mind whereas they are in 
the infinite mind.3 Nevertheless, the image or likeness 
of the Godhead is found in the trilogy of the mind even 
though that image is imperfect, deformed, and scarcely 
recognizable.4 Augustine says in On the Trinity, 
When the promised vision, "face to face," 
has come, we shall behold the Trinity --
that Trinity which is not only incorporeal 
but perfectly inseparable and truly change-
less -- far more clearly and surely than we 
now behold its image in ourselves. This 
present vision, through a mirror and in an 
enigma, as vouchsafed to us in this life, 
belongs not to any who can perceive in 
their own mind all that we have here set out 
by our analysis; but to those who see the 
mind as an image, and so are able to achieve 
a certain relating of what they see to him 
whose image it is: to reach through their 
actual vision of the image a presumptive 
1rbid., p. 171. 
2rbid., PP• 118-119, 121, 123. 
3rbid., PP· 138-140. 4raid., p. 119. 
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vision of the original which cannot yet be 
seen face to face. 
If the categories applicable to nature are not 
applicable to being, and if the categories of the mind are 
applicable to being, then the avenue to any ~elineation of 
being is through the categories of inner experience. 
Furthermore, if one is to say anything about God then the 
categories of the mind must not only be epistemic· but also 
must be ontolological. In some sense being must be like 
the categories of inner experience. Otherwise one can say 
nothing about.being, including that it is. Thus, Augustine 
is able to say that the categories of God are analogous to 
memory, understanding, and will. This is the reason for 
becoming involved in the treatment, even though cursopy, 
of Augustine's arguments for the existence and nature of 
God. Before he could talk about what God is he must first 
prove that God is. The only avenue he thought open to 
him to know God's nature was through the nature of the 
human mind. After an introspective analysis of the human 
mind he thought he could through analogical reasoning 
delineate the nature of God. This he attempted to do. 
In the light of the foregoing analysis what is the nature 
of God? When God's nature has been delineated then the 
libid., p. 171. 
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functioning of God's nature in his creating activity will 
be discussed. 
3) Nature of God 
A. God ~ Being. It has been pointed out that the 
memory is like God in that it contains ideas, norms, or 
forms. By analogy one can say that God is being by virtue 
of the fact that in him are to be found the immutable and 
universal norms or ideas. Through an examinatien of the 
nature and ontological status of the ideas one will be able 
to gain an understanding of Augustine's teaching that God 
is ~eing. 
In his treatise, De Diversis Quaestionibus, Augustine 
defines the ideas when he says, 
For ideas are certain primary forms or 
~atterns of things, abiding and unchange-
able, not created, and therefore eternal 
and forever the same, contained in the 
divine mind; and whereas they themselves 
do not eome into being nor perish, is said 
to be formed according to them.l 
From this definition it is evident that the "ideas are 
eternal, uncreated, and unchangeable, 1' and that creation 
was modeled according to them.2 
lsr. Rita Marie Bushman, "St. Augustine's Metaphysics 
and Stoic Doctrine," The New Scholasticism, .XX.VI (July, 
1952)' 286. --
2H. Meyerhoff, "On the Platonism of St. Augustine's 
uaestio de ideas," The New Scholasticism, XVI (January, 
1942 ' 21. 
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What is the ontolegical status of the ideas? Are 
they in God or external to him? To say that they are ex-
ternal to God is to say that there is a being besides God. 
This would controvert Augustine's contention that God is 
being and that all things are dependent on Him for their 
existenoe.1 Furthermore, following from the analogy of 
the finite mind, Augustine asks, 
Where, however, could these rationes be 
thought to exist except in the mind of God? 
For He did not·look at anything lying out-
side Himself, so that He might shape crea-
tion according te it. To believe .such a 
thing is sacriligious. If now the forms of 
all these things, created and to be created, 
are contained in the divine mind, and if 
nothing can be in the divine mind but the 
eternal and unchangeable, and if Plato called 
these primary things 'ideas,' they are not 
only ideas, but they are true, because they 
are eternal and because they remain the same 
and unchangea~le. Through participation in 
them it happens that everything is what it is 
and hew it is.2 
Thus, God is ~eing by virtue of the fact that in him re-
side the eternal and immutable forms. It is because all 
things participate in the forms, i.e., because they are 
images of the forms, that mutable and temporal things are 
what they are. Because the ideas are in God it is correct 
to say that the realm of change and time is dependent on 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 104. 
2Meyerhoff, The New Scholasticism, p. 36; cf •. 
Augustine, Later Works, p. 152. 
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and participates in God. 
B. God !,! Understanding -- Through the understanding 
one is able to determine the second pers,on of the Trinity, 
the Son or the Word. It has been shown that the understand-
ing in the finite mind is the self-knowledge· of the mind, 
that it is a perfect resemblance of the mind and as s~ch 
it is the nwordu of the mind, that it is the offspl!ing of 
the remembering activity of the memory and the searching 
activity of the will, that the uword" is spoken by the 
heart, i.e., by the mind, and not by the mouth. And, 
finally, that the "word" is the basis of all work the 
finite mind is able to de. Through the image of the "word" 
of the finite mind on~ is able to gain some understanding 
of God as understanding. One mu~t keep in mind that the 
finite mind is only an analogy of God. This means that 
Augustine is able to delineate with little precision the 
nature of God. However, the analogy allows enough pre-
cision fer Augustine to outline the ont.ological conditions 
for the possibility of creation and the operation of these 
conditions in his metaphysical scheme. 
First, the Word is the "Father's only-begotten Son.nl 
By "(\mly-begettentt AugustiJ:J.e means that the Son or the Word 
is the result of »a kind of speaking of" God the Father. 2 
lAugustine, Later Works, p. 153. 
2n~id. 
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One must not construe this simile literally to mean as it 
would for the finite mind that at one time the Word was 
not and that the Word was temporally brought forth. On the 
contrary; the Word or SGn is of the Father's essence and 
stands in that position for eternity.l This "speaking" 
is, of course, not an audible sound like human speaking. 
Rather it is the "speaking" of the inner heart, the mincl. 
of God. 2 Thus, this speaking is not a thought process as 
in the "brin.ging forth" of the- 1'wordu in the finite mind. 
There is no thought pr~cess inv~lved in God's mind.3 He 
. 
has full and complete knowledge and thought processes are 
not needed. In this "speaking" God has self-knowledge. 
Of what does the Son have knowledge? The .Son knows the 
ideas residing in God. It is evident, that for Augustine 
God's knowledge is known by his only-begotten Son, the 
Word. Not only is· the Word begotten of God and.is God's 
self-knowledge but also the Word is a perfect resemblance 
of the Father. Reasoning analogically from the nature of 
the finite mind and employing the assumption that like 
can know like, Augustine says, 
Thus, the Word who is God the Father's 
only-begotten Son, is all things like and 
equal to the Father, God of God, Light of 
Light, Wisdom of Wisdom, Essence of 
lrbid., p. 156. 2Ibid. 
-
3rbid. 
-
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Essence--that Word is entirely what the 
Father is, though he is not the Father 
since this is Son and that is Father.~ 
Further, it is through the Word that Gad operates as 
Great0r. In the ·eonftessions Augustine says, 
H0w, G0d, didst Thou make heaven and 
earth? Truly, neither in the heaven nor 
in the earth didst Thou make heaven and 
earth. • • • For whence couldest Thou 
have what Thou liadst not made, whereof to 
make anything? For what is, save because 
Thou Art? Therefore Thou diclst speak and 
they were made, and ~n Thy Word Thou 
madest these things. 
Thus, because God has self-knowledge he is able to work. 
This means that God must have understanding before he can 
know what to create. When Augustine talks about God's 
creating "through." or "in" the Word. what he means is that 
God has understanding or knowledge and that God envisages 
the ideas in himself and creates what he creates in the 
likeness 0f the ideas. 
In summary, then, reasoning from the nature of the 
finite mind to the nature of God Augustine says that God 
spoke and his Word is begotten, his understanding "arises." 
This means, simply, that God has self knowledge, and 
Augustine, attempting to maintain the Christian trinity, 
tries by analogy with the finite ming to eonceive of the 
libi<il.., p. 153. 
2oates, Basic Writings, I, 186. 
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Son as God's Self-knowledge. Since like can knew only 
like, Augustine presupposes, God's understanding of him-
self is a perfect resemblance of what he is. Finally, in 
order to function as Creator God must know what he is going 
to create. God must have knowledge. 
C. God .!!, will.-- In terms of the will of the 
finite mind one is able to gain some knowledge of the 
third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit. In the pre-
vious discussion of the will of the finite mind it was 
indicated that through the desire for knowledge of itself 
the mind strove toward and searched for an understanding 
of itself, and the result of this activity and the 
remembering of the memory was the "word. n In turn the 
understanding seeks an increased knowledge of the mind 
in order that the understanding may be a more complete 
likeness of the mind. Thus the mind not only desires 
knowledge of itself but also the understanding desires an 
increased grasp of the mind.l This is what Augustine 
means when he says that "the W<i>rd 'will' means the leve 
which unites the 'offspring' and its 'parent,' and which 
is in a manner common to botn..u2 Through this image 
Augustine says that the Holy Spirit is "neither of the 
lAugustine, Later Works, p. 169. 
2Ibid., p. 10s. 
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Father alone nor of the Son alone, but of both; and so his 
being suggests to us that mutual charity whereby the 
Father and the Son love one another.nl God loves the 
understanding of himself, i.e., the Word. Likewise, the 
Word~ being a perfect resemblance of the Father, possesses 
an understanding of the Father's knowledge and loves this 
understanding which he has. 2 Thro~gh this mutual desire 
for one another the Father and the Son are united. The 
dimension of will, then, which is common to the Father 
and to the Word is the dynamic aspect of the Godhead and 
is the Third Person of the Trinity. How are these three 
aspects of God related? 
D. The Interrelation of Being, Understanding, and 
~.-- Augustine indicates the difficulty of saying what 
the Trinity is in its interrelationships when he says, 
"The absolute transcendence of the supreme Trinity defies 
comparison.n3 Nevertheless he says that "for the divine 
Trinity by the nature of its divinity -- or Godhead if 
the term be preferred is what it is, changelessly and 
always equal to itself. At no time was it not, or was 
different: at no time will it not be G>r be di.f.ferent.n4 
Furthermore, "in the uncompounded simplicity of the supreme 
libid., P• 157. 
3Ibid., p. 170. 
2Ibid.~ pp. 157, 169. 
4Ibid., p. 171. 
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being which is God, though these are one God, there are 
yet three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. nl The 
Trinity is, and it is both three and one. The Godhead is 
one substance, one being, but it is three persons. Also, 
the Godhead is perfect, complete and has no lack. This 
means that each of the Persens of the Tri~ity is perfect 
and complete and that as one they are perfect and complete. 
The Godhead is a triunity, three substances, yet one.2 
Through the foregoing discussion of the nature of 
God has been delineated. These categories of God are 
~eing, understanding, and will. God as being means that 
in him reside the eternal and immutable ideas. God as 
Understanding means that he has knowledge of himself and 
this knowledge is his Word. The Word is a perfect like-
ness of the Father. Also, it is because God has under-
standing that he is able to create. God is also wtll. 
The will is the dynamic asp~ct of the Godhead. That 
which binds together the Father and the Son is the desire 
they have for understanding of one another. Also, these 
three components of the Godhead are both one substance 
and three persons, i.e., a triunity. 
lrbid., p. 170. 
2Gf. Oates, Basic Writings, I, 208, 230. 
163 
E. The Categories of God ~ Creative Categories --
Through the arguments for the existence and nature of God 
it has been shown that God is not only Truth, Beauty, and 
Goodness but also being, understanding and will. Apart 
from these God would not be. However, these are not onl~ 
the conditions for the possibility of God's being what he 
is in Augustine's metaphysics but also they are the con-
ditions for the possibility of God's creative activity. 
If God is and on him everything depends for its existence 
including himself, then that which he creates is also 
dependent on him. Thus, the conditions ~or the possibility 
·of creation lie in himself. What can one say about the 
nature of God? 'For Augustine, all that can be said about 
God must be said through analogical reasoning from the 
nature and structure of the finite mind to the nature and 
structure of the Godhead. Reasoning analogically one can 
say that God is being, that God is Understanding, and 
that God is will. One can also say th~t God is one sub-
stance and three persons. If this is all that one can 
say about God and if one is to indicate the conditions 
for the possibility of creation then one must turn to that 
which he knows about God. Thus, the categories of God 1 s 
creating activity are to be found in the categories of 
his being, understanding, and will. Are all three of 
these categories also categories of God's creative work? 
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Augustine says that all three categories of God are 
involved in God's creating activity. The ideas of God are 
the models for God's creating activity.l It is through 
the Word, that is, God's envisagement of the ideas, that 
God created. 2 Finally, the cause of God's creating is to 
be found in God's will.3 Thus, the categories of God are 
also the categories of God's creating activity. 
4) s~acy 
Through the methods of introspective analysis, in-
duction, and analogy the nature of God and thus the. 
categories of God's creating activity involved in his 
nature have been outl~ned. Through a synoptic view of the 
work of these categories it will become clear now and to 
what extent Augustine's cosmological position will enable 
him to overcome the problems in the relation of Creator 
and creature. How do these categories function in 
Augustine's cosmology? 
5. The Function of Creation 
Augustine reasons synoptically in showing how the 
categories of creation function. The manner of the func-
tioning of the conditions for the possibility of God's 
lschaff, Select Library, III, 61. 
2oates, Basic Writings, I, 186, 187. 
3schaff, Select Library, III, 63. 
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)• 
creative activity in Augustine's cosmolagy can best be 
seen first, by explicating God's initiating, sustaining, 
and perfecting activity, and, second, by indicating how 
the idea of creation enables Augustine to overcome the 
metaphysical problems he faced. One must keep in mind 
through the subsequent discussion that in God there are 
neither temporal nor discur.sive sequences. Although due 
to the nature of language the following discussion will 
tend to convey the meaning that God first decided to 
create and then set out to implement his decision by an 
act of will this is not what Augustine is saying. God 
is without change, either temporal or discur.sive. How 
then do the categories of creation function, first, in 
God's initiating activity? 
:I..} God's Initiating Activity 
A. Motivation for Creating God is perfect, self-
sufficient, and complete. In him is no lack. He is also 
good. Insofar as he is good, thus, he is perfectly good 
and lacks nothing in goodness. Augustine says, 
For of the plenitude of Thy goodness Thy 
creature subsists, that a good, which could 
profit Thee nothing, nor though of Thee was 
equal to Thee, might yet be, since it could 
be made of Thee. Fer what did heaven and 
earth, which Thou madest in the beginning, 
deserve of Thee? Let those spiritual and 
corporeal natures, which Thou in Thy wisdom 
madest, declare what1they deserve of Thee to depend thereon--. 
l0ates, Basic Writings', I, 228-229. 
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In The City of God Augustine says, 
If we ask, why He made it, 'it was good~' . 
Neither is there any author more excellent 
than God, ner any skill more efficacious 
than the word of God, nor any cause better 
than that good might be created by the good 
God. This also Plato has assigned as the 
most sufficient reason for the creation of 
the world, that good works might be made by 
a good G0d.1 
Why did God create the universe? 
God chose to create the world and this choice was 
one of grace and not done out of need. Whatever God 
creates is less than himself. How could he create him-
self or another like himself? If he did then that which 
he created would be another tieing and would not be de-
pendent on the Creator by virtue of which it is Being. 
Would not this render meaningless the idea of creation? 
That which is created must depend on that which creates 
it. Whatever comes into existence through the creative 
act of God is less than God and being less than God it 
is imperfect. God takes no pleasure in that which is 
imperfec't. Thus, God's choice to create and his relation 
to that which he created is one of grace, i.e., giving 
to that which is undeserving more than it deserves. 
Augustine points out the "gracetr aspect of God's creating 
the world when he says in the Confessions, 
lAugustine, City of God, pp. 364-65. 
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What, therefore, could there be wanting 
unto Thy good, which Thou Thyself art, al-
though these things had either never been, 
or had remained formless -- which Thou 
madest not out of any want, but out of the 
plenitude of Thy goodness, restraining them 
and converting them to form not as though 
Thy joy were perfected by them? For to 
Thee, being perfect, their imperfection is 
displeasing, and therefore were they per-
fected by Thee, and were pleasing unto 
Thee; but not as if Thou wert imperfect, 
and wirt to be perfected in their perfec-
tion. 
Second, God creates in order to bestow upon the 
creature as much likeness of God as the creature is able 
to possess. God desires to perfect the creature, i.e., 
to realize as much good in the creature as is possible 
for that creature to possess. Obviously, this follows 
from the contention that God creates because of the 
plenitude of his goodness. This aspect of God's motiva-
tion for creating Augustine indicates by saying, 
For Thy good Spirit was borne over the 
waters, not borne up by them as if He 
rested upon them. For those in whom Thy 
good Spirit is said to rest, He causes 
to rest in Himself. But Thy incorruptible 
and unchangeable will, which in itself is 
all-sufficient for itself, was borne over 
that life which Thou hadst made, to which 
to live is not all one with living happily, 
since, flowing in its own darkness, it liveth 
also; for which it remaineth to be converted 
unto Him by whom it was made, and to live 
more and more by the fountain of life, and 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 230. 
168 
in His light to see light, and to be per-
£ected, and enlightened, and maae happy.l 
Thus, the motivation o£ God's creating activity is £ound 
in his will and in his plenitUde o£ goodness. He creates 
not out o£ want. Rather, he creates in order to bring 
into existence a world and in order to perfect that 
created world. It is in God's will and his plenitude o£ 
goodness that one £inds the e££icient and teleological 
motivation for his creating work• That God decided to 
create a world is evident £rom the £oregoing discussion. 
But how does God implement his decision to create? 
B. Cause o£ ~reating -- The implementation o£ God's 
decision to create is carried out through the causality 
o£ God's will. It has been shown that the will of God is 
the dynamic aspect of the Godhead. Augustine £inds in 
this aspect of God the ontological condition £or the 
possibility o£ change in the realm of the creature. The 
will o£ God is the highest of all causes. Augustine, 
having pointed out that all natural changes are continuous 
and similar and should cause one no wonder ancl amazement, 
says that they are the result of God's will: 
Such are the eclipses o£ the sun and moon, 
and some kinds of stars, appearing seldom, 
and earthquakes, and unnatural births of 
living creatures, and other similar things; 
of which not one takes place without the will 
libid • 
.............. 
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of God; yet, that it is so, is to most 
peeple not apparent. And so the vanity 
of philosQphers has found license to 
assign these things also to other causes, 
true causes perhaps, but proximate ones, 
while they are not able to see at all the 
cause that is higher1than all others; that is, the will of God. 
The will of God is, then, the supreme productive cause, 
the ground of all causes. God's will is the ultimateJ 
principle of explanation of all other cause. As the 
ground of all causes operative in the universe God's will 
is free, i.e., neither caused nor conditioned by anything 
other than itself. This means that one must not loek be-
yond the will of God for a higher cause or principle 
which would govern its activity. It will become clear 
that though God's will always works in the light of God's 
knowledge nothing requires God's will to ~unction. It is 
free to function as it wills. 2 · As the ground of all 
causes the will of God is able to function as the cause 
operating in Godts creating the world. Augustine, in 
the Confessions, says that God creates by an act of his 
will.3 In On the Trinity he says that nit comes to pass 
that the will of God is the f~rst and the highest cause 
of all corporeal appearances and motions:n4 
lschaff, Select Library, III, 57. 
2cf •. Augustine, Citx ,2! God, pp. 811-12 .... 
3oates, Basic Writings, I, 212. 
4schaff, Select Library, III, 58. 
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In summary, God's efficient motivation to create is 
his "graceful" decision to create and the teleological 
.mctdvation is his plenitude of good~ess. The decision to 
make something good, to bestow his goodness upon his ere~ 
ation is implemented by his will. By an act of will, 
then, God created the universe. The motivation for crea-
ting is grace and perfect goodness and completeness; the 
cause of creating is God's will; what is the method of 
God's creating? How does God create by the act of his 
will? 
C. Method of Creating -- How Augustine understands 
the process of creation to have taken place can be under-
stood through discussions of (1) the act of God's speak-
ing the universe into existence and (2} the results of 
this act·, i.e., those things which eame into existence 
through God's speaking. Under the first topic will be 
considered whether the act was one act or many, whether 
it was temporal or non-temporal, and whether the act took 
six literal days or not. Under the second topic will be 
discussed the nature of time, of matter, and of the 
seminal reasons. When these topics have been covered 
one will see the basic structure of Augustine's cosmology 
and the process of its coming into existence. 
a. What is the nature of the act of God's speaking~ 
In order to understand the process of creating through 
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God's speaking one must understand what Augustine means 
by God's speaking and whether this act is temporal or not 
and one single act or not. God's speaking is an act 
involving his will and his envisagement of the ideas by 
his understanding. It was shown above that the finite 
mind is able to do work becaase it has an understanding 
of what it ought to do. This means that the finite mind 
works by means of the causality of its will and through 
~'t!be contemplation of the ideas by the understanding, that 
is, its ''word." When the finite mind speaks it does so 
through an act of its will and with a view to its ideas 
in its understanding. Through this analogy, then, 
remembering that Augustine considers the finite mind to 
be resemblance of the infinite mind, one understands the 
nwork" of God. Augustine clearly indicates that God's 
speaking is an act of the will with a view to the Word 
when he writes, 
I see it, however; but how I shall express 
it, I know not, unless that everything which 
begins to be and ceases to be, then begins 
and ceases when in Thy eternal Reason it is 
known that it ought to begin or cease where 
nothing beginneth or ceaseth. • • • In this 
Beginning, 0 God, has Thou :made heaven and 
earth -- in Thy Word, in Thy Son, in Thy 
Power, in Thy Wisdom, in Thy Truth, won-
drously speaking and wondrously making.l 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 188. 
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Thus God's creating act takes place through and by his 
act of speaking. Is this act to be understood as a 
single act possessing no temporal duration? 
In ~ Genesis ~ Litteram Augustine says that 
God's creating act was one single blow not having temparal 
duration, i.e., ''God created all things at once." l That 
God's act of speaking could not have been of temporal 
duration Augustine further attests to in The City'of ~ 
when he says, 
For if eternity and time are rightly dis-
tinguished by this, that time does not exist 
without some movement and transition, while 
in eternity there is no change, whe does not 
see that there could have been no time had 
not some creature been made, which by some 
motion could give birth to change -- the 
various parts of which motion and change, as 
they cannot be simultaneous, succeed one 
another -- and thus, in these shorter or 
longer intervals of duration, time would 
begin? Since then, God, in whose eternity 
is no change at all, is the Creator and 
Ordainer of time, I do not see how He can 
be said to have created the world after 
spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be· 
said that prior to the world there was some2 creature by whose movement time could pass. 
This means that 
Time is relative to changing things and exists 
where such things exist. Thus the original 
coming-irm~being of the world of changing 
lAugustine, Sancti Aurelii Augustini: Opera Omnia (11 vols.; Paris: The Gaume Brothers, Booksellers,. 1887), 
III, 296-298. 
2Augustine, mty of God, p. 350. 
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creatures 'begins' the temporal process and 
does not fall within that ·process. Criation 
is not in time but 'in the beginning.' 
It shou~d be noted here that a direct implication of 
Augustine's view that God created in one single non-
temporal blow is that the six days of Genesis I are 
figurative and not literal. The creation of the world 
had no temporal duration as the six days,if taken 
2 literally, would seem to suggest. 
God created by an act 0f will while envisaging the 
ideas in his mind. This act was one single blow and not 
of temporal duration. That which God created by this act 
of speaking came into existence. It did not exist 
temporally or logically prior to God's speaking. That 
which was created was created ~ nihile, that is, without 
the use of pre-existing materials such as the Receptacle 
in Plato's thought. Augustiae is eager to defend the 
supreme Beingness of God and that everything is dependent 
on God for its existence, including God himself. A 
Platonic dualism would not allow Augustine to maintain 
his doctrine of God as supreme Being. Thus, he adheres 
to the ~ nihilo character of the creative act of God. 
The significance of the ex nihilo doctrine will be clear 
lRoy w. Battenhouse (ed.), A Companion~ the Studz 
of St. Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 
I95bT, p. 318. 
2rbid., p. 319. 
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when the way Augustine's creation doctrine helps him 
answer his problems is discussed. 
Thus, Augustine contends that God spoke and created 
~ nihilo the world of change and time. The act of God's 
,speaking involves God's will as cause of his speaking and 
God's understanding as the model in the likeness of which 
God willed the univez:se into existence.. God's act was 
one and single, and it was non-temporal, i.-e., it was 1fin 
1 
the beginning," and it was~ nihil0. 
b. The result of God's speaking was the universe 
which was other than himself. The categories of this realm 
0f discourse·are hyle, time, and seminal reason.· Through 
a discussion of each of these topics one will gain a 
grasp of the functioning of the creative elements, the 
essential structure of ~ugustine's cosmology, and how 
God creates particulars. First, what is the nature of 
matter in Augustine's metaphysics? 
Augustine contends that hyle was created 0ut of 
nothing. In the Confessions he says regarding the coming 
into existence of hyle, 
lAugustine uses the phrase "in the beginning" to 
mean, on the one hand, the Word which is co-eternal with 
him and,on the other, the creative act of God in contrast 
with both temporal acts of finite persons and tho.se 
philosophical positions which would claim that God's act 
is one of temporal duration. How Augustine uses this 
phrase must be determined contextually. 
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And whence and in what manner was this, 
unless from Thee, from.whom are all things, 
insofar as they are? •••. Thou, therefore, 
0 Lord, wh0 art not one thing in one place, 
and etherwise in another, but the Self-same, 
and the Self-same, and the Self-same·, Holy, 
Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty, didst in the 
begirining, which is of Thee, in Thy Wisdom, 
which was born of Thy Substance, crlate 
something, and that out of nothing. 
Augustine is saying that hyle is neither something created 
out of God's substance nor something existing prior to 
God's creating activity. Rather, hyle is c~eated!! nihilo 
and stands over against God, that is, hyle is other_than 
God but nevertheless dependent upon God. Thus, God spoke 
and hyle came into existence. 2 Further, this "something" 
is formless, almost nothing, yet something. Augustine 
says, 
For it was ~.invisible and without form, and 
there was a deep over which there was not 
light; or, darkness was over the deep, that 
is, more than in the deep. For this deep of 
waters, now visible, ha~ even in its depth~, 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 207. 
2It must be noted that Augustine says that God cre-
ated the heaven and the earth out of nothing. Augustine 
means that heaven, nwhich Thou in the Beginning didst 
create, is some intellectual creature, which, although 
in no wise co-eternal unto Thee, the Trinity, is yet·a 
partaker of Thy eternity, and by reason of the sweetness 
of that most happy contemplation of TPyself, doth greatly 
restrain its own mutability, and without any failure, 
from the time in whieh it was created, in.clinging unto 
Thee, surpasses all the rolling change of times." (Oates, 
Basic Writings, I, 208.) Heaven is, thus, an intellectual 
creature and a non-temporal creature. (Cf. Ibid., p. 211.) 
This creature he calls the angels. (C~. Augustine, City 
of~' p. 396.) 
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a light suitable to its nature, perceptible 
in some manner to fishes and creeping things 
in the bottom of it. But the entire deep was 
almost nothing, since hitherto it was alto-
gether formless; yet there was then that which 
could be formed. For Thou, 0 Lord hast made 
the world of a formless matter, which matter, 
out of nothing, Thou hast made almost nothing, 
out of which to make those Ireat things which 
we, sons of men, wonder at. 
In another passage in Concerning the Nature of Gooct, 
Augustine says, "But by Hyle I mean a certain material 
absolutely formless and without quality, whence those 
qualities that we perceive are formed, as the ancients 
said.n2 Being formless hyle is able to become formed 
according to any form in terms of which it is moulded. 
Not only was hyle created out o~ nothing and existed 
absolutely formless, but also it was good. Continuing 
in his treatise, Concerning the Nature of Go££,Augustine 
says, 
Nor is the Hyle, therefore, to be called 
an evil whicn-cannot be perceived through 
any appearance, but can scarcely be thought 
of through any sort of privation of appear-
ance. For this has also a capacity of forms; 
for it cannot receive the form imposed by the 
workman, neither assuredly may it be called 
material. Hence if form is some good, whence 
mhose who excel in it are called beautiful, 
as from appearance they are called handsome, 
even the capacity of form is undoubtedly some-
thing good. As because wisdom is good, no one 
doubts that to be capable of wisdom is a good~ 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 207. 
2Ibid., P• 437. 
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And because every good is from God, no 
one ought to doubt that even matter, i~ 
there is any, has its existen~e from God 
alone. 
Hyle is good by virtue of its capacity for form and by 
virtue of the fact that God created it. Further, hyle 
is composed of the four elements, fire, earth, air and 
water.2 It is difficult to say how Augustine can contend 
that hyle is without quality and form and yet say that 
matter is composed of the four elements. That Augustine 
makes these claims is undeniable, but how he can do it 
and be consistent is difficult to determine. Finally, 
matter, though it is something, is known only negatively. 
Nevertheless it must be something otherwise it could not 
be known.3 It is clear that hyle is a plastic form-
lessness; good; created!! nihilo; composed of fire, 
earth, air, and water, and known negatively. 
From this discussion of Augustine's doctrine of 
hyle it is clear that this plastic material is able to 
function as the "stuff" out of which God makes the rest 
of the universe. 
Not only does Augustine conte~d that,hyle was 
lrbid. 
2Gilson, Christian Philosoghy, p. 206; cf. De Genesis 
~ Litteram, V, 7, 20; PL 34, 32 • 
3oates, Basic Writings, I, 437. 
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created "in the beginning," but also time was created. 
In the Confessions Augustine says, 
But in the excellenc~ of an ever-present 
eternity, Thou precedest all times past, 
and survivest all future times, because 
they are future, and when they have come 
they will be past; but Thou the same, and 
Thy years shall have no end. • • • Thy 
to-day is eternity; therefore didst Thou 
beget the co-eternal, to whem Thou saidst, 
'lfhis day have I begotteH Thee." Thou hast 
made all time; and before all times Thou1 art, n<:>r in any t-ime was ·there not time. 
This means that God is immutable and eternal while the 
creature is changing and temp<:>ral. The creature having 
been created by God is contingent on God even though it 
is other than God. Among the.chief characteristics of 
the creature is change. There is no time without change. 
Thus, when God created the werld, the changing creature, 
he also created time. Time is meaningless apart from 
change, and change began only when God created the 
universe. 2 How is time to be understood? Augustine 
submits that time is measured sequence.3 Having despaired 
of meas~ring time in terms of external motions and events, 
Augustine says that time is measured in the mind of man.4 
libid., p. 191. 
2Augustine, City of .God, p. 350; cf. Oates, B~sie 
Writings, I, 202. 
3oates, Basic Writings, I, 195. 
4Ibid., p. 200. 
179 
In man's mind time is measured according to past, present, 
and future. He says in the Confessions, 
In thee, I say, I measure time; the impres-
sion which things as they pass by make on 
Thee, and which, when they have passed by, 
remains, that I measure as time present, 
not those things which h~ve passed by, that 
the impression should be made1 This I measure when l measure times. 
-
Time, then, is measured sequence, and this sequence is 
measured in the mind of man. If one aesires to understand 
what time is one must turn to the inner experience of the 
finite mind. 
What is the c0smological status of time? It has 
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been shown that Augustine contended for the position that 
God created hxle and time ~ nihilo. In light of Augustine's 
teaching that God created everything in one non-temporal 
blow or act it is evident that both hyle and time were 
created together. Thus, the first two aspects of Augustines 
cosmology have been presented. The final aspect is his 
doctrine of seminal reasons. 
All the components of Augustine's cosmology have 
been presented except for the doctrine of seminal reasons. 
It is in terms of this doctrine that Augustine is able to 
bring into his system change. Unformed ~yle and time are 
abstractions without change, and change is ~eaningless 
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apart from a principle of uniformity and difference. Hyle 
is a pla~c, undifferentiated yoid apart from some principle 
to give it differentiation. Time is dependent upon change, 
and change is the outcome of formed hyle. In order to 
render time and hyle meaningful, i.e., to indicate their 
place in Augustine's cosmology, a principle of uniformity 
-and difference must be introduced into his position. The 
doctrine of seminal reason provides this principle for 
Augustine's cosmology. Does this mean that hyle and time 
are dependent on the seminal reasons for their meaning£ 
Are they abstractions apart from the seminal reasons? 
Augustine is not clear about this point. However, from 
Augustine's discussions of time, hyle, and seminal reasons 
one could contend that hyle is the plastic material of the 
seminal reasons and that time is the measured sequence of 
the development of the potential structure of the seminal 
reasons. This hypothesis will become clear as the dis-
cussion of the nature and function of the seminal reasons 
ensues. 
Augustine contends that everything was created at 
the same time. If this is the case, how will he account 
for appearances which are apparently new, for example a 
new born child? Augustine's answer to this difficulty 
is the doctrine of seminal reasons. What are seminal 
reasons, and how do they function in :his cosmology? 
What is the· nature of seminal reasons? First, they 
are created existences. 1 They came into existence thro~gh 
the creative will of God. God, envisaging the ideas and 
by an act of will, creates ex nihilo the seminal reasons 
in the likeness of the eternal ideas. Like time and nyle 
the seminal reasons are dependent on God yet they are 
other than God. These created reasons are centers or 
seeds of efficient causation. Their causative power is 
derived from and dependent on the will of God. Apart 
from God's initiating and continuing causal activity the 
seminal reasons not only would have no power but also 
they would not exist. 2 One should note that Augustine 
contrasts the causal activity of God through the seminal 
reason with external causes. He contends that God works 
through the essence of the species whereas all other 
causes work on the speci.es externally. In this way 
Augustine contends that God is the highest cause and that 
all change and development is ultimately dependent on God. 
Thus Augustine says, 
Accordingly, the Apostle Paul, distin-
guishing God's creating and forming within, 
from the oper,ations of the creature which 
~re applied from without, and drawing a 
lschaff, A Select Librarz, III, 62. 
2rbid., pp. 62-3; cf. Augustine, Citx of God, p. 4G9. 
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simjJitude from agriculture, says, "I planted 
Appllos watered; but God have the increase.ui 
Further, they are like the eternal reason, the ideas 
residing in the mind of God. In On the Trinity Augustine 
says, 
Just as Jacob, again, was not the crea-
tor of' the colers in the flocks, because he 
placed the various colored rods for the 
several mothers, as they drank, to look at 
in conceiving. Yet neither were the cattle 
themselves creators of' the variety ef' their 
own off-spring, cause of' the variegated 
image, impressed through their eyes by the 
sight of' the varied rods, clave to their 
soul, but could affect the body that was 
animated by the spirit thus affected only 
through sympathy with this commingling, so 
far as to stain with color the tender be-
ginnings of' their offspring. For that they 
are so af'f'eeted from themselves, whether the 
soul from tae body, or the body from the 
soul, arises in truth from suitable reasons, 
which immutably exist in that highest wisdom 
of' God Himself', which no extent of' place 
contains; and which, while i·t is itself' un-
changeable, because there is not one of' 
them that is not created by itself. For it 
was the unchangeable and invisible reason 
of' the wisdom of God, by which all things 
are created, which caused not r2ds, but 
cattle, to be born from cattle. 
God created the seminal reasons in the likeness of his 
wisdom, i.e., the eternal ideas in his mind. It is clear 
that the seminal reasons were created in the image of' the 
wisdom or Word of' God, but what is the exact relation 
lschaff', A Select Library, III, 61. 
2Ibid., p. 61. 
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which the seminal reasons have with God? In Q! Diversis 
Quaestionibus Augustine says, 
~he forms of all these things, created and 
to be created, are contained in the divine 
mind, .and if nothing can be in the divine 
mind but the eternal and unchangeable, and 
if Plato called these primary .things 'ideas,' 
they are not 0nly ideasi but they are true, . 
because they are eterna and because they 
remain the same and unchangeable. Through 
participation in them it happens tiat every-
.thing is what it is and how it is. 
Thus, the relation between the eternal forms and the 
seminal forms is that of participation. The relation be-
tween the seminal reasons and God's will is the total 
dependence of the causative_ power of the seminal reasons 
on the will of God. In so far as the seminal reasons 
have· form they are ·dependent on the ideas residing in 
God's mind. In so far as the seminal reasons are efficient 
causes they are dependent on God's will. Can the nature 
of the seminal reasons be further specified? 
These seed-like principles are not only created 
causal principles standing in the relation of participa-
tion in the eternal forms which reside in the mind of God 
and in causal dependence on God's will, but also they are 
images of the eternal ideas. This means that the seminal 
reasons not only participate in the eternal reasons but 
lMeyerhoff, The New Scholasticism, p. 36. 
they derive their structure from the eternal reasons.1 
What is the structure of the seminal reasons? Augustine 
says that the seminal reasons are com}Dosed of "measure, 
number and weight'.'· 1because they participate in. the eternal 
ideas which are composed of measure, number and weight. 2 
When God created the universe he created the seminal 
reasons in the likeness of the eternal ideas and the re-
sulting structure of the seminal reasons were measure, 
number, and weight. What does Augustine meaR by these 
three terms? w. J. Roche interprets Augustine's meaning 
l:>y saying, 
In the Book of Wisdom it is written of 
God that He hath disposed all things accord-
ing to measure, number, and weight •••• The 
"measure" spoken of in this place, says 
Augustine, is that which prescribes "modus," 
or limit to all things; "number" here is the 
principle of form; while "weight" is that which 
draws all things to rest and stability. Hence 
God may truly be said to have disposed all 
things according to measure, number, and 
weight; for it is He Who limits all things 
(terminat); fosms all (format); and orders 
a~l (ordi:aat). 
The seminal reasons are also principles of potentiality. 
It was indicated above that these principles are centers 
lAugustine, Cit~ of God, p. 408. 
2schaff, A Select Library, III, 62. 
3Roche, "Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint 
Augustine, u The New Scholasticism, XV (October, 1941), 4. 
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of power, causal principles. Augustine says that the seeds 
contain potentially all possible species of particular 
things and that this potentiality is actualized through 
the causative power God has built into them and sustained 
by God's causative will. Augustine makes this clear in 
the CiEl of God when'he says, 
As, therefore, in respect of that spiritual 
growth whereby a man is formed to piety and 
righteousness, the apostle says, 'Neither is 
he that planteth anything, neither he that 
watereth, but God that giveth the increase,' 
so also it must be said that it is not he 
that generates that is anything, but God that 
giveth the essential form; that it is not the 
mother who carries and nurses the fruit of her 
womb that is anything, but God that giv.eth the 
increase. For He alone, by that energy where-
with 'He worketh hitherto,' causes the seed 
to develop, and to evolve from certain secret 
and invisible1folds into the visible forms which we see. 
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The sufficient condition for the possibility of a universe 
of changing actual objects having measure, number, and 
weight is the seminal reasons which possess a built~'i:n 
efficient causality; number, measure, and weight; and the 
potentiality for developing into particular things. Thus 
the seminal reasons are by nature created, causal principles, 
existing through participatipn in the eternal ideas, and 
having causal dependence on God's will structured like 
the ideas in God's mind, i.e., according to measure, 
lAugustine, Citx of God, p. 851. 
number, and weight, and ~enters of potentiality for develop-
ing into the world of changing but stable objects. The 
nature of the seminal reasons has been discussed, but their 
cosmological status has yet to be determined. When this 
has been discussed one will be able to turn to their 
function in Augustine's cosmology. 
It has been shown that Augustine believed that the 
hJ:le God created trin the beginning" is essentially four 
elements: fire, earth, air, and water. When the seminal 
reasons were created they were implanted in the element, 
water. 1 Thus, the seminal reasons were implanted in the 
element, water. It would seem to follow that the water 
would nourish the seeds and they would be able to germinate 
and develop into the form, order, and limitation pr9per to 
their nature. Augustine indicates that as the seeds de-
velop they give form to matter by developing that which 
they are capable of becoming. In On the Trinity he says, 
For all these things in the way of original 
and beginning have already been created in 
a kind of texture of the elements, but they 
come forth when they get the opportunity. 
For as mothers are pregnant with young, so 
the world itself is pregnant with the causes 
of things that are born; which are not 
created in it, except from tha:t highest 
essence, where nothing either springs up or 
dies, either begins to be or ceases. But 
lailson, Christian Philosoph~, p. 206; cf. De 
Genesis ad Litteram, V, 7, 20; PL4, 328. 
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:eh.e applying from without C!>f adventi t.ious 
causes, which, although they are not 
natural, yet are to be applied according to 
nature, in order that those things which are 
contained and hidden in the secret bosom of 
nature may break forth and be outwardly 
created in some way by the unfolding of the 
proper measures and numbers and weights which 
they have received in secret from Him 'who has 
ordered ill things in measure and number and 
weight.' 
Where, the~ are the seeds? They-are implanted in water, 
one of the four elements composing formless matter. The 
function of the seminal reasons in Augustine's cosmology 
must now be considered •. 
As in the seed there are invisibly and at 
one time all the things which in course of 
time will grow into a tree, so the universe 
must be conceived -- since God created all 
things at the same time -- as having had at 
the same time all the things which were made 
in it and with it, when the day of creation 
came, not only the heavens with the sun and 
the moon and the stars, whose species remains 
in their rotary motion, and the earth and the 
deeps, which suffer changing movements, and joined together below produce the other part 
of the world; but also those things which 
lschaff, A Select Library, III, 62. 
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earth and water produ·ced potentially and 
causally, before in the course of time they 
came into being in the shape in which they 
are now known to us in those works which 
God 'worketh until sow.' (John v, 17).1 
With the doctrine of seminal reasons Augustine accounts 
for the stability in the universe. These seed-like prin-
ciples contain all the possible species in a potential 
condition. The species develop and continue because their 
potential structure is built into the seed from which they 
germinate. Thus, "in the beginning" God created all things, 
but all things were not as yet actual, some remained in a 
potential state until such time as their coming into frui-
tion was possible. In this way Augustine attempted to 
account for both the stability and the development that 
one finds in all things. Also, Augustine answers the ques-
tion as to the possibility of the coming into existence 
of new things by using the doctrine of seminal reasons. 
Augustine says that there are no ~ things if by 
new one means radically new. If semething came into 
being which was radically new Augustine's contention that 
God created all things at the same time would be dealt a 
devas:®,tjpg blow. What Augustine contends is that there is 
nothing new even th<:rugh it may appear that way.. What 
lE. Przywara~ (ed.), An Augustine Synthesis, trans. 
E. Przywara with an introduction by C. C. Martindale 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1945), p. 119. · 
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seems to be new is the fruition of a seminal reason which 
until this time had not actualized itself. 1 
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Another service the doctrine of seminal reasons per-
forms for Augustine is to solve the problem of the Biblical 
account of man's coming into existence. Genesis, Chapter 
1, says that man and woman were created on the sixth day, 
while Genesis, Chapter 2, says that Adam was formed from 
the slime of matter and Eve was taken from man's side. 
Since there are not two creations of man the ~ormer must 
refer to man's rational nature and the latter to man's 
physical nature. He says in De Genesis ad Litteram: 
Therefore we should see that, whether per-
haps it could be true, which seems to. be 
certainly bearable by human opinion, God 
in those first works created all things, 
he created the human mind, which in his 
own time he might br~athe into the members 
formed out of the slime of the lifeless 
substance, which lifeless substance he 
created putting into them the causal 
reason in things, after which he made, when 
it could be made, the human body. For we 
understand neither that which is said, in 
his image, if not in the mind, neither that 
which is said, male and female, if not in a 
suitable body. ~is-Deiieved, therefore, 
if it does not contradict the validity or 
true principle of the Scriptures, that man 
was made in the sixth day, so that the 
principle of human body (might be) in the 
_ causes in the elements of the world; now 
the true reason itself was created, just 
as the day it was first formed, and having 
lschaff, A Select Library, III, 60-61. 
been created hid in the works of G0d, until 
having blown upon it in his own time, that 
is having breathed, he implanted it into 1 the body having been fo~ed out of slime. 
Thus Augustine accounts for man's coming into existence 
. 
by employing the doctrine of seminal reasons. 
D. Summary -- The categories of creation function in 
God's initiating activity in this manner: God, motivated 
teleologically by the plenitude of his goodness and 
efficiently by his grace envisaging the ideas in his under-
standing and by the causality of his will, spoke and there-
by created the universe ex nihilo. Although Augustine 
contends that all things were created together he indicates 
a logical progression in God's creating activity. This 
progression is aon-temporal and is stated in temporal 
terms only as a means of clarifying the activity of God's 
creating the world. God created hyle, iee., the four 
elements, a formless ~xistence, almost n.othing but never-
theless something. In order to account for stability in 
the universe and in order to indicate how God could create 
all things at once and yet account for those things in the 
\ 
universe which seem new, Augustine says that God created 
innumerable seed-like principles and placed them in the 
watery element of matter. These seeds, being centers of 
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efficient cause as well as potential structure for actual 
objects, develop hyle according to the seed's structure, 
i.e., meas.ure, number, and weight. The power of the seeds 
is dependent on the will of God as the ultimate cause of 
their existence. Furthermore, God created them through 
his wisdom, that is, in the likeness of the ideas God has 
in his mind. It is because the seminal reasons were 
created in the likeness of these eternal ideas that they 
have the str~cture they do. Further they are dependent 
on the ideas in God's mind for their existence, that is, 
they participate in these ideas. Thus, matter and seminal 
reasons provide the conditions for the possibility of 
change. Hence, when the seminal reasons begin to be 
actualized change enters Augustine's world scheme. Be-
cause time is meaningless apart from change, with the 
advent of change time also comes into existence. Thus, 
God, envisaging the ideas residing in his mind, his Word, 
his knowledge of his ideas, and through the causality of 
his will, spoke and hyle, seminal reasons, and time were 
created ex nihilo. The result was a world which was 
created perfect and complete but perfect and complete in 
the sense that all that would or could be in the world 
was in the world but in an incomplete and unfinished 
condition. 
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God's creative work stops with the initiation of 
the universe. Augustine contends that after the initial 
creative act God sustains and perfects the universe he 
has created. God does not create the universe and then 
withdraw nimself from it. On the contrary God maintains 
the universe and guides it toward himself. How does God 
sustain his creati0n? When this has been discussed one 
will be ready to investigate how God perfects the creature 
of his creating work. 
2) God's Sustaining Activity 
In Augustine's cosmology God created the universe 
ex nihilo. God also sustains it. The universe is sus-
tained by God in two ways: through the causality of his 
will and through the participation of the creatures in the 
eternal ideas residing in God's mind. 
A. Causalitx of God's Will -- Augustine contends 
that the creature created by God is upheld by the will or 
power of God. He says in De Genesis ad Litteram, 
Indeed the power of the Creator and His 
omnipotent and all-swaying strength is for 
each and every creature the cause of its 
continued existence; and if this strength 
were at any time to cease from directing 
the things which have been created, at one 
and the same time both their species would 
cease to be and their whole nature would 
perish •••• Since we are other than He, 
we are not in Him for any other reason except 
that He caused it, and this is His work whereby 
193 
He co~tains all things. • • • And by this 
disposition, 'in Him we live and move and 
are' (Acts xvii, 28). Whence it follows 
that if this His working were withdrawn from 
things, we should neither live nor be.l 
In the preceding discussion of the seminal reasons it was 
pointed out that the seminal reasons are centers of power. 
This means that God built into each semi'nal reason an 
efficient cause which functions as the cause of the seminal 
reason to devel·op into the fulness of the structure 
potential to it. These efficient causes are not sui 
generis. On the contrary, they are dependent on the 
supreme productive cause, God's will. Thus, God sustains 
all efficient causes in the seminal reasons by his will. 
The universe is also sustained through its participation 
in the being of God. 
B. Participation of Existence in Being -- Augustine 
contends that the creature is not only because it is sus-
tained by God's will but also because it participates in 
the ideas of God, that is, because it is dependent on the 
ideas for its existence. 2 After the initial creative act 
of God, Augustine says that the creature is sustained be-
cause it participates in the ideas in God's mind. The 
seminal reasons are both centers of efficient causality 
lprzywara, An Augustine Synthesis, pp. 117-18; cf. 
Schaff, A Select Library, III, 50. 
2Meyerhoff, The New Scholasticism, p. 36. 
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and p0tential structures. To the extent the seminal 
reason has structure or form it has it because it is 
dependent on the eternal ideas. Augustine means a Platonic 
type of participation. But does not Augustine say that 
the seminal reasons were created ex nihilo? He does say 
this, but once the seminal reasons are created their 
structure is dependent on the eternal ideas in the like-
ness of which they were created. Augustine~ doctrine of 
participation is a carry over from his Neo-Platonic back-
ground. 
It is at this point that-Augustine gives a meta-
physical function to·the Word, the self-knowledge of God. 
What is the condition for the pGssibility of creatures 
participating in the eternal ideas? It is clear that 
creatures derive their existence from the eternal ideas, 
ancl this is done through participation. But what allows 
existence to "participate" in being? The ontological con-
dition for this participation Augustine finds in the rela-
tion of the Son, the Word, to the Father. What is this 
relation? The Son, being perfectly equal with the Father 
is a perfect resemblance of him. In the Son's resemblance 
to the Father Augustine finds the sufficient condition for 
the resemblance of being in the creature. 1 
lAug~stine, Later Works, p. 135. 
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Gilson clarifies this point when he says, 
Saint John says that the Word is the 
light that enlightens every man that comes 
into the world (i, 9). Philosophically 
speaking, this means that the Word is the 
living and eternal thought of the Father. 
In other words, he is the self-knowledge of 
the Father, and, as such, his perfect image 
and resemblance. In fact, being a perfect ex-
pression of the Father, the Word is Resem-
blance itself, and the model of all other 
minor resemblances. This is to say that the 
perfect resemblance of absolute 'being' is 
the model of all that which is, or can be. 
The Word then contains within himself, or, 
rather, he is all the intelligible patterns, 
or 'reasons,' of all that which is capable 
of existence. These eternal patterns, or 
models, are called the divine Ideas.l 
A direct implication of the pa~ticipation of exist-
ence in being is the structure of existence which results 
from this relation to being. All things are because they 
are sustained by God's will ·and because they participate 
in the ideas in God's mind. However, some .creature$ are 
more completely like the ideas than are other creatures. 
Those that do so are said to be more like being than those 
that do not. If it is the case that God is being and God 
controls all things then it is reasonable to infer that 
those creatures who are by nature closer to God and 
resemble him more than do other creatures will be superior 
to their inferiors. They will consequently be in control 
of the lesser creatures. Thus, in Augustine's system the 
lGilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 71. 
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higher controls the lower, that is, that creature which 
is less like God. Augustine points this out when he says, 
Therefore, more powerful things receive 
·form from the Supreme Excellence and give 
it to things in the natural order. And when 
they give, surely, they do not take away. 
And to whatever extent the things which are 
inferior exist, they exist because the form 
in which they exist:. is given to them by 
those more powerful than they.l 
If it is the case that Augustine believes the world is 
structured according to an hierarchical arrangement pf 
the more like God havin_g control over the less like God, 
then, which is the structure which results? In ~he Cify 
of God he outlines the structure of existence when he 
says, 
For, among those beings which exist, 
and which are not of God the Creator's 
essence, those which have life are ranked 
above those which have none; those that 
have the power of generati~n, or even of 
desiring, above those whieh want this 
faculty. And, among things that have life, 
the sentient are higher than those whach 
have no sensation, as animals are ranked 
above trees. And, among the sentient, the 
intelligent are above those that have not 
intelligence --men, e.g., above cattle. 
And, among t~e intelligent, the immortal, 
such as the angels, above the mortal, such 
as men. These are the 2radations according 
to the order of nature. 
Thus, God created the universe ~ nihilo and sustains 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 315.. 
2Augustine, City of God, p. 360. 
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it both through his will and through the participation of 
the creature in being. However, God also causes the 
creature to develop into its fullest possible actuality. 
This is God's perfecting function in relation to his 
creature. 
3) God's Perfecting Activity 
God works in the creature to guide it into a full 
realization of its full potentiality. In this way God 
perfects the creature. Into the soil of the universe God 
has planted seeds, seminal reasons, which are both 
complete and incomplete. They a~e complete in that all 
that they are capable of becoming resides in them 
potentially. They are incomplete in that they have not 
realized their full potentiality. Built into these seeds 
is an efficient cause capable of causing the potentialities 
of the seeds to actualize. ~his power is efficacious be-
cause God sustains it through the power of his will. Thus, 
God works from the innermost part of the seed and causes 
·it to develop into a full realization of itself. 1 What is 
that which the seed realizes through God's active will? 
It has been shown that the seed develops according 
to the seed's limit, form, and order into an hierarchical 
and harmonious structure; that the seed is because it 
lschaff, A Select Library, III, 62. 
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participates in the eternal ideas and as sueh it has 
:"'measur~, number, and weight, i.e., limit, form, and order. 
Through this participation the seed has in a greater or 
lesser degree limit, form, and order. Resulting from 
this degree of perfection is an hierarchical structure of 
existences. Augustine makes this clear when he says, 
For all things in proportion as they are 
better measured, formed, and ordered, are 
assuredly good in a higher degree; but in 
proportion as they are measured, formed, and 
ordered in an inferior degree, are they the 
less good. These three things, therefore, 
measure, form, and order ••• are as it 
were generic goods in things ~ade by God, 
whether in spirit or in body. 
Also, a degree of internal harmony of all species results 
when each species realizes t0 some degree its proper 
measure, number, and weight. Augustine says in The City 
of God, 
All natures, then inasmuch as they are, 
and have therefore a rank and species of 
their own, and a kind of internal harmony, 
are certainly good. And when they are in 
the places assigned to them by the order 
of their nature, they preserve such being 
as they have received. And those things 
which have not received everlasting being, 
are altered for better or for worse, so.as 
to suit the wants and motions of those 
things to which the Creator's law has mane 
them subservient; and thus they tend in the 
divine providence to that end which it 
embraced in the general scheme of the 
loate~, Basic Writings, I, 432. 
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government of the universe. So that, though 
the corruption of transitory and perishable 
things brings them to utter destr~ction, it 
does not prevent their pr0ducing that whieh 
was designed to be their result. And this 
being so, God, who supremely is, and who 
therefore created every being which has not 
supreme existence (for that which was made 
of nothing could not be equal to Him, and 
indeed could not be at all had He not made 
it)", is not to be found fault with on 
account of the creature's faults, but is to 
be praised in view of the natures 'He has 
made.l 
Thus, resulting from God's initiating and sustaining 
activity the creature not only is but also is sustained 
as it develops into a harmonious hierarchical struc~ure, 
which structure was built into the seeds and the elements 
of the universe according to the eternal wisdom {word) of 
God. But how does this creature realize its potentiality, 
that is, come into a state of relative perfection? 
Augustine ~urns to the Holy Spirit for the ontological 
condition for the possibility of the creature's becoming 
actualized. 
In his Confessions Augustine discusses the perfecting 
function of the Holy Spirit. He says, 
For Thy good Spirit was borne over the 
waters, net borne up by them as if He 
rested upon them. For those in whom Thy 
good Spirit is said to rest, He causes te 
rest in Himself. But Thy incorruptible and 
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unchangeable will, which in itself is all-
sufficient for itself, was borne over that 
life which Thou hadst made to which to 
live is not all one with living happily, 
since, flowing in its own darkness, it 
liveth also; for which it remaineth to be 
converted unto Him by whom it was made, 
and to live more and more by the fountain 
of life, and in his light to see light, 
and to be perfected, and enlightened, and 
made happy.l 
In On the Trinity Augustine says that God wills to per-
fect the creature, to bring it into a full realization 
of itself.2 It is obvious on the one hand that when the 
creature has attained a full realization of its inherent 
nature it also is as ~erfect a likeness of the eternal 
ideas as it is capable of becoming and on the other hand 
that a structure results which is characterized by degrees 
of both perfection and harmony. Through the Holy Spirit 
God works to accomplish this harmonious cosmological 
structure. 
From the foregoing discussion of the initiating, 
sustaining and perfecting function of God, it is clear 
that Ged spoke and thus created all things in one Ublow" 
~ nihilo, by an act pf his will and in the likeness of 
the ideas residing in his understanding, i.e., his Word. 
The result of this creative act is a universe which is 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 230; italics mine. 
2 Schaff, A Select Library, III, 58-9. 
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both complete and incomplete, which is sustained by Godts 
will or sustaining causal activity and ~Y the universe's 
participation in God, and which is perfected by God's 
direct causative action through the seed-like principles 
implanted in matter so that the seminal reasons can fully 
realize in matter their measure, number, and we~ght. It 
is in terms of the creative act of God that Augustine 
seeks to overcome the difficulties he faces. How is 
Augustine able through his idea of creation to overcome 
the problems confronting him? 
4)' Solutions to Metaphysical Problems 
The idea of creation was developed by Augustine to 
answer at least three problems. In review, what are 
these three problems, and how does the idea of creation 
help him to deal with them? 
The cyclical view of history was an attempt to · 
provide an answer to the problem of the relation of an 
eternal God to a temporal world. The Stoics contend 
that the universe is set in the eternal pattern of 
historical and natural recurrence. In this way they 
attempt to show that the world is eternal in that it 
undergoes an eternal cycle and that the world is temporal 
in that it undergoes the cycle of change. Also in this 
way the Stoics tried to overcome the problem of the re-
lation of time and eternity. 
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A~gustine objects to this view because on the one 
hand it does not allow for the possibility of happiness 
for the soul and on the other hand if it attempts to 
render happiness meaningful it allows into the system of 
eternal recurrence something that is new to the system, 
i.e., a contradiction of the basic assumptions of the 
system. If cyclism is untenable, how can one render 
meaningful the life of the soUl, i.e., history? 
The second problem is found in the doctrine of the 
"co-eternal" creature. The Platonists claim that 
existence is a creature but, since one can not conceive 
of a "before" the creature existed, the creature must 
have existed eternally, but nevertheless dependently, 
upon God •. This position poses two problems for Augustine: 
(1) how can a "beforen be conceived, and {2) how can two 
heterogeneous beings be related? 
The third problem is found in the doctrine, creatio 
ab Deo. The force of this doctrine is this: for God to 
--
> 
create in a way that is intelligible to the finite mind 
God must do so with the use of ~existing materials. 
To contend that God created using materials other than 
himself is to involve oneself in an ontological dualism. 
To avoid this conclusion one must say that God created 
the creature out of himself. Thus, the argument concludes, 
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if one is to develop a metaphysical position that is 
intelligible then one must allow that God created the 
universe out of himself, i.e., one must adhere to an 
ontological monism. 
How does Augustine's doct!ine of creation function 
to help him answer these problems? Each of these pro-
blems will now be briefly considered taking the last 
problem as the first for eonsideration. How does 
Augustine deal with the problem of 'ontological monism 
in terms of his doctrine of creation? 
A. Metaphysical Monism -- Augustine comes to grips 
with the difficulties in the doctrine of ontological 
monism first by indicating the difficulties involved in 
the position and second, by offering a position which 
does not become involved in the problems 0f the former 
position. Essentially, Augustine argues that being 
and existence are two different kinds of beiqg. On the 
one hand, being is immutable, perfect, and complete, 
while on the other hand existence is mutable, imperfect, 
and incomplete. How can being create out of itself that 
which is not itself, i.e., something· different i~ kind 
than itself? This is just as unintelligible as it is 
to contend that God created out of a pre-existing 
material and to become involved in an ontological dualism. 
Augustine contends that God had the power to speak into 
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existence the creature and that nothing was needed to 
aid his all-powerful will. He says in his treatise, 
Concerning the Nature of Good, 
But tfrom Him' does not mean the same 
as tof Him.' For what is of Him may be 
said to be from Him; but not everything 
that is from Him is rightly said to be of 
Him. For from Him are heaven and earth, . 
because He made them; but not of Him be-
cause they are not of His substance. As 
in the case of a man who begets a son and 
makes a house, from himself is the son, 
from himself is the house, but the son is 
of him, the house is of the earth and 
wood. But this is so, because as a man 
he cannot make something even of nothing; 
'but God of whom are all things, through 
wham are all things, in whom are all 
things,. had no need of any material 
which He had1not made to assist His omnipotence. 
The creature came into existence through the power of 
Godts will and through God's Uspeaking," that is, in 
terms of the Word, Wisdom, Understanding or ideas of God. 
That which came into existence is not God but is of·a 
different kind of being than is God, and it came into 
existence through God's creating out of nothing, that is, 
without God's use of pre-existing materials. 
B. Metaphysical Dualism -- The second difficulty 
Augustine faces is the contention of those holding that 
the creature is co-eternal with God that since one cannot 
loates, Basic Writings, I, 442. 
conceive of a temporal sequence before the world was 
created and since the world is changing and temporal and 
obviously dependent upon something other than itself f0r 
its existence one must conclude that the creature is 
co-eternal with God. Implied in this contenti0n of the 
Platonists is the further contention that if one ascribes 
temporality to mutable existence and eternality to 
immutable being then one has an ontological dualism of 
a radical sort. With such a radical dualism it becomes 
even more difficult to specify the relatiGn between 
eternal immutability and temporal mutability. Thus, for 
this reason it becomes all the more important that the 
creature be co-eternal with the Creator. Through his 
doctrine 0f creation Augustine answers these problems. 
First, he agrees that it is impossible to con-
ceive of ages before the creation of the world. Those 
who attempt to do so are assuming that time is eternal 
which is a contradiction. Time.is change in measured 
sequence and change is dependent up0n something other 
than itself for its existence. Thus, change is not 
eternal, and consequently, time is not eternal. Augustine 
contends that time is a creature created ttin the beginning' 
by God's willful speaking. Thus, if time is not eternal 
it must have ha~ a beginning and if it had a beginning 
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it must have been created. Augustine says in the 
Confessions, 
But if the roving thought of any one 
should wander through the images of bygone 
time, and wonder that Thou, t~e God 
Almighty, and All-creating and All-sustain-
ing, the Architect of heaven and earth, 
didst for innumerable ag~s refrain from 
so great a work before Thou wouldst make 
it, let him awake and consider that he 
wonders at false things. For whence could 
innumerable ages pass by which Thou didst 
not make, since Thou art the Author and 
Creator of all ages? • • • But if before 
heaven and earth there was no time, why 
is it asked, What didst Thou then? Fol 
there was no tthen' when time was not? 
If, then, it is possible to account for time in terms of 
its being created one can conclude that the creature is 
not ce-eternal with the Creator. However, if one ascribes 
time to mutability and eternity to immutability does not 
one involve oneself in an ontologica~ dualism? One not 
only has heterogeneous modes of being but also heterogenous 
modes of duration. How does Augustine handle this implica-
tion of the doctrine of the co-eternal creature? 
Augustine contends that the universe was created ex 
nihilo and that the universe is not God, that is, it is a 
different kind of being than God. Howe~er, the universe 
is not wholly unlike God. On the contrary, it was created 
~hrough the Word, that is, in the image of the ideas of 
1 . Ibid., p. 190. 
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God. Since the universe was created in God's image the 
creature is like God and is a resemblance of him. Fur-
thermore, the creature exists because of its·partiaipation 
in the ideas of God. Thus, through the ontological func-
tioning of the Word and through his doctrine of participa-
tion Augustine is able to relate being and existence.1 
c. The Meaning of History -- Augustine contends 
that the cyclical view of history renders meaningless the 
life of the soul. Caught up in an eternal recurrence the 
1Paul Elmer More contends in his Shelburne Essays 
that Augustine's metaphysical position is radically dual-
istiee More says that Augustine's former Manichaean 
position led him to a radical dualism (p. 93}. Further, 
More points out that uGodts will became the supreme being; 
man's will, insofar as it differentiated itself from God's, 
the-voluntary inclination to not-being. He now had a 
dualism of two personalities, God and man. n ( p. 94) More 
also sees in Augustine a dualism of nature. More says, 
"Since God, he there says (De Civitate Dei), is essential 
being and immutable, to those th1ngs whicn he created ex 
nihilo he gave being, but not the highest being equal to 
his own. The dualism of nature is thus reduced to being 
and not-being, esse and nihilo~ and the world is, so to 
speak, a mixture-or- these two. "l p. 86) More seeks to 
force Augustine into a position that Augustine's position 
will not admit. Nowhere does Augustine say that not-being 
exists. On the contrary, there is no such existence as 
not-being. Rather, Augustine contends that there are 
grades of being. Of course, Augustine says that the 
creature is other than God, but nowhere does Augustine 
admit that the creature is radically other than God, that 
is, pure not-being. Thus, though Augustine says that the 
creature is other than God, one must keep in mind that 
the creature 'is nevertheless like God. More's contention 
must be tempered with Augustine's monistic tendencies. 
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soul is unable to achieve its final end of being in right 
relation to God, to the world and to other souls. If 
cyclism were to say that the soul were able to achieve 
such happiness the proposer of cyclism would be denying 
his basic premise, that there is nothing new and that 
what is eternally recurs. Because of the inadequacy of 
the cyclicists position to render meaningful the life of 
the soul, Augustine contends that one must search for 
another world-view. How can time, the life situation of 
the sGul, be considered so that the soul's ·existence has 
meaning, i.e., is able to achieve happiness? 
Augustine's answer to this prGblem is found in his 
doctrine of creation. He contends that the life of the 
soul is caught up neither in a shadowy, unreal existence 
nor in an eternal recurrence. On the contrarY:·;· the life 
of the soul is able to have meaning because through time 
God is working to achieve the perfection of his creatures. 
The soul is in time and is thus in the stream of God's 
providential activity. God is attempting to achieve some-
thing real in time and this gives time and the creatures 
in time meaning. 1 Christian clearly states Augustine's 
position when he says, 
In summary, how does the notion of a 
'beginning' of the world function in 
lAugustine, gity of God, p. 238; cf. Oates, Basic 
Writings, I, 255-5 • 
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Augustine's thought? It does not mean 
the world -was created in time,. for time was 
created ·with the world and not before it; 
hence the creation has existed at all times. 
Nor does it mean, on the other hand, simply 
that the world is dependent.on God for its 
existence, for many ancient philosophers had 
said this, as Augustine well knew, without 
supposing a 'beginning.' Its function in 
Augustine's thought was .to open to him a way 
of understanding and saying that though God 
is eternal, time is real, and that human 
history is neither a dreamlike appearance 
of eternity nor a per.petual cycle in which 
nothing is new. History is made of events 
that are both new ana decisive, as a 
'beginning' is' new and decisive. For it 
is the eternal will of the creator that in 
these events something real shoulci be 
accomplished.l · 
D. Summary -- Confronted with an ontological dualism, 
w~th an ontological monism, and with a cyclical view of 
history Augustine dem_onstrated the internal inadequacies of 
each position and offered the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
as an alternative. Monism has difficulty in showing how 
that which comes out of God can be unlike God, i.e., how 
m~table existence can be created out of the substance of 
the immutable Creator. In order to account for mutable 
existences Augustine contends that God created the creature 
ex nihilo and that the creature is a different kind of 
being than is God. Dualism has difficulty in relating 
heterogenous kinds of being and duration. In the doctrine, 
• 
lBattenhouse, A Qompanion, p. 328. 
210 
creatio ~ nihilo, Augustine contends that God created 
the creature in the likeness of the eternal forms and that 
the creature participates in the eternal forms, i.e., God. 
Thus, the universe is both unlike and like the C!eator. 
God is both transcendent to and immanent in the creature. 
Grabowski summarizes Augustine's position on the relation 
of God to the creature by saying, 
His theology and philosophy fall into the 
middle-of-the course road between monism 
and dualism. In a sense his doctrine can 
be considered monistic. For as a genetic 
explanation of the universe, it reduces all 
reality to a single principle, to a sole 
source-Being, to the will and power of one 
everlasting and immutable God. Yet it is 
not monism, as defined and usually accepted, 
because the God of St. Augustine is dist~nct 
from and transcendent to the world which pro-
ceeds from Him. It is a dualism insofar as 
it maintains that God is the self-sufficient 
and necessary Being whieh is distinct from 
creation, and therefore holds for two dis-
tinct entities of diverse substances, namely 
God and creatures. It is likewise a dualism 
in this sense, which is Augustinian, that, 
considering the world as it is now created, 
all entities in it ean be reduced to two 
ultimate principles of reality, viz., spirit 
and matter •••• The designation which is 
used nowadays to signify the doctrine con-
tained in St. Augustine is 'cosmological 
dualism.'l 
F~nally, Augustine contends that the world of time and 
lstanislaus J. Grabowski, The All-Present God: 
A Stud! in St. Augustine (St. Louis, Missouri: B:-Herder 
Book Co., 1954), P• 190. 
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change is real, that God is working out his own purposes 
in time, and that the life of the soul is meaningful 
because it is working in a real context. Thus, the 
doctrine of creation provides a perspective and a system 
of categories in terms of which Augustine is able to pro-
vide an alternative to the positions of ontological 
monism, ontological dualism, and cyclicism. 
5) Summary 
Augustine was confronted with the problems of giving 
an intelligible account of God's relation to the world 
and of history so that the life of the soul could be made 
meaningful. The doctrine of creatio ~ nihilo was ad-
vanced as an alternative to the inadequate positions he 
faced. Through the methods of introspective analysis, 
induction, and analogy Augustine developed the categories 
of God which were also the categories of creation. Con-
tinuing in his attempt to render his experience intelli-
bible through the perspective of Biblical faith, he allows 
the creative elements to function in their respective and 
composite roles. God, motivated because of the plenitude 
of his goodness and his desire to perfect the creature, 
created ~ nihilo a world by an act of his all-powerful 
will in the likeness of his Word, his understanding. 
Thus, God spoke and the world came into existence. The 
212 
result of God's speaking is a world which is both complete 
and incomplete and which has a hierarchical and harmonious 
structure. Functioning as the Creator, Sustainer, ana 
Perfecter of the universe, God is both transcendent to 
and immanent in the world. God is also achieving his 
purposes through time. The soul, because it operates 
in this context, is able to find meaning for itself. 
Thus, Augustine's doctrine of creatio ~ nihilo is able 
to function in such a way that alternatives are provided 
to the inadequate positions he faced. 
The nature and function of Augustine's doctrine of 
creation has been discussed. However, can his idea of 
creation be further clarified? What Augustine ·means by 
creatio~ can be made more distinct by examining the root 
analogy underlying his position. Throughout the above 
argument for the nature and structure of God and con-
sequently the creative categories Augustine employed an 
analogy drawn from the realm of inner experience. 
Through a discussion of this root metaphor not only will 
Augustine's doctrine of creation become more explicit 
but also one will be able to evaluate the ability of 
his idea of creation to provide an intelligible world-
view and to aRswer the problems facing him. What, then, 
is the fundamental analogy underlying Augustine's idea 
of creation? 
213 
6. The Root Analogy of Creation 
When Augustine took the perspective of Biblical 
faith uhat God created the world he attempted to render 
the perspective intelligible. In order to render this 
perspective intelligible he began working in terms of 
an analogy. This root analogy suggested an approach and 
a set of categories on the basis of which not only the 
Biblical notion of creation could be made intelligible 
but also Augustine could settle his metaphysical diffi-
culties. What, then, is the nature and structure of 
Augustine's root metaphor of -creation? What is its 
function? And, finally, what is the capacity of the 
root analogy to suggest an approach and a set of 
categories in terms of which Augustine's Biblical faith 
can be understood and his problems answered? First, 
what is the nature and structure of the root analogy 
underlying his cosmology? 
1) Nature and Structure of the Root Analogy 
A. Nature of the Root Analogy The analogy 
underlying Augustine's cosmology is the act of speaking. 
How ftoes Augustine arrive at this analogy and what is 
its nature? However, before these questions are dealt 
with one. should review the nature of a root analogy. 
What is a root analogy? In the preceding Chapter 
a root analogy was defined as a perceptual or common. 
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sense image which suggests a theoretical or conceptual 
hypothe~is which would provide a perspective and a 
structure in terms of which data can be interpreted and 
related. The function of a root analogy is to suggest 
a conceptual hypothesis possessing both a perspective and 
a structure in terms of which the date of experience can 
be interpreted. Thus, a root analogy is the experiential 
foundation of a conceptual hypothesis. How does !ugustine 
arrive at the root metaphor underlying creation? 
Despairing of the capacity of the physical senses 
to lead him to being and to the categories necessary to a 
doctrine of creation, Augustine looks to the realm of 
inner experience to aid him in his search. If one is to 
have any knowledge of being and if the categories of the 
mind operative in experiences of nature lead only to 
changing events, then one must seek being through the 
structure of inn~r experience. Further, the soul's 
categories must not only be phenomenal but they must also 
be ontological. This means that these categories must 
not only allow one knowledge that God is but also what 
God is. Following this train of reasoning Augustine 
contends that God's creative activity can be understood 
through the ca~egories of inner experience, and that the 
root analogy of creation is the act of speaking. In 
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fact, Augustine seeks in his treatise, On the Trinit~, 
to show that the structure of the finite mind suggests a 
conceptual hypothesis possessing both a perspective and 
a set of categories which will allow the notion of crea-
tion of Biblical faith to be made meaningful. Thus, 
Augustine arrives at his root metaphor of creation, tae 
act of speaking,in his attempt to delineate the nature 
and function of God. What is the nature of the root 
analogy undergirding Augustine's cosmology? 
Speaking involves three notions: activity, purpose, 
and understanding. These aspects of speaking are essen-
tial to it and without anyone of them speaking would be 
impossible. First,speaking involves a cause. Before one 
speaks one must decide to speak. After the decision to 
speak the energy by which speaking is done is exerted by 
the will. Further, speaking involves understanding. A 
person who speaks usually has something he wants to say, 
that is, he desires to enunciate something he understands. 
Finally, speaking involves a purpose. The speaker.through 
speaking is attempting to achieve a desired end, such as 
communication. For example, through the sound of the 
voice the speaker purposes to bring about an idea in the 
mind of the hearer. In summary, essential to the root 
metaphor of creation, speaking, are activity, purpose, 
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and understanding. If this is the nature of speaking 
what is the structure of the root analogy? 
B. Structure of the Root Analogy -- Speaking 
is a functioning of the finite mind. What are the struc-
tural elements of the finite mind that allow speaking to 
take place? These are memory, understanding, and will. 
The memory is a storehouse of ideas, that is, of know-
ledge which is not presently being used. The understand-
ing is the contemplation of the ide~which have been 
recalled from the memory. Further, the understanding is 
a likeness, a resemblance of the mind. This follows from 
Augustine's assumption that the knower and the known must 
be alike if knowledge is to take place. Finally, the 
will is the dynamic aspect of the mind. It is the search-
ing, striving element in the mind which causes the mind 
both to seek, to possess ~he object of its concern and 
to communicate its knowledge. Thus, the memory, under-
standing and will are the essential structural elements 
in speaking. How do these elements function in Augustine's 
cosmol0gy? 
2) Functioning of the Root Analogy in Augustine's 
Cosmology 
Confronted with the metaphysical positions of onto-
logical dualism and ontological monism, and confronted 
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with the cyclical view of history, Augustine developed an 
ontology and a cosmology from the perspective and structure 
suggested by the root analogy, the finite person's act of 
speaking. He contends that the categories of human inner 
experience: memory, understanding, and will, are images 
not only of the categories of being but also of the 
categories of creation. On the basis of this suggestion 
Augustine advances ·the conceptual hypothesis that God, 
through an act of his will and in terms of the ideas he 
contemplates through his unQerstanding, that is, through 
his word, spoke and the creature came into existence ex 
nihilo. Through the continuing power of his will God 
undergirds all creatures. Further, all creatures were 
created in the image or likeness of the ideas in God's 
mind. After the creative act the universe participatesin 
God's ideas and its structure is maintained through this 
relation. Finally, God perfect~ the cre~tures by causing 
them to·develop to their fullest potential, thus causing 
the creatures to be as much like the ideas as they are 
capable of being. Resulting from Goats perfecting activity 
is a world which is structured hierarchically and 
harmoniously. Thus, the root analogy, speaking, suggests 
an hypothesis which possesses both a perspective and a 
structure through which the Biblical doctrine of creation 
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is made intelligible. 
Augustine's root analogy not only suggests to him 
a way to develop m~aningfully the Biblical notion of 
creation, but also it helps him to find answers to the 
metaphysical difficulties he faces. Through God's act of 
speaking the temporal world came into existence. This 
world is and is not like God, that is to say God is both 
immanent in and transcendent to his creature. Also, this 
world is real and valuable in and o~ itself. It is good. 
The life of the soul or history is meaningful because the 
decisions made by finite souls in the temporal context do 
make a difference about the significance of their lives. 
Thus, through the doctrine-of creatio ex nihilo Augustine 
finds answers to settle his metaphysical problems. 
3.) Summary 
Undergirding Augustine's cosmology is the root 
metaphor, speaking~ A root metaphor is an aspect of common 
sense experience which suggests a conceptual hypothesis 
having not only a perspective but also a set of categories 
in terms of which a cosmology can be developed. From the 
perspective of speaking and its structural elements, that 
is, memory, understanding, and will, Augustine not only 
advances the doctrine of creatio ~ nihilo but also both 
accounts for the relation of being and existence and 
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renders meaningful the life of the soul. 
Does Augustine's root analogy of creation allow 
him not only to . s.ol"'Ve his metaphysical problems but also 
render intelligible the notion of creation of Biblical 
faith? If the fundamental analogy is able to suggest a 
way in which.Augustine can accomplish his goals the root 
analogy is successful. Otherwise, the suggestion is un-
successful and must either be revised or discarded. How 
successful is Augustine's. root analogy?_ 
7. Critique of the Idea of Creation 
Augustine builds his cosmology on the root analogy 
of speaking. How is this root analogy to be tested? 
It can be tested by examining the ability of the hypothesis 
suggested by it to accomplish the purposes :f:or which the 
hypothesis was developed. If the hypothesis functions 
successfully, thep, the root analogy is successful, i.e., 
it has suggested n?t only a perspective but also a set of 
categories in terms of which ~he cosmology can do the work 
Augustine asks of it. Is Augustine's cosmology successful? 
This question will be answered by reviewing the crit.eria 
for testing an,hypothesis and by applying these criteria 
to the hypothesis. 
1) Criteria of a World-Hypothesis 
There.are two criteria by which an hypothesis can 
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be tested: . . d 1 prec1s1on an scope. Precision in an 
hypothesis is the close reference of the hypothesis to the 
facts to be related. Scope in an hypothesis is the ability 
of the hypothesis to refer to an increasing number of 
facts. Thus, when an hypothesis functions successfully 
it will closely refer to an increasing quantity of facts 
to be interpreted, that is, the hypoth~sis will allow 
one to interpret and to relate most if not all of the 
facts under consideration. 
2) Strength of the Idea of Creation 
The h~pothesis of speaking and its structural elements 
enable Augustine to overcome his metaphysical problems. 
How strong is Augustine's cosmological hypothesis? By 
applying the criteria of an hypothesis to Augustine's 
hypothesis one is able to determine the strength of his 
view. 
There are four areas of data which Augustine attempts 
to interpret and rela.te: change, permanence, efficient 
cause, and the interrelations of these data. The cos-
mological hypothesis of creation, speaking, has three 
categories: memory or ideas, understanding, and will. 
Augustine attempts to show that these categories are 
lstephen C. Pepper, World Hypothe.ses, . (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1948), p. 91. 
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sufficient to account for all experiences of the finite mind. 
Thus memory or ideas refers to permanence and will refers 
both to cause and to· change, .that is, the activity of the 
will is a cause and produces change. Change is the result 
of the activity of the will. Furthermore, the interrela-
tionship of ideas, understanding, and will that takes place 
when God speaks is categorical to the experience of change 
amid pe!ffianence and permanence amid change. Also, the 
orderly and purposive change that takes place in the 
creature has for its ground the continuation of God's 
willing ~nd purposive activity, that is, God's willing to 
bring the creature into a complete image of the eternal 
ideas. Thus, Augustine's position does have precision and 
scope relative to the data under consideration. Does it 
have any weaknesses? 
3) Weaknesses of the Idea of Creation 
There are two areas of data which the hypothesis, 
speaking, does not sufficiently refer to and relate. The 
first is. the nature of the relation of the temporal and 
changing creature to the eternal and immutable Creator. 
The second area of data is change. Regarding the first 
area of data one is confronted with the problem of speci-
fying the nature of the relation of being and existence. 
Augustine argues that the Word envisages the ideas in 
God's mind and_through an act of will God creates the 
universe in the image of the contemplated idea.s. The 
structure of the universe exists because it participates 
in the ideas of God. It is able to participate because 
the Word, being a perfect resemblance of the Father, pro-
vides the conditions for the possibility of the resemblance 
of the Creator in the creature. However, what is the nature 
of this relation called participation? There is no founda-
tion for indicating its nature in Augustine's root analogy. 
Augustine leaves this problem unsolved. 
Augustine is also unable to account for the data of 
changing exis~tence. In Augustine's system God creates the 
universe ex nihilo and sustains it through his will. How-
ever, the conceptual hypothesis which provides the per-
spective and the set of categories for his cosmological 
system provides no category or composite functioning of 
categories which would refer either to the nature of 
creatio ex nihilo or to the fact of changing existence. 
In the root analogy the act of speaking brings about an 
idea in the mind of the one to whom one is speaking. This 
act of finite speaking is analogous to God's creating ex 
nihilo. Nevertheless, Augustine has not specified the 
nature of the act of creating without the use of pre-
existing materials. He has articulated no category or 
composite functioning of categories which would allow 
for th~ possibility of God's bringing into existence a 
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plastic material which ~ not before it was. There is 
nothing in his root analogy which would suggest a way to 
solve this problem. 
Further, there is nothing in his root analogy which 
refers to and relates the data of changing existence. He 
hints at a possible solution when he says that in the act 
of speaking to another person an idea is brought out in 
the listener's mind. But, the idea in the listener's mind 
does not change and is not maintained by the will of the 
speaker. Thus, Augustine·' s analogy, speaking, is deficient 
in two ways: (1) it does not allow an hypothesis to be 
developed which would make intelligible the nature of the 
relation of being and existence, the participation of 
existence in being, and (2) it neither allows for the 
intelligibility of the nature of creatio ex nihilo nor 
accounts for the fact of changing existence. 
8. Contrast with Plato's Root Analogy 
Two analogies have been examined: Platots "crafts-
manship," and Augustine t s ".speaking. 11 Each philosopher 
has developed a cosmological structure in terms of the 
perspective and set of categories his root analogy 
suggested. Fur~her, the strengths and weaknesses of each 
basic analogy have been examined, Plato's in the pre-
ceding chapter and Augustine's in the present one. In 
224 
the light of this examination of these analogies what are 
the similarities and differences between them? 
~j Similarities 
There are at least four similarities between Plato's 
and Augustine's root analogy. Each analogy has for its 
foundation the structure of the mind. Each one suggests 
an hypothesis having categories which directly refer to 
the data of permanence and cause. Finally, neither analogy 
is capable of suggesting the answer to the problem of the 
precise nature of the relation of existence to being. 
Each similarity will now be briefly considered. 
A. Mind -- Both Augustine's and Plato's analogy is 
based on a structure of the mind. Though Plato develops 
his analogy to suggest not only cause but also malleable 
material his root analogy is the dual structure of the 
soul: permane~ce and change. Augustine finds the 
categories of the mind to be mem0ry or ideas, understand-
ing, and will. In terms of these categories he develops 
his cosmology. 
B. Permanence Augustine fallows in the Platonic 
tradition by contending that the ideas in ones mind are 
ones experience of permanence. Thus, both Augustine's 
and Plato's analogies allow for the possibility of inter-
preting and relating the data of permanence by sugge~ting 
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a category through which this data can be rendered 
meaningful, the ideas for Plato and the memory fer 
Augustine. 
C. Cause Both Augustine and Plato provide for 
an efficient cause in their system. Each finds this 
cause in the a.cti vi ty of the mind. Each develops his 
doctrine of cause by contending that the kind of cause 
he employs in his system is the kind one experiences 
when one wills to act and action takes place. 
D. Relation of Being and Becoming One of the 
deficiencies of Plato's and Augustine's root analogy is 
the inability of either one to suggest a category or a 
composite functioning of categories which would refer 
to and render intelligible the relation of being and 
existence called "participation." It has been demon-
strated that this deficiency in each root anal0gy 
seriously affects its capacity to make intelligible the 
relation between being and becoming. 
2) Differences 
Two major differences beuween Augustine's and Plato's 
root analogy are these: {1) Plato can render meaningful 
the data of change while Augustine cannot, and (2) Plato 
develops his initial root analogy to suggest both cause 
and plastic material while Augustine seeks to interpret 
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all data in terms of the hypothesis suggested by the 
structure of the mind. 
A. Change Plato's root analogy suggests three 
categories: cause, material, and ideas. Through the 
causality of the soul the material takes into itself the 
form and order of the ideas envisaged by the soul. The 
result of the composite functioning of these categories 
is that the realm of orderly change exists. Thus, in 
Plato's system change can be made intelligible. Augustine 
is not able.to explain the existence of change, however. 
Nothing in his root analogy suggests the conditions for 
the possibility of the existence of change. Whereas 
Plato's analogy suggests a material which is formed and 
orderly change results, Augustine's analogy suggests 
no such material. At this point it is evident that the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is incomprehensible. 
B. Structure of the Root Analogy -- Plato de-
veloped his root analogy to suggest not only an efficient 
cause but also a material one in terms of which the 
efficient cause could function. By doing this he was able 
to account for the existence of orderly change. Augustine, 
on the contrary, attempts to set up the categories of 
creation only on the analogy of the structure of the mind. 
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As a result he was unable to account for the existence of 
change in his system. Of course he argues that the realm 
of change was created ex nihilo and sustained by God's 
will. Nevertheless, his analogy does not explain God's 
creating without the use of pre-existing materials. 
Because his root analogy does not suggest either a 
category or a functioning of a group of categories which 
would account for creation ~ nihilo, Augustine's idea 
of creation is to that extent incomprehensible. 
9. Transition to Brunner 
The position of Augustine regarding God's creative 
activity is the supreme effort of the early Christian 
intellectual community to make intelligible its faith. 
Although Augustine develops a thoroughgoing metaphysical 
system utilizing Greek concepts to express Christian 
meanings to answer the problems for Christians in the 
dualism of the Platonic creation view, Augustine's view 
has its problems for s0me Christian thinkers in the 
twentieth century. 
The problems in Augustine's creation view stem 
fundamentally from his reliance upon reason to say any-
thing significant about God, man, the world, and the 
relation of God both to the world and to man. It was 
pointed out in the foregoing analysis that Augustine 
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argues that God created the world as well as that the world 
exists because it participates in the ideas in God's mind. 
This appeal to two opposing principles of explanation for 
the world points clearly to the problems Augustine 
encounters when he appeals both to authority and to 
reason in an effort to explain his world. Authority leads 
him to a creatio ~ nihilo view. Reason, however, in an 
effort to account for how God create$ and the structure of 
that which God creates, appeals to arguments to prove the 
existence of God, the nature of God, and the relation of 
participation between the seminal r~asons and the ideas in 
God's mind. Thus, the problems Augustine affords Brunner 
are to re-examine the capacity of reason to say anything 
about God and about God's relation to the world and to 
examine carefully what the Bible says about God and his 
relation to the world. In the following chapter en 
Brunner it will become clear that he is attempting to base 
his view of creation on what he means by revelation and 
that he decries both the attempt of Plato to make 
intelligible God's creative activity through unaided 
reason and the attempt of Augustine to hold to the 
authority of Bible statements, on the one hand, and on 
the other, to rely heavily on reason to know God and his 
relation to the world. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE IDEA OF CREATION IN BRUNNER'S THOUGHT 
1. Introduction 
What is the meaning of creation in Brunner's thought? 
• 
This question will be answered through an analysis of the 
problems Brunner confronts, of the methodology he employs, 
of the categories of creation he advocates, of the function 
of these categories, and, finally, of the root analogy 
underlying his system. 
2. Problems Facing Brunner 
Brunner comes to grips with two problems in working 
out his idea of creation. These problems are suggested by 
two positions regarding the relation of God to the world 
and the method of philosophical speculation employed in 
the development of these positions. First, what positions 
regarding God's relation to the world confront Brunner as 
he attempts to develop the idea of creation and what pro-
blems do they suggest? When these problems have been dis-
cussed the problems involved in the methodology and goals 
of the philosophical positions cGnfronting Brunner will be 
discussed. 
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1) Relation of God to the World 
A. Pantheism -- Pantheism is the position that God 
is the sole reality. As the only real God has not only 
omnipotentia, the power to do anything, but also potestas 
absoluta, absolute power. 1 Pantheists argue that if God 
alone is real, and if there is any power operative in 
reality, then it must come from God. Further, if all 
power is in God and God is perfect, then' He must have per-
fect power. Thus, "God can do everything.n2 Following 
immediately from the omnipotentia of God is the potestas 
absoluta. If God is being and is able to accomplish any-
thing and if he is the ground of all existence and cause 
then God possesses absolute power. The implication of 
this is that "God, the Almighty, becomes the One who 
alone can effect anything, which again leads logically to 
the idea that He is the Sole Reality, and this means 
Pantheism.n3 If God is the nsole Reality," if God has 
both perfect power and only He is able to effect anything, 
then "all creaturely independencen4 is swallowed up and a 
lEmil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. 
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: 1'lie Westm~nster Press, 1950), 
pp. 248-49. 
2Ibid., p. 248. 
3rbid., p. 249. 
4rbid. 
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full scale determinism is the result. 1 Thus, the dilemma 
that either one accepts the pantheistic position or the 
difficult position that God is not related to the world in 
any continuously effective way. However, if God is the 
ground of all existence and the ultim~te principle of ex-
planation then one must adhere to the Pantheistic positionf 
Brunner is faced not only with the force of the Pantheistic 
position but also the strength of the Deistic world-view. 
B. Deism -- In direct opposition to Pantheism, 
Deism insists that God created the world, an independent 
and self-sufficient creature, and set it over against him-
self. Brunner summarizes this position when he says, 
[Deism] consists in laying so much stress on 
the independence of the created existence 
that the world is regarded as so independent 
of the divine activity that it is self-
sufficient. This means that God's influence 
is reduced to that of a Prime Mover, a 
spectator, who looks at the world from the 
outside, who may possibly, occasionally, 
and as an exception, intervene in its course, 
whereas normally the world goes on its way 
by itself.3 
Deism presents the problem to Brunner that God and the 
lrbid., p. 251. 
2Emil Brunner, God and Man: Four Essars on the 
Nature of Persona1ity~rans. David Cairns (Lonaon:--
Student-uhristian Movement Press, 1936), p. 47. 
3Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation 
and Redemption, trans:-Glive Wyon (Philadelpfira: 1he 
westminster Press, 1952), pp. 149-50. 
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world are two independent reals, except, of course, at the 
point of God's creation of the world. If there are two 
independent reals and God and the world are separate and 
distinct, then not only does God have no meaningful con-
tinuous relation to the world but also the meaning of God's 
creation of the world is suspect. How can God, being, the 
sole reality, create an object which is itself being, that 
is, another independent real? 
c. Summary -- Thus Pantheism presents the problem of 
accounting for the experience of finite freedom and render-
ing meaningful the Biblical doctrine of creation. Deism 
presents the problem in indicating in what sense God is 
related to the world he created and established seemingly 
in a self-sufficient and independent existence. Pantheism 
and Deism pose difficult problems for Brunner. However, 
the methods used in philosophical speculation, in the 
development of such metaphysical views as Pantheism and 
Deism, also pose difficulties for Brunner. 
2) Philosophical Speculation 
Brunner is concerned not only with the probaems 
posed by the philosophical positions of Pantheism and 
Deism regarding the·relation of God to the world, but al-
so with the problems involved in the methods and goals of 
the metaphysical enterprise. 
23] 
A. Goal of Metaphysics -- Brunner contends that the 
goal of all metaphysical endeavors is to develop a system 
of thought which would both render intelligible the nature 
of reality and be in itself coherent. He says, 
The fundamental convicti0n underlying 
every system is monistic. The metaphysician, 
whether he be the metaphysician in the 
narrower sense, or the speculative idealist, 
has the confidence that thought, and that 
means human thought, has the power to 
penetra-te to the ground, the unity of all 
things; consequently that this unity is 
present in the last resort in his own think-
ing; that the meaning and the coherence of 
the world discloses itself to his thought, 
In his thought he has the infallible access 
to that unity or ground or ultimate cause 
which he calls God, and this access is in-
fallible because it1depends upon nothing but right thinking. 
The metaphysician strives toward a thoroughgoing monistic 
system, a system in which God, man, and the world are 
rationally related. 2 If one intends to render intelligible 
the totality of one's experience, the metaphysician argues, 
then one must seek a coherent system of thought, a system 
in which exist no contradictions or incons_istencies or 
otherwise Unintelligible relations among concepts. If one 
does not adhere to this goal and one allows unintelligible 
relations to enter one's system of thought, then one is 
lBrunner, God and Man, pp. 46-7. 
2Ibid., p. 50. 
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£aced with accepting the conclusion that reality is 
unintelligible. Brunner £aces difficulties not only in 
the goal o£ metaphysics but also in the methods it employs. 
B. Methods of Metaphysics There are two concepts 
used by the metaphysician to attain the goal of system or 
rational continuity: (1} causality, and (2) analogy. 1 Re-
garding causality, Brunner says that metaphysicians reason 
in the following manner: 
If every single finite existence has a cause, 
why should not the finite as a whole also have 
a cause? Especially the perception of immanent 
purposiveness· seems actually to force us to 
such a conclusion, since nothing finite can 
fully account for purposiveness.2 
Working from the experience o£ finite cause metaphysicians 
seek an ultimate cause, the ground of all finite causes. 
Having specified the ontological cause,metaphysicians seek 
to establish a causal relation between the ground of all 
causes and finite causes. In this way God and the world 
are related in an intelligible fashion. 
The conc·ept of analogy is also employed in the 
development of a coherent system of thought. Brunner says, 
Reality appears as a graded structure o£ 
realms o£ being, which is not concluded 
in the· finite, and therefore demands its 
ideal completion in the construction of 
an existence in which that may be present 
in its perfection which appears as still 
libid., p. 42. 
2Ibid. 
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imperfect: even at the highest stage 
empirically known. It is Aristotle who 
was the first to combine these notions 
into a great philosophical system whose 
point of unity he named God.~ 
This means that metaphysicians attempt to understand re-
ality in terms of their own experience. They assume that 
whatever being is, it must be in some sense analogous to 
their own experience. Thus, metaphys.icians reason 
analogically from their experience to being in their 
attempt to understand being. They assume an underlying 
likeness between existence and being and co~sequently be-
tween God and the world. 
The goal of the metaphysician is then a rationally 
integrated system of thought in which the nature and 
structure of being is known. In his search for such a 
system he employs the perspectives, methods, and concepts 
he finds in his experience. To belittle or openly to 
oppose the methods, concepts, and perspectives in one's 
experience is to thwart the endeavor to render intelligible 
the totality of one's experience and consequently to 
assume that even if one's experience is ultimately intel-
ligible one does not have adequate tools for making· it 
intelligible. Without the concepts of analogy and 
causality employed in an effort to render coherent one's 
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experience how is one to delineate the nature and structure 
of reality? 
3) Summary 
Brunner is faced on the one hand with the goals and 
methods of metaphysics, and on the other with- the positions 
of Deism and Pantheism. The metaphysician argues that 
either one assumes a likeness at some point between being 
and knower and accepts the goal of a coherent.systematiza-
tion of the totality of one's experience or one accepts 
the position that one's experience is ultimately unintel-
ligible. Further, the metaphysician contends that one must 
either work from the data of one's experience to a coherent 
world-view by means of the tools at one's disposal -- tools 
such as analogy and causality, or not engage in the de-
velopment of a coherent world-view and live in ultimate 
unintelligi ~il:ity'. 
Brunner is also faced with the claims of Pantheism 
and Deism, two results of the methods of philosophical 
speculation j'ust discussed. Pantheists argue that God is 
the ground of all existence, that God is the gro~d of all 
cause, and that nothing exists apart from God. Thus on~ 
must conclude that what is is God and that which exists 
is completely regulated by God. In the Pantheistic system 
any distinction between God and the world is wiped out and 
human freedom is meaningless. Deists contend that God is 
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the Prime Mover of a self-sufficient world-machine. Thus 
God has no continuously effective relation to the world and 
any notion of God's regulation of the world is meaningless. 
What procedures does Brunner employ to answer these prob-
lems? 
3. Methodology 
In meeting the difficulties posed not only by the 
metaphysical positions of peism and Pantheism but also by 
the methods of metaphysical speculation, first, Brunner 
shows the incapacity of metaphysical speculation to attain 
its goals. Then he takes the perspective of Biblical 
faith and revelation. Having taken this perspective he 
attempts to clarify the concepts fundamental to creation. 
What, then, are the inadequacies involved in metaphysical 
speculation? What does Brunner mean by revelation in the 
Biblical sense? And, how does he reason from revelat.ion 
to an answer to his problems? First, what are the in-
adequacies involved in the approach metaphysicians employ 
as they attempt to understand the nature and structure of 
reality? · 
1) Critique of Speculative Knowledge 
Metaphysicians assume that one can have a knowl-
edge of reality through a coherent system of thought 
developed by means of such concepts as analogy and 
causality. Brunner attacks this assumption in a fashion 
typical of a sceptic of reason's power. He s.ays that self-
critical knowledge has two features. In the light of these 
two features Brunner argues that the metaphysician's assump-
tion is groundless. These features are stated when he says, 
Now criticism shows by an analysis of 
knowledge that knowledge always consists 
of two features, it is both an elaboration 
of data, perceived by the sense and yet 
self-contradictory, into a harmonious co-
ordination in thought, and also a limitation 
and control of such rationalizing by an X 
which is a datum that can never be resolved 
into a concept. Sense--perception without 
concept is blind, concept without sense-
perception is empty. In its progress and 
aim, knowledge is rational, but it always 
has its occasion in an irrational datum 
that shows the way to the rationilization 
and sets permanent limits to it. 
Brunner is arguing here that the goal and methods of the 
metaphysical enterprise must be re-examined. If the datum, 
X, cannot be known then the metaphysician's goal of under-
standing reality through a fully coherent system of thought 
is unattainable. And without a fully coherent system of 
thought, a system in which all data are conceptualized and 
all concepts intelligibly related, one cannot claim full 
knowledge of reality, that is a knowledge not only that 
reality is but also what reality-. is. 
lEmil Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion from the 
Standpoint of Protestant Theology, trans. A. J. u:-Farrar 
and B. L. Woolf (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), 
p. 62. 
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Furthermore, the methods used by metaphysicians are 
unable to lead one t0 a full knowledge of reality. If one 
can know being only as a limiting concept and the mind is 
incapable of conceptualizing being, then no methods or 
concepts available to the finite mind are capable of guid-
ing the mind to a full knowledge of reality. This means 
that the concepts of analogy and causality are inadequate 
avenues of approach to a full knowledge of reality. Self-
critical knowledge, thus, undercuts not· only the goal of 
metaphysics but also the concepts metaphysicians employ in 
their search for an understanding of the nature and 
structure ef reality. 
Though the goal of metaphysics is unattainable and 
its methods are inadequate, one can say something about 
the noumena, the ground of all existence. Brunner says, 
The fact that we get atreality at all by 
an ordering process of thought is an indication 
to us of its rational character. But the fact 
that what we are able to set in order is never 
more than a certain 'datum,' the existence and 
nature of which always finally evades our com-
prehension, is an indication of its irration-
ality. Hence despite our knowledge we are 
ignorant of the true nature of reality. This 
twofold result is the quintessence of-critical 
idealism.l 
That reason is unable to acquire a knowledge of reality 
such that a delineation of the nature of being could be 
lrbid. 
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possible is evident. Nevertheless, reason can and does 
know something about being even if that "somethingn is 
nothing more than that being is "a necessary limiting con-
ception.n1 Brunner's attack on the goal and methods of 
metaphysical speculation, thus, centers around his epistemE 
dualism, the incapacity of reason not only to gain a 
knowledge of being so that the nature and structure of 
being can be determined but also to attain such knowledge 
by any methods at its rlisposal.2 
Not only does Brunner argue that the rational 
capacity of man is unable to gain knowledge of the limiting 
concept, being, but also he argues that any rational system 
developed by man is his interpretation of his own expe-
rience and nothing more. The system maker does not know 
reality for all his system making. This means that man 
is caught up in the ego-centric predicam~nt and is unable 
to expel himself from it. Brunner points this out when he 
says, 
We say the same thing when we make the pro-
position that every system ~s a monologue 
of the thinker with himself. Inasmuch as 
the world ~nfolds itself to him, it is his 
thinking self which unfolds itself .therein. 
lrbid., p. 66. 
2Ibid., PP• 65-6. 
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He puts the question, but it is he too who 1 answers it to himself. No other intervenes. 
Brunner illustrates his contention that man is isolat~d in 
his system building when he says, 
Even God is here part of ~ rational world, 
in which I am the center; even He is the 
Gbject o~my knowledge. It is true that I 
thirik of Him as Subject, as the absolute 
Subject; but I myself am the subject of 
this thought; it is my thought; I introduce 
God into the world of my thought7 Nothing 
happens that breaks through the circle of 
my self-isolation. I am alone with my 
truth, even with my idea 0f God. • • • 
Neither the human nor the divine Person is 
able to drag me out of my self-isolation.2 
Thus; on the basis of the inability of the finite 
mind to delineate the nature and structure of being 
Brunner argues that the goal of metaphysics is unattainab+e 
and that the methods metaphysicians employ are inadequate 
to lead one to a knowledge of being's nature and structure. 
If the goal and methods of metaphysics a~e unable to lead 
one from the ego-centric predicament and allow one know-
ledge of reality, through what avenue and method can one 
know being and be delivered from the isolationistic 
implications of the metaphysical endeavor? 
2) Perspective of Revelation 
If one cannot take the perspective of reason and 
lBrunner, God~~' p. 47. 
2Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, trans. Olive 
Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westmin~ter. Press, 1946), p. 366. 
---~-- ~,-------------------------------------------------~------------------
experience in one's attempt to know God, what perspective 
can one take? Brunner believes that the only way the self 
can be emancipated from its is~lation is for being to be 
,. 
given to the person. What does Brunner mean by "given"? 
It means at least for Brunner that God addresses the finite 
person·and unveils himself to the person and that person 
receives the unveiling. 1 Brunner takes the perspective of 
revelation in his theological endeavors. But what does 
he mean by revelation? What part does reason play in his 
perspective? Throughout the following explication of 
revelation it will become increasingly clear why it is of 
urgent importance to indicate the place of reason in 
Brunner's system. The importance ~11 become noticeably 
acute when such words as "recognition,n "understandiJ?-g," 
and "grasp" are used to speak of mant s response :eo·· the 
encGunter with God. Thus, first Brunner's view of re-
,j 
velation will be discussed and second his view of reason 
and its relation to revelation will be CGnsidered. 
A. The Meaning of Revelation In the first place, 
for Brunner the Biblical revelation is the unveiling of 
something heretofore veiled. He says, 
Revelation always means that something 
hidden is made known that a mystery is un-
veiled. But the Biblical revelation is the . 
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absolute manifestation of something that had 
been absolutely concealed. Hence it is a way 
of acquiring knowledge that is absolutely and 
essentially -- and not only relatively --
opposite to the usual human method of acquiring 
knowledge, hy means of observation, research, 
and thought. Revelation means a supernatural 
kind of knowledge -- given in a marvelous way --
of something that man, of himself, could never 
know. Thus revelation issues from a region 
which, as such, is not accessible to man.l 
Given that revelation is the making something known which 
was previously unknowable, what is revealed? Brunner re-
marks, 
The real.content of revelation in the Bible 
is not 'something,' but God Himself. Re-
velation is the self-manifestation of God. 
The real revelation, that is, the reve~ation 
with which the whole Bible is concerned, is 
always concerned with the revelation of God 
Himself, His nature and His will.2 
Thus, that which is unveiled to man is God's nature. 
In the second place, revelation involves a finite 
person who is the .recipient of God's self-manifestation. 
This is made clear when Brunner says: 
Revelation is a transitive event which pro-
ceeds from God and ends in man, a light ray 
with these tw9 poles. There is therefore no 
point in setting the objective fact of re-
velation over against the subjective act ef 
receiving the revelation, because the revela-
tion actually consists in the meeting of two 
subjects, the divine and the human, the self-
communication of God to man. Jesus Christ is 
not •revelation' when He is not recognized 
lrbid., p. 23. 
2rbid., p. 25. 
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by anyone as the Christ, just as He is not 
the Redeemer if He does not redeem anyone. 
The Biblical doctrine of revelation means 
this transition from the divine to the 
human subject.l 
How does man, the recipient of God's self-disclosure, re-
ceive this revelation? God is grasped by the human person 
through the person's recognition, act of obedience, and 
act of trust, in other words, faith. First, the divine 
self-disclosure is received by the finite person by hi~ 
recognizing the·Revealer. The person recognizes that 
something "outside" of his ordinary realm of experience is 
now in his experience. That "something" which is revealed 
is recognized as a person, a subject like the recognizer. 2 
Second, the finite person recognizes. the Revealer as Lord 
and the person submits himself in absolute obedience to 
his Lord. Brunner says, 
This act of perception is both an act 
of recognition and an act of obedience. 
With this confession man submits himself 
absolutely to Him whom he has acknowledged 
as Lord. Faith is obedience •••• Faith 
arises in and with the abdination of the 
self which claims absolute sovereignty; it 
is the renunciation of independence, of 
one's own sove'reignty, and the recognition 
of the sovereignty of the God who reveals 
Himself. Faith is self-surrender, willing 
submission.'3 
lrbid., p. 33. 
2Brunner, Doctrine of God, p. 178. 
3Brunner, Revelation and Reason, pp. 34-5. 
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Further, the person not only recognizes the Revealer 
as Lord and submits himself absolutely unto.him in obe-
dience, but also the person thrusts himself completely into 
the control of the Revealer, that is, the persom places 
complete trust in God. In commenting on the "trust" aspect 
of faith Brunner says, 
Man, however, is unable to make this 
act of surrender unless he is convinced that 
it w~ll be for his good. This perception 
that it is good for man not to be his own 
master, but to have God as his. Lard and 
Master, is the core of the act of faith; 
that is why, in the language of the Bible, 
it is described as, trust, or confidence. 
Confidence (or trust) is the heart of faith. 
This trust means the act· by which we abandon 
ourselves without reserve into the hands of 
God. In this act of trust the deepest 
instinct of the human heart -- and, where God 
is concerned, the worst sin of man -- is over-
come: the instinct of self-preservation, the 
desire to·'paddle one's own canoe.tl 
The act of divine self-disclosure is God's revelation of 
himself, and this revelation is received by man's act of 
trustful obedience, i.e., by faith. 
Finally, Brunner says that revelation must be under-
stood both as God's self-disclosure and man's faith in 
personal communion. He says that "the self-disclosure of 
the gracious Lord to the self is one aspect, the obedient, 
trustful surrender of the previously independent and 
1Ibid., p. 35. 
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anxious self is the other aspect of the same pro_cess. u1 
If revelation involves both the divine disclosure and'the 
faith of the person, what kind of relation exists between 
God and man? 
Brunner is careful to distinguish between the way of 
knowing through the "Objective-Subjective correlation,tt2 
and the way of knowing through the I-Thou correlation. 
The relation between knower and known found in one's know-
ledge of physical things is an "I-ittt relation.3 This 
means that the knower seeks to possess, to control, to 
define the known. In the knowledge process the knower is 
caught up in the isolation of his own mind and cannot 
grasp the true nature of the known. The known is objec-
tified in definition by the knower, that is, the known is 
an impersonal "it." On the other hand, the "I-Thou" re-
lation is between God and man, between Absolute Subject 
and a particular subject. The knowledge attained through 
this relation points out the kind of relation that exists 
between God and man in the Divine self-disclosure trust-
ful obedience relation. Brunner says, 
libid., p. 36. 
2Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, trans. 
Amandus w. Loos (Philadelphia: ~he Westm~nster Pres~, 
1943}' p. 204. 
3Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 36. 
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Likewise 'knowing' also acquires a new 
meaning. -No longer is it a question of 
the insertion of something into the know-
ledge that I possess, the expansion of the 
intellectual riches at my disposal, bat it 
is answering personally when personally 
addressed, and hence obedient, thankful 
confession and prayer •••• The antithesis 
between Object and Subject, between 'some-
thing truthful' and 'knowledge of this 
truth' has disappeared and has been re-
placed by the purely personal meeting belween 
the accosting God and the answering man. 
Thus, God's and man's relation in their encounter is one 
ef "personal c0rrespondence,n2 an inter-personal relation-
ship. 
It has been shown that for Brunner revelation is 
God's self-discl0sure as Absolute Subject to man as indi-
vidual subjects in their response of trustful obedience. 
One should understand, however, that God supremely reveals 
himself as Person in the person of Jesus Christ. It is 
through Jesus Christ that God makes himself known to man 
as Absolute Person.3 This means that God not only re-
vealed himself in Christ in a particular historical 
circumstance but also reveals himself in the living, 
present Christ. This also means that the Bible is a 
witness to the historical revelation and constantly points 
lBrunner, Divine-Human Encounter, p. 89. 
2Ibid., p. 29. 
3Ibid., p. 29. 
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to the revelation of the living, present Christ given in 
the divine self-disclosure human trustful obedience re-
lation. Brunner says that the Holy Spirit, the living, 
present Christ, 
Binds us to the Scriptures, ihsnfar as it 
witnesses to Christ, insofar as it dis-
closes the will of God and His nature •••.• 
The letter of the Bible is not the object 
of faith, but the means of the divine self-
revelation.l 
Brunner believes not only that the Bible speaks to the 
meaning of the personal correspondence between God and man 
but also that the encounter between God and man speaks to 
the meanin~ of the Bible. Brunner makes this clear when 
he says that in the Reformation the Church's 
••• 'epistemological' principle was a 
dialectic; that is, its form of ex-
pression was never the use of one concept, 
but always two logically contradictory 
ones: the Word of God in the Bible and 
the witness of the Holy Spirit, but these 
understood and experienced, not as a duality, 
but as a unity. What is of concern is the 
truth given once for all, the truth of 
salvation and revelation clearly discover-
able and available in the words of the Bible. 
But this Biblical truth can never be con-
sidered as available, willy-nilly, at the 
command of the Church in doctrine or dogma, 
but as the Word of the living, present 
Spirit of God, wherewith the Incarnate Word, 
Jesus Christ Himself, takes pessession of 2 our hearts and Himself makes His home there. 
1Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 181. 
2Brunner, Divine-Human Encounter, p. 29. 
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Thus, God breaks into man's isolation and reveals himself 
throngh the present, living Christ t0 the trustful obedi-
ent man and gives perspective for a better understanding 
of Biblical statements. This revelation is nst wholly sub-
jective, however; the Bible is on the other hand an 
objective means of disclosing the nature and will of God, 
a means of helping the person un~erstand his personal 
correspondence with God. In the light of Brunner's 
critique of speculative knowledge and of his acceptance of 
revelation as the only way of knowing God or Reality, what 
part d0es reason play in revelation and in the theological 
endeavor? As was pointed out above,Brunner's use of such 
words as "knm~n "communication," "recognition," "under-
standing," and "grasp, 11 require clarification. Why .he 
uses these words and what he means by them can be under-
stood through a discussion of the relation of revelation 
and reason in Brunner's system. 
B. Revelation and Reason -- The relation of reason 
to revelation in Brunner's writings can be grasped through 
a discussion of the mean±ngand functions of reason in 
Brunner's system. 
Fundamentallynreasorl'in Brunner's writings is the 
capacity of the person "to realize me~ning.n1 This means 
lBrunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 312. 
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that a person is so structured that he has the capacity to 
know and that his experience can be given unity and 
signif'icance. This is the "f'ormal" element in the structure 
of the mind. However, in order to have meaning the person 
must possess more than the capacity to realize meaning. He 
must also know the true, the good, and the just. These 
norms are immanent in the mind. 1 It is in terms of' these 
norms that the mind judges and gains truths, realizes 
meaning. 2 Brunner calls the f'or.mal and the normative 
elements of' the mind the logos of' ~eason.3 In the light of 
Brunner's meaning of' reason what £unction does it perf'orm? 
Reason functions primarily in the person's attempt to 
understand phenomena. Here the relation between the knower 
and the ~nown is an I-it relation. The knower seeks to 
give connectedness to his experience. This knowledge is 
his achievement. Brunner describes the activity of reason 
lrbid., p. 314. 
2Two points must be clarif'ied here. First, the kind 
of meaning that Brunner is talking about is not only 
cognitive but also moral, aesthetic, and religious. 
Second, Brunner distinguishes sharply the logos of the 
finite mind and the Logos of God. The finite logos is but 
a feeble echo of the Divine Logos. They are purely formal 
ideas and functi0n c:mly as ":pointersn ?.nd pr:j.nciples of 
order for the finite mind. Thus, they cannot help us to 
know God, The finite logos functions in Brunner's writings 
in the same manner as the. transcendental ideas do in Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason. Cf. Brunner, Revelation and 
Reason, pp; JI4=16. 
3Ibid., p. 315. 
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in knowing when he says, "Knowing, thinking, possessing 
something is thus, first of all, something over which I 
have disposal, secondly, something that does not essen-
tially change me; and thirdly, something that leaves me 
solitary.nl If this is reason's domain what relation does 
it have to revelation? 
Brunner holds that the relation between reason and 
revelation as modes of knowing is essentially this: 
reason operates in the I-it world of phenomena and re-
velation operates in the I-Thou world of God's self-
disclosure to a receptive person. 2 Does this mean that 
there is no relation between reason and revelation? The 
following illustration will help to clarify the relation 
between reason and revelation as modes of knowing: The 
closer one comes to the relation of personal cerrespondence 
between God and man the more revelation plays a part and 
the farther away one moves from this relation the more 
reason plays a part. To put it acutely, as ways of know-
ing reason operates in the phenomenal world and revelation 
operates in the ontological world. God cannot be known by 
reason interpreting phenomena. God is known only through 
his self-disclosure to a receptive person, that is, 
lBrunner, Divine-Human Encounter, pp. 87-8. 
2Brunner, Philosophy of Religion, pp. 55-66. 
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• 
through revelation. 
This does not mean, however, that reason in some 
sense plays no part in revelation. Indeed, Brunner says 
that "reason is the conditio si:ne qua!!.£!! of faith."1 In 
the light of the foregoing analysis this calls for clari-
fication. In its most fundamental sense Brunner under-
stands that reason is the capacity of the individual to 
realize meaning. One way reason attempts to realize mean-
ing is through a coherent interpretation of experience. 
This was discussed above when reason was considered as a 
mode of knowing. Brunner, however, holds that at the basis 
of the communication of God and man there is rational 
activity. What kind of rational activity takes place here? 
When God speaks, Brunner holds, the finite person 
appropriates what he hears and he does this through mental 
activity. The person interprets God's address. This 
appropriation is not through the method of logical 
coherence in which ideas are interrelated at the expense 
of ·experience. Rather, the person to whom.God speaks 
hears and realizes meaning in his experience of God's 
address. Brunner says, 
God indubitably says "somethingn to us in 
order to be present as Lord and~as Father 
in the Son through the Spirit. Similarly 
lBrunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 418. 
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the direct address in its very simplest 
form -- 11r am the Lord, thy God" -- when 
conceptually compr~gended, conceals doctrine, 
"theology."·· •• Consequently, we can never 
separate the abstract framework from the 
personal Presence contained in it, although 
certainly we mast differentiate them.l 
Thus, reason in the sense of the activity of the person 
in realizing meaning is fundamental to revelation. 
However, one must not confuse reason operating in 
the realm of phenomena with reason operating in the realm 
of the I -Thou encounter between God and a: l£ini te person. 
The crucial difference is that while reason operating in 
the realm of phenomena understands its world and develops 
a world~view and treats it as an object, an1 it, reason, 
operating in the realm of the I-Thou encounter between God 
and a finite person, interprets what the person hears and 
realizes meaning in what he hears. This means that when 
God addresses the pers0n the person hears and interprets 
the data, he renders the data meaningful. The finite 
person addressed by God understands God's address and 
enters into a personal relation with God. 
Further, what is the relation of reason to faith~ 
When a finite person enters into a personal relation with 
God that person is acting trfaithfully.n This means that 
the person unconditionally submits himself to God in 
lBrunner, Divine-Human Encounter, pp. 110-11; cf. 
Brunne~ Revelation and Reason, p. 418. 
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obedience and unconditionally places his life in God's 
control in trust. God addresses the finite person and the 
finite person interprets what he hears, understands that 
God is addressing him, and responds with trustful obedience. 
This is what Brunner means that faith is nothing apart from 
reason. 
c. Summary -- From this discussion of Brunner's 
doctrine of revelation it is clear that the perspective 
which Brunner takes in his attempt to gain knowledge of 
being is that of personal correspondence between God and 
man. This is the perspective which permeates all he has 
to say about every theological subject inclading the re-
lation of God to the world. Brunner says: 
This two-sided but unambiguous relation, 
this state of the dependent-independent 
creature -- to be face to face with God 
according to His Will -- is the funda-
mental category of the Bible; and in re-
lation to it everything said in the Bible 
is said and must be understood. • • • 
Thus everything that theology avers must 
remain within this basic structure and 
everything that contradicts this funda-
mental presupposition must be rejected and 
fought against as anun~Biblical and even 
anti-Biblical error of speculation or 
doctrinal distortion. We call this basic 
formal relation, which at the same time 
is identical with the contents of the 
whole Bible, Eersonal correspondence.1 
If personal correspondence between God and man through 
libid., pp. 65-6. 
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God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ is the perspective 
Brunner takes what method does he employ in determining 
the relation of God to the world? In terms of the preced-
ing discussion of the incapacity of speculative knowledge 
either to attain its ~etaphysical goals or to develop 
methods capable of helping it attain these goals Brunner 
has answered one of his problems. By what method does he 
attempt to answer his other preblem: the relation of God 
to the world? 
-3} Analysis and Implication 
Succinctly, Brunner employs the methods of descrip-
tion and implication in working out the relation between 
God and the worla. It has been pointed out that Brunner 
takes the perspective of revelation, that God is known 
through a personal correspondence between God aad man, and 
that he attempts to understand both his experience and the 
Bible in terms of this perspective. How these methods 
operate in his system will be evident in the course of the 
following discussion of the nature and function of 
creation. 
4} Summary 
Before the nature and function of creation is dis-
cussed, however, one should review the argument up to this 
point. It was pointed out that Brunner faces two problems: 
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(1) the relation of God to the world and (2) the goals and 
methods employed by metaphysicians to specify the relation 
between God and the world. The second problem Brunner dis-
poses of by showing the incapacity of reason thoroughly to 
interpret phenomena and to devel@p a coherent system of 
thought in which God can even be known and delinated much 
less understood as Person. Since reason in its dealings 
with phenomena is incapable of specifying the relation 
between God and the world, Brunner contends that what one 
says about this relation must be understood in light of 
revelation, ''personal correspondence" between God and man. 
Thus, in terms of the perspective of revelation Brunner 
works toward a clarification of the teachings of the Bible 
and his experience and toward a systematization of those 
teachings and experiences. With 11personal correspondencen 
as the fundamental Brunner attempts to specify the Biblical 
view of the relation of God to the werld. How does Brunner 
overcome his problems by using ttpersonal correspondence" 
as his perspective? 
Through analysis of the encounter between God and 
man and the teachings of the Bible, Brunner contends that 
the relation between God and the world must be understood 
in terms of the notion of creatio ex nihilo. What does 
Brunner mean by creatio ex nihilo and how does this notion 
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of creation function to overcome the problem Brunner 
faces? 
4. Nature of Creation 
It is Brunner's contention that the relation between 
God and the world must be understood in terms of God's crea-
tion of the world. What the great German theologian means 
by creatio ~ nihilo can best be understood through an 
analysis of the revelation of God in the "personal 
correspondence" relation between God and man and witnessed 
to by the Bible. Through this analysis the Biblical 
doctrine of God will become clear. With the nature of God 
clarified one will be able to grasp the categories or 
nature of creation. When the categories of creation have 
been determined their function in Brunner's theology will 
be discussed. The result of the determination of the nature 
and function of creation will be both a grasp of what 
Brunner means by this d0ctrine and what is God's relation 
to the world. First, however, the nature of God must be 
delineated. 
1) Name of God 
Brunner initiates his analysis of God's nature by 
. . 
contending that in the "personal correspondencen relation 
between God and man God manifests his Name to man. What 
does Brunner mean by God's Name? 
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A. Self-communication -- A knowledge of the nature 
of God is given by God to man in an act of self-communica-
tion.1 Without God's manifestation of himself in an act 
of self-communication man cannot know God correctly. The 
knowledge that God is possessed by all men. But men who 
do not have this "personal correspondencen as witnessed to 
by the New Testament,2 possess only enoug~·knowledge of 
God so that they are "without excuse, 1'3 that is, this 
knowledge is sufficient such that ev.ery man knows he is 
not in a relation of personal correspondence with GQd but 
\ 
it is insufficient "to bring him to glorify God and to 
enter into communion with Him.rr4 It is clear, then, that 
for Brunner God is known through God's self-communication, 
his Name. However, what is known of God through his Name? 
B. Person -- Involved in the self-communication of 
God is the notion that God is Person. When God breaks 
through the thought world of a person and speaks to that 
person God enters into a personal relation with that 
person. A person receiving God's self-disclosure in the 
I-Thou relation understands that the one who discloses 
himself is like the one receiving the disclosure; God is 
lBrunner, Doctrine of God, p. 120. 
2Ibid., p. 121. 
3Ibid. 4It>id. 
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a willing, thinking, feeling, remembering, acting being.1 
The finite person is aware that God is a person, like a 
finite person. 
However, the God who addresses a man is not the same 
as the God a man thinks for himself. That God which de-
velops from man's thought processes is not a personal God. 
It is the case that theistic philosophy conceives of a God 
who is a Person. Nevertheless, the God of speculative 
theism is a God thought about and not Thou; Person who 
addresses a finite person and reveals not only his nature 
but also that he is other than the one whom he is addresskg. 
The God of revelation discloses himself as a Thou, a Person, 
one who speaks, wills, thinks, feels, and remembers. 2 Thus, 
God manifests himself to man and involved in this self-
manifestation is man's recognition that God is Person who 
communicates with man. 
c. Communion -- Through God's self-disclosure there 
is the establishment of a relation with man, a relation of 
personal communion. Brunner says that when "Yahweh 
manifests His Name He m~kes known fully and finally the 
personal mystery of God, He establishes communion between 
the Holy God and sinful man.n3 
lBrunner, Philosophy of R~ligion, p. 82. 
2Brunner, Doctrine of God, p. 122. 
3rbid., p. 24. 
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In the establishment of communion between God and man God 
breaks into man's world of experience and not only reveals 
himself as Person to man but also establishes a communion, 
a personal relation with man. God's breaking into man's 
experience is the establishment of 1fdialogical truth.nl 
What does Brunner mean by "dialogical truthTr? 
D. Dialogical Truth -- rf the act of self-communica-
tion God breaks into man's worl~ and reveals himself, his 
Name and thus his nature. God gives this revelation to 
the man who receives it by faith. Brunner says that nod's 
revelation of himself is "given" truth. Brunner clearly 
distinguishes between ttgiven" truth and that truth which 
is determined by rational method. 
What is rational truth? For Brunner rational truth 
is that truth gained through the exercise of reason's 
interpretation of experience along the lines of consistency 
and comprehensiveness. The finite reason will allow as 
truth only that which it can verify through the means at 
its disposal. Further, those who follow this procedure in 
their search for truth recognize reason to be supremely 
capable of grasping and making intelligible the structure 
and nature of reality. This approach to truth Brunner 
calls monological. Reason recognizes nothing outside 
lrbid., p. 125. 
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itself in its search for truth. Thus the person and his 
reason are isolated from everything in the world. 
What is "giv~n" truth? "Given" truth is that which 
is imparted to the finite person by God when God breaks into 
the isolation in which the finite person lives. In this 
breaking into the finite person's isolation the person 
understands God's addressing him and God enters into a 
personal relation with that person of faith. Having 
established a personal relation with man God and man are 
able to carry on a dialogue. Through this dialogue God 
makes known to the finite person His nature. That which 
the person knows as a result of this relation is truth, 
that is, is God. A finite person is incapable of gaining 
this truth through rational procedures, through a monologue 
with himself. This truth is given only in the dialogical 
1 
relation between man and God. 
Thus, the Name of God is not only the establishment 
of a personal communion between God and man through God's 
self-disclosure but also the establishment of ndialogicalrr 
truth, "giventt truth. That which God makes known to a man 
through communion with that man is received by reason and 
by faith as "truth." This truth is attained not through 
lrbid. 
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rational thought processes alone but through a personal 
correspondence between God and man. 
E. Summary --Brunner starts with the Name of Ged 
because it is here that the "meaning of the whole Eiblical 
doctrine of God1' is to be found.l Brunner points out that 
the 
'Name of God' ••• gathers up, in a 
simple way which everybody can under-
stand, certain decisive elements in the 
reality of revelation: God stands 'over 
againstt;·we stand 'over against' Him; 
God is not an 'It' but a 'Thou'; .who 
addresses us; He makes Himself.known 
through His self-revelation; He manifests 
Himself to us in order that we may call 
upon Him and have communion with Him. 
The 'Name' of God covers both the re-
vealed Nature of God and His revealing 
action; the foundation of this revelation 
in Being and in Act is the Divine will to 
sovereignty and communion, the purpose of 
which is the glory of God and communion 
with God.2 
Thus, the Name of God means for Brunner God's self-
communieation as Person so that a communion between God 
and man might be established in which truth might be 
"given." In this establishment of a personal correspond-
ence with man God reveals his nature to man. What does 
God reveal himself to be when he reveals his Name? What 
are the categories of God as revealed in his Name? 
lrbid., p. 120. 
2rbid • 
.............. 
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2) God as Lord 
When God reveals his Name ta man he reveals himself 
as Lord. 1 What does Brunner mean by Lard? 
A. God ~Unconditioned Addressing Subject When 
God reveals himself to man he does so as the Subject who 
addresses a man. Brunner means by "Lord," first, that God 
is the Subject who addresses. Brunner says, 
The God with whom we have to do in 
faith, is not a Being who has been dis-
cussed or 'conceived' (by man); He is 
not an Ens, a 'substance,' like the 
Godhead-of metaphysical speculation; He 
is not an object of thought -- even 
though in a sublimated and abstract 
form -- but the Subject who as '1' ad-
dresses us as ithou.' God is the-Per-
sonality who speaks, .acts, disclosing 
to us Himself and His will.2 
What does Brunner mean by "Subject"? What Brunner means by 
this is best understood through Brunner's contrasting the . 
person as subject and God as Person and Subject. The finite 
person des~ribed by Brunner as a subject which is limited. 
The particular subject is limited by space and by time. 
Regarding freedom of the finite subject Brunner says that 
the finite subject is free inside certain limitations. He 
is limited by the body in which he lives, by his capacities 
to do work and to aceomplish goals, and by the amount of 
lrbid., p. 137. 
2Ibid., p. 139. 
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time to fulfill his ~ims. Thus in his decision making the 
finite subject experiences limitations even though he knows 
no outside compulsion at the point of decision. On the 
other hand, God is Absolute Subject. He is neither limited 
in time nor place. God is free to carry out his will. 
Nothing limits God from accomplishing his. purposes. For 
Brunner God is Absolute Subject; one who is absolutely 
free, that is, knows no limitations of.time or place. God 
is absolutely spontaneous and knows no compulsion from out-
side of himself. Further, God is not only free but also 
he is pure thought. He knows himself. In him there is no 
dualism between the interpretati0n of the self and the self 
interpreted.1 Brunner elarifies this point when he says 
God is pure personality; man is not. That 
which constitutes the nature of the 'subject' 
in contradistinction to that of 'object': 
namely, freedom, positing and not being 
posited, thinking and not being thought, that 
which is absolutely spontaneous, that which 
is only active and not at the same time 
passive, that which only gives and does not 
at the same time receive ••• 2 
Thus, by "Lord" Brunner means that God is Active Subject, 
and by this Brunner means that God is truly Person, only 
Subject, who possesses pure thought freedom and absolute 
spontaneity. God is Unconditioned Active Subject. God is 
not passive. This means that God can never be understood 
as passive, as an "it." That God is Active Subject is 
libid., ·p. 140. 2Ibid. 
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grasped through one's experience of God's addressing one 
and one's recognition that God is Lord. 
B. God ~ Absolute Power -- In the personal corres-
pondence relation God reveals himself to man as the Uncon-
ditioned Active Subject. However, in one's experience of 
God in his self-disclosure as the Unconditioned Active 
Subject one.recognizes that God is Absolute Power. What 
does Brunner mean by this? 
Brunner contends that the finite person who is 
addressed by an Unconditioned Active Subject recognizes 
that he is totally dependent upon that Subject. In this 
recognition of his total dependence upon this Subject the 
finite person makes the distinction between his having 
been seized by God and God's having a right to seize man 
in this way. Brunner calls the being seized by God the 
"actual fact,n or the experiential demonstration that God 
is Absolute Power. The distinction that God has a right 
to seize man by virtue of man's being totally upon God is 
called by Brunner the "ideal fact 11 or the logical aspect 
of God's Absolute Power in relation to man. 1 What, then, 
does Brunner mean when he says that God has "absolute 
power" over man? He means that the person is totally 
dependent on God for his existence. This notion is 
libid., PP· 141-2. 
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expressed through the additional notion that God is Creator 
and finite persons are created creatures. Implied in the 
recognition that man is totally dependent upon God is the 
notion that God is Creator. God is recognized as one in 
whom all capacity to make a difference resides, and all 
other power originates in God. If God is the supreme power 
then he is also the Creator. Brunner clarifies his notion 
of God as Absolute Power and thus Creator when he says, 
Since God lays His absolute claim upon us, 
who are parts of this world, He reveals--
Himself to us as Absolute Power, the 
power from which all other power is de-
rived. Only as this power -- as the 
power of the Creator -- is He able to 
assert an absolute right over us. We 
belong to Him unconditionally, because 
He has created us.l 
Thus, through God's self-disclosure man recognizes 
that God is Unconditioned Active Subject who is Absolute 
Power and consequently that man is totally dependent upon 
God for his existence. Man's total dependence on God is 
expressed by Brunner as man's recognition that God is 
"Creator and Lord.n2 
C. God As Creator -- Brunner eontends that the 
--- . 
direct implication of the teaching that God is Unconditioned 
Active Subject who addresses man and reveals himself as 
Absolute Power is that God is Creator. It has been pointed 
1tbid.' p. 141. 2Ibid., p. 146. 
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out that from one's experience of God as Absolute Power 
one recognizes that God is Creator. One experiences God 
first as sovereign Lord and then as Creator. By the .. 
notion that God is Gretor Brunner does not mean a theory 
regarding how the world came into existence, a Maker, or 
a first causee On the contrary, Brunner contends that in 
the interpersonal relation between God and a finite person 
that person recognizes God as Unconditioned Active Subject 
and absolute Power and that he is totally dependent upon 
this being who addresses him. Brunner amplifies this 
notion when he says, 
The being of God as Creator is that which 
is known in and through His Being as 
Lord. The statement: God is the Creator, 
is therefore not a theoretical statement 
about the way in which the world came into 
existence, but it is primarily a statement 
about our unconditional responsibility.l 
What Brunner is doing is reinterpreting the notion 
that God is Creator. Not only is he attempting to found 
the notion of God as Creator squarely in the Biblical 
understanding of God and his relation to finite persons 
and the world mut also Brunner is attempting to circumvent 
a difficulty he thinks is involved in the relation of God 
to the finite person and to·the world as understood by 
some theistic philosophers. How Brunner seeks to base his 
lrbid., p. 141. 
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understanding of God as Creator on the Biblical understand-
ing of the relation of G0d to the world is evident from the 
preceding discussion of God as Absolute Power. But what 
problem, is he seeking to avoid in the relation of God to 
the world? The problem is that in some theisms God is not 
considered to be meaningful apart from both the thinker and 
the world. This means that for some theists God is under-
stood through the world and the world through God. To have 
a ground of existence is meaning~ess apart from the ex-
istence of which it is the ground. Likewise to have ex-
istence without a ground on which it depends for its 
ex~ence is a meaningless notion, at least one has no 
explanation for existence. But is a God which is meaning-
less apart from existence the kind of God experienced in 
the interpersonal relation or witnessed to in the Bible? 
The God recognized in the I-Thou relation ancl witnessed to 
biblically does not obtain his meaning because of his re-
lation to the world. He is not tied to the worlcl or to 
the thinker for his significance. Rather, he is free of 
these ties, and his significance lies in himself which he 
makes known to man through revelation. Brunner points out, 
"the God who is the result of thought cannot be set free 
from the thinker and his world. Philosophical Theism, the 
effort to 'think' the Creator and the Creation, always 
269 
remains a hopeless enterprise:a 
If the notion that God is Creator is inconceivable 
by rational thought whence arose the idea of God as Creator? 
Brunner contends that it arose from revelation, from God's 
self-disclosure as Lord. He says, 
The belief in Creation of the Biblical 
revelation breaks down the continuity 
of self-thought by the fact that it is 
not man, but God, who posits it. In 
this positing God reveals Himself as the 
free Lord, and His free underived act 
as the beginning of all things. Pre-
cisely because this is so the werld is 
posited as a freely posited, irrational, 
contingent, fact. Never can thought of 
itself build up the idea of a contingent, 
non-necessary, f~eely-posited world, just 
as indeed the very idea of contingency 
was unkn~wn in ancient philosophical 
thought. 
D. Summary -- Through the personal corresp0ndence 
between God and man God discloses his Name. In this dis-
closure God is recognized by man as Lord: God is Uncon-
ditioned Active Subject addressing man and showing man that 
he is Absolute Power. Upon this Free Absolute Ag~ive Sub-
ject, Go~man depend~ for his existence. Following from 
the recognition that man is totally dependent on God for 
his existence is the further recognition that God is 
Creator. Though it is rationally inconceivable the notion 
that God is Creator is meaningful from the perspective 
libid., p. 146; cf. ibid., p. 147. 
2Ibid., p. 147. 
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that man and God are involved in a personal dialogue and 
that man is totally dependent upon God as Lord. Thus the 
first categpry of God is Lordship. How this category 
functions in Brunner's notion of creation has been 
suggested, but a full discussion of this categoryts function 
will be dealt with below. God discloses his nature or Name 
te man and man recognizes that God is Lord. What else of 
his nature does God disclose to man in the relation of 
personal correspondenc~? 
3) God a~ Holy 
Involved in the notion that God is Lord is the notion 
that God is Holy. What does Brunner mean that God is Holy, 
and how does the Holiness of God derive from God's Lordship? 
A. God ~ "Wholly Other" -- Holiness means that which 
differentiates God from all other things. Brunner says, 
Holiness is the Nature of God, that which 
distinguishes Him from everything else, 
the Transcendence of God in His very Nature, 
as the tWholly Other.' Hence Holiness is 
not a ~uality which God possesses in com-
mon with other beings; on the contrary, it 
is that which distinguishes Him Ilearly and 
absolutely from everything else. 
God as the Wholly Other is derived from the recognition of 
God as Lord. How does Brunner draw out this implication? 
It has been shown that Brunner initiates his dis-
cussion of the nature of God by considering the Name of God, 
J.Ibid., p. 158. 
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God's self-manifestation to man. In this recognition one 
knows God as Absolute Power, Unconditioned Active Subject, 
Creator. From God as Creator Brunner draws the implication 
that God is wholly Other. He argues, 
Only He who, in the strict sense of the 
word, is the Lord of the world, the 
Creator, can be 'wholly Other.' Only 
the Creator Lord,. by His very nature, 
is different from all other existence, 
in such a radical and absolute manner 
as indeed only Creator and creature can 
be different. The Creator has no trace 
of 'the world' or of 'the creaturely' in 
Himself, and conversely, the creature 
as such has no trace of 'non-creature-
liness', of1 tdivinityt, and therefore of 
'holiness'. 
Brunner is saying that in no sense can God and the world 
be identified or equated. The Creator is not the creature 
and the creature is not the Creator. When God addresses a 
pe~son that person recognizes a being which is other than 
he is. In no sense can the person recognizing God say that 
he and God are the same. There is a gulf between God and 
man, and this gulf can be crossed only by God's approaching 
man. However, the notion of God as wholly Other does not 
fully indicate the meaning of the Holiness of God. 
B. God as Will -- Brunner also contends that the 
---
Holiness of God is a dynamic concept, not a static one as 
the phrase "wholly Othern wc:mld suggest. Not only is 
there a radical discontinuity between the nature of God 
as Creator and any other £orm of existence but also God 
"actively maintains it, and defends it against every in-
£ringement on the part of the arrogant creature.nl In 
the interpersonal relationship the finite person re-
cognizes not only that God is wholly Other but also that 
God actively maintains his position. The position God 
has in relation to all else is maintained by an act of 
his will. God asserts that he is supreme and repels any-
thing whieh would seek to encroach on this position. 
Brunner calls God's self-assertion and repulsion of all 
would be encroachers on God's position God's ttactive self-
differentiation.n2 Involved in this emphasis on God's 
willful self-dif£erentiation from all else are "the Glory 
of God, and His Wrath.n3 
c. God's Glory and Wrath -- Stemming from Brunner's 
contention that God is wholly Other and that God is will-
fully maintai~ing his position are the contentions that 
God "wills that all men should know and confess His name," 
i.e., "'be filled with His Glory,tn4 and that God 
actively resists any resistance to tiis will.5 Regarding 
l:Ibid., p. 160. ·2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 161. 
5Ibid., PP• 161-2. 
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the Glory of God Brunner elaborates, 
[God] is not a static Being but the 
God of revelation, who indeed reveals 
Himself precisely because He wills that 
His. Name sh0uld be made known, in order 
that He may be glorified, in order that 
His will should be done. The Holy Name 
and the Glory of God are inseparable. • •• 
The Glory of God is the unity of God's 
sovereignty and His revelation, the re-
vealed visible 'glory,' the majesty of 
God as it is seen by His creature, ~ecog­
nized as that which shines forth upon the 
creature. The revelation of the Holy God 
has attained its end where the •Glory of 
the Lord's is 'mirrored' in the-hearts· of 
believers. This is the meaning of the 
Biblical idea of. the Glory of God.l 
God, as Brunner und·erstands him, not only actively main-
tains his position as the Supreme Being but also actively 
seeks that he be recognized as the Supreme Being. This 
means that in order for one fully to recognize that God is 
the Supreme Being one must not only know God as Lord but 
also do God's will. God's 'Uloryn for Brunner, then, means 
that God makes known his position and ;he attempts to 
realize his will in the lives of finite persons. 
Regarding God's Wrath Brunner explains that "God 
takes the fact that He is God 'seriously'. n2 Cc:mtinuing, 
Brunner remarks, 
This 'seriousness' works itself out 
negatively as resistance provoked by 
resistance, and indeed as resistance. 
which ultimately is the rock against 
which all other resistance founders. 
lrbid., p. 161. 2rbid. 
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The man who fights against God will 
finally break down at this point. The 
resistance of the creature has no 
,possibility of asserting itself finally 
against the will of the Creator. The 
will of God crushes the will which 
opposes Him; if the rebel does not 
separate himself from the will which is 
opposed to God, he himself will be 
annihilated. This is the Divine Wrath, 
the working out of the Divine Glory up-
on those who refuse to give Him glory; 
the working out of the Holiness of God 
against him who irreverently, godlessly, 
does not acknowledge Him.l 
The point Brunner is making is that persons who resist re-
cognizing God as Lord and doing God'.s will are not allowed 
by God to enter into a right moral relationship with God. 
The result of their being out of this right ·relation with 
God is not that God's position is thereby destroyed by 
those persons' active resistance. On the contrary, those 
persons are ultimately "anniailated." God actively maintains 
his position and resists ali resistance to his will. All 
resistance to his will is a threat to his position. Those 
who resist ~od's will are saying in effect that God is not 
Lord of their lives. They claim that they are the lords 
of their lives. God resists all claims of the creature 
to be Lord. Thus, the positive and negative aspect of G9d 
as Will is his Glory and Wrath, his desire to reveal his 
Name to all creatures and his desire that he be recognized 
God. 
lrbid., pp. 161-2. 
D. Summa~ -- From the recognition o£ God's Otherness 
involved in the notion of God as L@rd and Creator Brunner 
further recognizes that God is HQly. By Holiness is meant 
not only that God is wholly Other than all else but also 
that God actively defends and maintains his Otherness. God 
wills to be Other. However, God also wills that the fact 
that he is God be known and recognized. He wills to reveal 
himself to all creatur:es so that they may respend to his 
Will. Those creatures who react negatively to God's will 
witness God's Wrath, God's resistance to resistance. Thus 
at the heart of Brunner's doctrine of the Holiness of· God 
is the notion ef God's active will w0rking t'o maintain his 
status, to reveal his nature, and to resist all resistance 
to his Will. It has ~een shown that the'second category 
e£ God is his Holiness. What is the third? 
4) God as Lqve 
God is not only a Holy God but also a God of Love. 
What does Brunner mean that God is Love, and how does this 
notion arise in Brunner's dogmatics? 
A. God's Holiness as the Basis of God's Love --
----- ~------- -- ---
Brunner contends that God as Love is directly implied in 
the notion that God is Holy. It is Brunner's position that 
God willfully asserts his own position as other than the 
world and man. At the same time, however, God comes to the 
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world and man in self-disclosure to establish a communion 
with man and to make known his own nature. Thus, Brunner 
declares, 
As the Holy One, God wills to be separate 
from all creatures; as the Holy One He 
also wills that all creation should be 
filled with His glory, and thus should 
have a share in that quality which is His 
alone. Thus the Holiness of God is the basis 
of the silf-communication which is fulfilled 
in love. 
Apart from God's self-communication man would have no under-
standing of the Love of God. Brunner further states, 
[The] situation is this: that the idea, 
the understanding of love -- the Agape of 
the New Testament -- can only be under-
stood from what happens in revelation. 
The story of revelation, Jesus Christ, the 
Crucified, defines realiter the meaning of 
the new conception: Love, which is ~gape. 
Love is the self-giving of God: love is 
the free and generous grace of the One who 
is Holy Lord.2 
Thus the notion of God as Love arises from God as Holy 
in willful self-communication freely giving a knowledge 
of himself to man. But what exactly is the meaning of 
Love when applied to God's nature? 
B. God ~ Agape, lli Eros -- Brunner clearly dif-
ferentiates be~een Agape and Eros when discussing the 
meaning of the love of God •. On the one hand Eros is not 
.what the Scriptur~s and Brunner mean when they say that 
lrbid., pp. 163-4. 
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God is leve. Eros;. rather,' is that kind of love which 
seeks fully to possess that which is only partially 
possessed. It is the desire to possess the valuable.1 
On the other hand Agape is the Biblical and Brunnerian 
meaning of the Love of God. Brunner states that the 
essential meaning of Agape is to give rather than to seek 
to possess something valuable. This kind of love is the· 
opposite of Eros. ·When one speaks of God 1 s love as ex-
pressed in the Bible one speaks of a love which is unde-
servedly out going and giving and not of a love which is 
of something to be possessed fully. Brunner says, 
[Agape] cloes not seek value, but it 
creates value or gives value; it does 
not desire to get but to give; it is 
not 'attracted' by some lovable quality, 
but it is poured out on those who are 
worthless and degraded; in the strict 
sense of the word this Love is 'unfath-
omable, '· and 'pas seth all understanding. t 2 
From this contrast between Agape and Eros it is clear that 
AgaEe is God's self-giving, his self-communication, revela-
tion. Brunner's understanding of God's nature as Agape is 
summarized when he says, 
Love is the movement which goes-out-
of-oneself, which stoops down to that 
which is below: it is the self-giving, 
the self-communication of God -- and 
it is this which is His revelatio~ • • • 
Only when we understand love as this 
self-communication of God do we grasp 
li~id., pp. 185-86. 2rbid., p. 186. 
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it as groundless and generous, as freely-
electing, as incomprehensible love, as 
that which the Bible calls Agape. To 
know this 'love1means to know His self-communication. 
Thus, God's loye is God's movement toward the creature, 
the will to self-communication of his nature. God's love 
is not a self-seeking, Eros kind of love. 
C. Summary -- Resulting from the recognition in 
personal correspondence of the Holiness of God and God's 
will to manifest himself is the fur~her recognition that 
God is Love. Love is his nature. Brunner summarizes, 
Just as sovereignty is His Nature 
the Being who is Absolute Spirit --
so also, to put it in an abstract way 
for once, so also His Being as Subject 
is tfor-some-end,' it is Being which 
goes forth from Itself, Being which 
communicates Itself. To use a parable: 
We cann0t grasp or describe the nature 
of radium without speaking of radio-
activity. Radium is the radiant ele-
ment -- that is its very nature. Even 
so the nature of God is to shine forth 
in His Glory, communicating activity, _ 
personal being, which wills communion.2 
5) Summary 
Brunner takes the perspective that God is known 
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through personal correspondence between God and man. It is 
through God's self-communication that God makes his nature 
known to man. This kind of knowledge is that which comes 
from the I-Thou encoUnter between God and man. It is neither 
libid., PP· 187. 2rbid., PP· 191-2. 
discursive nor intuitive knowledge. It is that kind of 
knowledge one has when one responds to the call, summons, or 
command of another person. Brunne~ then, describes what he 
knows in this experience of personal correspondence with 
God. 
In the I-Thou relation between God and man and through 
the witness of the Bible God reveals his 'nature, his Name. 
In meeting God in this encounter experience one recognizes 
God as Lord and Creator. - Following from this recognition 
is the further recognition that-God is Holy. Holy means 
that. God is wholly Other. He wilfully and actively main-
tains the differentiation between himself and all else. In 
his maintaining this differentiation, however, he wills to 
reveal his nature, his Glory to all his creatures in order 
that the creatures will recognize tiis Holiness. The 
creatures not recognizing his Will meet resistance from 
God and ultimately destroy themselves by their disobedience. 
In the Holy God in self-communication Branner sees the basis 
of another aspect of God's nature, Love. Essentially, this 
Love is the Agape kind of l0ve. "God is love" is the same 
as "God is freely revealing His Nature to man.n It has 
been pointed out that these categories of God, Lord, Holy, 
and Love are the conditions for the possibility of the 
existence of creatures. How do these categories function 
in Brunner's idea of creation? When the function of these 
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categories has been discussed one will be able better to 
grasp not only the nature and function of creation but al-
so the meaning of creation in Brunner's system. 
5. Function of Creation 
The function of the categories of God can best be 
grasped through a delineation of the ground for God's 
creating activity, of the creating activity itself, of 
Godts preservation of the created existence, and of God's 
redeeming activity. First, what is the ground for God's 
creating all existence? 
1) Ground for God's Creating Activity 
It has been shown that for Brunner the ground of 
God's self-communication is his dynamic Holiness. On the 
basis of God's dynamic Holiness, his will to reveal himself, 
one can say that God is "being-for-us." It is in this 
will of .God to make himself known that one finds the 
ground for God's creating activity. Brunner makes this 
clear when he says, 
· We have said, it is true, that God, 
as He is in Himself, is the reason why 
there is a world at all. God's being 
t-as-He-is-in-Himselft is at the same 
time the will to communicate Himself, 
His 'being-for-us,' before we come in-
to being. It is because He is tfor us' 
that we have been created; it is be-
cause He wills to communicate Himself, 
that the world exists. Hence we have 
been thinking, not o~ly of the eternal 
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Being of God, but also of His eternal 
Will, which precedes all created being 
as the ground of its existence, of His 
'decree·of creation.'~ 
God's will to create is not conditioned on anything apart 
from his will to communicate himself. 
2} God's Creating Activity 
The g~ound of God's creating activity is found in 
his nature, that is, his Holy Will. In the light of 
God's will to create what does Brunner mean by God's 
creating work? Through an examination of the phrase, 
creatio ~ nihilo; of the method of creating; and of God's 
continuous creating activity one will be able to under-
stand Brunner's meaning. 
A. Creatio ex nihilo -- The phrase, creatio ~ 
nihilo, first appears in this "explicit formulation ••. 
in the literature of later Judaism, in the second Book 
~ } ~I J I ., ' .. / 
of the Maccabees: E F OIJk' avrwv c7To' fld'l"V i!llr.a C). ecttJs !rZ 
What does this phrase mean? This sentence "does not mean, 
however, 
prets it 
as Gnosticism of all ages continually inter-
that there was once a 'Nothing' out of which 
God created the world, a negative primal beginning, a 
Platonic ME ON, a formlessness, a Chaos, a primal Dark-
ness.".3 On the contrary, creatio ex nihilo means that 
lBrunner, Doctrine of Creation, p. 4· 
2rbid., p. 11. 3rbid., pp. 9-10. 
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"God is the One who determines all things and is determined 
by none.n1 It is from the perspective of the "personal 
correspondence" relation that Brunner finds meaning in 
the phrase, creatio ex nihilo. 
Brunner interprets the phrase, creatio ~ nihilo, in 
the light of the kind of experience he has with God. In 
the I-Thou experience the Christian understands that God 
is his Lord. This means that he understands God as 
unconditioned Active Subject freely addressing him and 
that he knows God's Absolute Power not only in actually 
being seized by God but also as God's right to seize him. 
The Christian realizes that he is dependent upon this 
Unconditioned Active Subject who is absolutely powerful. 
For Brunner the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is not a 
theory about how the world came into existenc·e. Rather, 
it is a statement about the kind of relation that obtains 
between the creature and the Creator, the relation of 
creaturely dependence on the Creator, the relation of the 
dependence of the servant on the Master. 
Creatio ~ nihilo, thus, is a statement about why 
God creates. In the I-Thou relation between God and 
finite person the finite person becomes aware of being 
totally dependent on God. He is dependent on God not 
only for a knowledge of God and for a fellowship with God 
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but also for his existence both spiritually and physically.l 
Further, in the I-Thou relation the individual is aware 
that he is dependent upon God for a purpose. G0d creates 
in order to enter into an I-Thou relation with the creature 
and thereby to make his nature k~own among his creatures.2 
From the experience of God as Lord one becomes aware 
not only of one's own total dependence upon God but also 
of why God creates. What about the relation of nature to 
God? Brunner says that one not only becomes aware that 
everything about one is totally dependent upon God but 
also that nature is also totally dependent upon God for its 
existence. This is an inference on Brunner's part. In 
the I-Thou relation he recognizes that Power which makes 
the greatest difference in his life. This Power is greater 
than anything experienced in nature. Nature is not self-
explanatory. Thus, Brunner infers that God as Absolute 
Power is the ultimate explanation of nature. Nature is 
thus understood as dependent up9n God.3 Again Brunner is 
not so much interested in indicating how God creates nature 
as he is concerned about making clear why God creates 
nature. God creates nature in order to make his essence 
known through nature. This is accomplished through his 
creating nature and entering into an I-Thou relation with 
1Ibid., p. 35. 
3Ibid. 
2rbid., p. 150. 
it.1 In what sense God has anI-Thou relation with the 
world will be dealt with below. The point here is that 
creatio ~ nihilo means now how God creates but rather wh~ 
God creates and that the creature is dependent upon God for 
its existence. Thus, through this experience of the Lord-
ship of God one finds the central meaning of the p~rase 
creatio ex nihilo. 
It is clear, then, that the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo takes on meaning as God's self-communication and 
man's awareness in this I-Thou relation that God is Lord, 
absolute power, Holy Will and Love, and that man and all 
other existences are totally dependent upon God for their 
existence for the purpose of God's self-revelation. Wever-
theless, Brunner does consider how God created. 
B. Method of Creating Activiti -- At the outset one 
must note that Brunner is emphatic in denying that God's 
creating activity is comprehensible. Creatio ex nihilo 
"expresses something which is utterly beyond all human 
understanding.n2 The notion of God's being over against 
the world and the world's being over against God intro-
duces into one's system of thought a radical rational 
discontinuity between God and the creatures. If there 
is such a discontinuity in one's system one must admit 
lrbid., p. 21. 2Ibid., p. 11. 
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that the relation of God to his creatures is in the last 
resort incomprehensible. Thus, "Fichte therefore was quite 
right when he said of the creation that it is 's~mething 
which cannot properly be imagined.•n1 This is the obvious 
reaction of a philosopher who contends "that everything 
can be deduced by human reflection and thus assumes the 
absolute continuity of human refleotion.1r2 It is clear, 
then, that Brunner recognizes from the start that the 
notion of creatio ~ nihilo is unintelligible from the 
point of view of conceivability. Nevertheless, Brunner 
does delineate to some extent, at least, how God creates 
the world. 
It has been pointed eut that from ene's recognition 
of God as Lord and thus as Unconditioned Free Subject, 
Brunner says that one also recognizes God as a Person. 
As a Person God has both thought and will. In terms of 
his thought and will God creates the world.3 Brunner says, 
There can, however, be no doubt that 
the origin of the Creation is simply 
and solely the thought and the will 
of God. The world exists, because 
God wills it; the world is as it is 
because God wills it so. Hence it is 
the expression, manifestation, reve-
lation, of His thought and will. Be-
cause thought, God's thought, God's 
wisdom, lies at its foundation, there 
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is in it an order which can be per-
ceived; that is why it is accessible 
to knowledge, that is whi it has a 
logical rational aspect. 
That God is will is obvi·ous from the foregoing discussion 
of God's Holiness. But at what point in the relation of 
personal correspondence does one recognize that God's 
nature also includes his thought, a rational aspect? 
That God has a rational nature is recognized by man 
through ~an's awareness first that God wills to achieve 
his purpose "of creation, and its final accomplishment.n2 
This means that God is faithful. Even in the face of 
man's sin God wills to realize -his goals for his creatures. 
God's will is constant~ This also means that God is 
righteous. Brunner says, 
[God] wills that man should be, and 
live, and act-- both-in his own life 
and in his dealings with others -- in 
a particular way, and not otherwise. 
And this will of God, which demands 
so much of man, is unchangeable and 
immutable~ This is the divine Right-
eousness.:> 
In terms of the constancy of the Divine Will as seen in 
God's faithfulness and righteousness toward all creatures 
Brunner infers the rational aspect of God's nature. God 
makes demands upon his creatures. He sets up laws which 
remain constant and which he requires his creatures to 
lBrunner, Doctrine of God, p. 307. 
2rbid., p. 271. 3rbid., .P· 278. 
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obey. Through these moral laws one is able to understand 
"the rational element within the doctrine of God.nl The 
recognition of the Divine Wisdom, thus, arises from the 
recognition of the constancy of the Divine Will both in 
faithfulness and righteousness. Thus, at that point in 
which one recognizes the Holy Will and its constancy one 
also recognizes the rational nature of God. 
It is clear that God has both thought, a rational 
aspect in His nature, and will. But how does He create? 
Brunner points out, 
The Creation has its foundation and 
its origin in God alone. 'For He 
spake and it was done; He commanded, 
and it stood fast.' 'In the beginning 
was the Word • • • all things were made 
by Him.' This too is the meaning of. 
the sublime story of Creation in the 
first chapter in the Bi~lel •God spake 
••• and it was done.' 
Brunner says that God creates by "speaking." What does 
"speaking" mean? Speaking involves an act of the will and 
a thought or an idea one wants to communicate. It was 
pointed out above that God creates because he wills to do 
so. For Brunner God's Will is the ultimate principle of 
explanation. Motivated by his Will and in terms of his 
thought, his Logos, God speaks. This act of speaking is 
God's act of creating. In terms of his thought or 
libid., p. 279. 
2Brunner, Doctrine of Creation, p. 10. 
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knowledge and motivate_d by his Will God ~~a~~ and the 
creature is created. 
c. God's Continuous Creating Activity -- Brunner 
is faced with the problem of determining whether or not 
God created all things at once or whether he continues t·o 
create. However, he settles his problem when he seeks to 
account for things which are new. How else can they be 
accounted for except in terms of God's continuous creating 
activity? Brunner argues, 
The more we take into account the fact 
that the various forms of life did not 
all arise at the same time, as we 
certainly must do on the basis of our 
present knowledge, the more unavoidably 
are we led to this thought. God did 
not create everything at once; He is 1 continually creating something afresh. 
Brunner illustrates his notion that God continuously 
creates when he says, 
I, this human being, am evidently 
both a product of my ancestors and 
a new creation of God. We must as-
sign the continuity to the preserva-
tion, the new element to the creation 
of God, whereby the question may re-
main open whether or not as a whole and 
apart from man each individual as such, 
in spite of all continuity and explic-
ability of its elements from its ante-
cedents, is something new. This must 
in any case indubitably be claimed for 
the human person. Every human being is 
a new creation of God; every one is an 
original, and none is a product of a 
series, although in its cultural 
lrbid., p. 34. 
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manifestation the originality m·ay be 
very slight. Each human being is not 
only an individual but a person, and 
therefore directly related to God as 
its Creator. 
The problem is that the experiences of continuity and new-
-
ness need to be explained. How are they to be accounted 
for? The experience 0f continuity Brunner says is ex-
plained in terms of what he calls God's preserving 
activity. What he means by this will be discussed below. 
The experience of newness, however, such as the birth of 
a new human being, Brunner says can be explained by appeaL-
ing to God's creating activity. Not only did God create 
"in the beginning" but also God continues to create, and 
the new things in our experience like new human beings are 
accounted for by God's c0ntinuous creating. Thus not only 
did God create all that exists "in the beginningn ex 
nihilo but also God creates continuously. Brunner adheres 
t0 the notion of continuous. creation to explain the pre-
sence of things which are ~· 
How does God create? In terms of his thought and 
motivated by his Will,,God speaks and the creature exists. 
That this kind of creation is incomprehe~sible is obvious. 
Between God and man there is a radical rational discontin-
uity. No concept or method available to man will allow 
1rbid.; p. 34. 
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him to conceive of this relation. >However, this does not 
mean that creatio ~ nihilo is meaningless. Through one's 
personal correspondence with God and one's recognition of 
God as Lord, Hol~and Love one recognizes one's absolute 
dependence on God. Though rationally oreatio ex nihilo is 
unintelligible, regarding how God creates, it is nonethe-
less meaningful because it expresses the total dependence 
of the creature on the Creator. 
D. Summary -- God creates because he wills to com-
municate himself. It is through God's cummunication o~ 
himself that man recognizes his total dependence on God 
the Creator and Lord. Even though how God creates is not 
fully intelligible, Brunner says that God creates by an 
act of "speaking." Motivated by his Will and with a view 
to his thought, God creates the world without the use of 
pre-existing materials, i.e., ~ nihilo. God spake and· 
the world was. In order to explain the presence of new 
things Brunner also says that God creates continuously, 
God continuously "speaks." What relation does God have 
to the world he creates? God preserves the world. 
3) God's Preserving A~tivity 
In order to understand Brunner's doctrine of preserva-
. 
tion, one must clearly distinguish between God's creating 
activity and God's preserving activity. Having made this 
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distinction clear, God's preserving relation to the world 
can be delineated. Then in the light of the relation of 
God to the world in his creating and preserving activity 
one can see the.way in which God ia related to the world. 
In order, then, to clarify "preservationu one must, first, 
distinguish between creation and preservation. 
A. The World ~ Overagainst God -- Brunner contends 
that when God created the world,and when God continues to 
create,God "created something Other than Himself, 'over-
~ 
against' Himself.n1 However, Brunner points out: 
Creaturely being, which is quite differ-
ent from God's Being, is not set in 
opposition to God on account of this 
'otherness.' God Wills this Other, it 
is He who has estao!islied it as the . 
wholly other. It is His will that a 
second existence, and indeed a very 
varied and many-sided second existence, 
a world of very varied creatures, should 
be overagainst Himself.2 
Thus, through God's "speaking" the world is created and 
continually created and the created existence stands 
overagainst God. What does Brunner mean by "overagainsttt 
God? 
By "0veragainsttr Brunner mean~ that the world is 
real and free. Through his willful self-limitation God 
places the world in a position of real existence and 
libid., p. 19 .. 
2Ibid., p. 20; cf. ,. ~·, p. 34. 
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real freedom. Brunner says, 
God does not wish to occupy the whole 
of Space Himself, but that He wills to 
make roem for other forms of existence. 
In so doing He limits Himself. He limits 
Himself by the fact that the·world over 
against Himself is a real existence. 
Hence the maximum of the divine self-
limitation is equally the maximum of 
actual 1 overagainstness' -- the free 
position of that being who is 'over 
against' God, and is therefore.able to 
answer the World of the Creator in 
freedom. Yes, indeed, this is pre-
cisely the ultimate, and the real mean- 1 ing of the divine Creation of the world. 
Underlying Brunner's notion of ttoveragainst" is God's 
Holy Will. God, it will be recalled, actively defends 
His wh0lly Otherness by means of his Will. God is not 
the world and the world is not God, and God actively 
works to maintain this relation. Can this relation be 
clarified? 
The notion of the world's being ''averagainst n God 
must be understood in terms of the primary experience, the 
personal correspondence between God and man. When speak-
ing of the relation between God and man or God and the 
world Brunner always appeals to his "theological principle" 
of explanation. God is known through_his self-disclosure 
to a faithful man and a relationship between persons is 
established. It is through this relation that God is 
known. Thus when seeking to understand what kind of 
lrbid., p. 20. 
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relation obtains between God and the world Brunner appeals 
to the kind of relation obtaining between God and man. 
In the I-Thou relation God addresses man and man 
responds. Man's response is an act of faith, it is not 
a passive receptance; it is a returning unto God what God 
has communicated unto man.: love. Brunner says that "in 
the full sense of the word, God can only glorify Himself 
and impart Himself where a creature in freedom gives His 
word back to Him, the Word which He addresses to it, the 
word of love.rr1 
In the I-Thou relation the person freely responds to 
God's Love, his addressing the finite person. The. finite 
person is conscious of his total dependence upon God for 
his existence but he is not conscious of any power coercing 
him to respond to this add~ess of God. The relation be-
tween God and man is between the self-dependent Person, 
God, who is absolutely free either to unveil himself or 
not and the dependent finite person who is free to re-
spond or to resist the summons. The finite persen is, 
thus, relatively independent of God. He experiences that 
he is dependent on God for his existence but that he is 
free from coercion in the act of decision. If this is the 
kind of relation that obtains between God and man and if 
this is the only kind of relation that one is aware of 
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regarding God and finite existence then one must appeal to 
this relation for help in understanding the kind of re-
lation between God and the world. 1 
If the kind of relation between God and all of 
finite existence must be understood in the light of the 
kind of relation between God and man and the kind of re-
lation man has with God is an I-Thou relation in which he 
is aware both of his freedom for decision an~dependence 
upon God for his existence then the kind of relation that 
God has with all finite existence is an I-Thou relation 
in which finite existence is able to resist God's summons 
but is nevertheless dependent on God for its existence. 
Brunner suggests, then, that all 1'of the created forms of 
life"2 are both free and dependent and are structured 
according to the degree of freedom each possesses. 
Brunner points out, 
This hierarchy of created life corres-
ponds to the greater or lesser distance 
from the human way of existence. It is 
the hierarchy which is determined by 
the degree of freedom or unfreedom, 
which leads from the minimum of free-
dom in the sphere of matter to the 
maximum of freedom in Man, whicp, for 
its part, has its essential character-
istic and its theological significance 
in the fact that Man may and should 
answer the divine Word in freedom.3 
3Ibid., p. 21. 
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I£. the ultimate principle of explanation for the kind of 
relation between God and all finite existence is the kind 
of relation between God and finite persons it follows 
that all finite existence must be understood as related 
tq God like finite persons are related to God. It also 
follows that all finite existence must be understood as 
being perso~ like. Although Brunner nowhere works this 
out, what he is sayi~g seems to mean that some areas of 
finite existence are more like the finite person than are 
others. For example, one would admit that an animal has 
more person-like characteristics than does a flower or 
a rock. Thus in finite existence there is an hierarchy 
in which the principle of differentiation is the posses-
sion or relative lack of characteristics of the person. 
Does Brunner mean that those creatures possessing 
the maximum of freedom for response to Godts address also 
possess the maximum of independence from God and that 
those possess~ng the minimum of freedom also possess the 
minimum of independence from God~ If this is what. 
Brunner means, then Brunner is seemingly in the position 
of saying that that finite existence which has the 
least characteristics of a person has the least inde-
pendence from God, and this means that that which has 
the greatest dependence upon God is the most unlike 
God. But, how can that which has th~ most dependence on 
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God be the least like God? 
This objection is based on a failure to grasp the 
meaning of the criterion for determining the grades or 
levels of created existence. At the root of the fore-
going objection lies the assumption that levels of ex-
istence are determined by the degree an existent has being. 
This means that the more being possessed by an existent 
than the more like being is the existent and the greater 
dependence the existent has on being. This also means 
that the less being possessed by an existent then the less 
like being is the existent and the greater independence 
the existent has from being. The words' "dependence" and 
"independence" are, thus, used here to convey the degrees 
of being or levels of being in what is called existence. 
That this is not what Brunner means by the kind of relation 
finite existence to God is obvious. 
The criterion for determining the levels of created 
existence in Brunner's system is not the degree to which 
an existent has being. Rather the levels are determined 
by the degree to which the finite existent has the capacity 
to enter into ah,I-Thou relation with God. This follows 
clearly from Brunner's contention that since the only kind 
of relation one is aware of between God and finite ex-
istence is the I-Thou relation between God and man then 
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one must attempt to unclerstand the relation between God 
and all finite existence in terms of the I-Thou relation. 
Thus all finite existence must be person like. Finite 
existence thus possesses to some extent freedom, and this 
means the capacity.to.resist or to obey God's will. It 
is clear, then, that finite existence have degrees of 
I-Thou relations with God and that these relations are not 
to be understood in terms of degrees of being possessed by 
finite existents. 
This line of argument is reinforced by Brunner's 
contention that the finite mind unaided is incapable of 
embracing being directly and immediately. The finite 
mind can know that there is being but not what being is. 
Brunner makes this point clear when he says that the mind 
can know that there is being but the mind cannot concep~ 
1 tualize it, that is, specify its nature. If the mind can-
not know being th~n it is incapable of differentiating 
between levels of being. In summary, then, Brunner is 
saying that the only way one can know being is through 
God's self-disclosure of himself to persons and that the 
kind of relation God has with finite existents is the 
I-Thou relation. Finite existents which possess person-
like characteristics are organized hierarchically in 
lEmil Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 62. 
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terms of their capacity to enter into an I-Thou relation 
I 
with God. Thus, the creature created by God stands 
"overagainst" God, and the meaning of "overagainst" is 
that there exists relatively independent creatures who 
are related to God in an hierarchy of I-Thou relation-
ships. 
B. The World ~ Upheld Ex God's Will -- When God 
creates the creature he creates it overagainst himself. 
The world is not God and God is not the world. Neverthe-
less God has a preserving relation to the creature. 
Brunner says, 
That which has been created stands 
actually 'overagainst' God. Hence-
forth, through the action of God it 
has an independent existence, even 
though this independence be a limited 
one. It depends on a divine thread 
of preservation above the abyss of 
nothingness; at any moment God can 
let it fall into nothingness.l 
What is God's preserving activity? God wills'that that 
which he has created should remain. Brunner states, 
Without the preserving will of God 
the world would fall into nothimgness 
in a flash • • • At every moment God 
'upholds' the world above an abyss of 
nothingness, into which it could fall 
at any moment, and into which it would 
fall, if God were not upholding it.2 
lBrunner, Doctrine of Creation, p. 34. 
2Brunner, Doctrine of God, p. 153. 
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Fr0m Brunner's position that God preserves the create& 
world it is obvious that the ground of God's preserving 
activity is his constant will. God intends t0 realize his 
goals in his creatures and he wills that they be realized. 
Thus the creature will be maintained or preserved until 
God attains his purposes in the creature. 
At this point one should note that God's preserving 
activity must not be understood in terms of a doctrine 
0f causality. Brunner reacts sharply to the Scholastic 
dectrine of Concursus Divinus. 1 This pesition maintains 
that "God ••• is the cau~ prima; natural causes are the 
causae sacundae. Now there is a constant influxus of the 
causae secundag.u2 Brunner criticizes this doctrine at 
two points. He says, 
First of all, even the applicati0n of 
the causal idea to G0d is more than 
questionable. There is causality be-
tween created objects, but there is 
none between the Greater and the Cre-
ation. Particularly in the questien 
of human freedem do we·see how ques-
tionable it is to attempt to transfer 
• • • the principle of causality to the 
relation between God and the world.3 
Brunner continues, 
Secondly, however, this doctrine is 
dangerous because it severs that which 
ought not to be divided: the independence 
lBrunner, Doctrine ef Creation, p. 153. 
2rbid. 3rbid. 
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of the Creation and the Divine work of 
Preservation. The mystery consists in 
the fact that God carries on His work 
of preservation within -- and not out-
side of --1the real independence of His creatures. 
Brunner is saying that the notion of primary and secondary 
causes brings up two problems regarding the relation of 
God to the creature. First, if God is the first cause and 
all finite existence is an effect then one must say that 
even the decisions of finite persons are caused by God. If 
the ultimate causal explanation is God's will, for instance, 
then everything known as finite is to be explained in terms 
of God's will. When one asks why did John kill his brother 
the answer is that God caused him to kill his brother • 
. . 
Brunner contends that if one says that God is the firs·t 
cause then all effects find their explanation in God's 
will. This eliminates human freedom in the sense that one 
is able to make decisions apart from coercion or compulsion • 
.... 
Second, if all natural causes are secondary causes then 
God has no immediate relation to that which has been 
created. It was argued above that God's relation to all 
finite existence is an I-Thou ~elation. If this is the 
case then God has a direct relation to creatures and the 
notion of secondary causes finds no place in this relation. 
Between .God and finite existence no secondary cause is 
lrlblid., p. 154. 
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needed in order for God to relate himself to creatures 
. . 
God's relation to finite existence is a personal 
one. But how does God preserve that which he has 
created? Brunner says only that God does it by his will. 
What does this mean? Brunner calls it a mystery. He 
disclaims any causal relation between God and finite 
existence. Such an explanation would render meaningless 
human freedom and introduce a causal relation into a 
relation which is essentially not causal, the I-Thou re-
lation between God and the creature. Thus, the relation 
between God and the creature for Brunner is not compre-
hensible regarding how God maintains the creature. Thus, 
Brunner contends that the personal relation between God 
and his creatures must not be understood in a causal 
sense, but in a sense 0f personal correspondence, personal 
communion and that God preserves in a mysterious way the 
creature in his freedom. 
c. The World as Both Dependent Upon and Independent 
of God -~ God not only sets the creature overagainst him-
self in freedom and real existence, but also God completely 
preserves the creature by his will. The primary relation 
between God and the world is, thus, a personal one. It is 
a relation in which the world as a free existence responds 
to the Absolutely Free Being. Brunner specifies the 
creature's independence/dependence relation to God when 
he says, 
God the Lord creates a creature, in whom 
He wills to be glorified, and with whom 
He wills to have communion. But He can 
only have communion with that which is 
not Himself. Communion pre-supposes 
differentiation. Further: God wills to 
have communion with His creatures in such 
a way that they freely return Him love 
for love, and in so doing give glory to 
Him. The whole of creation has been made 
for this maximum of creaturely independence, 
for the free creature, capable of loving 
God in freedom. On the o~·hand, if God 
wills to be glorified in His creation, 
then the freedom of the creature cannot be 
inherent in man's nature, it can only be 
derived from Himself. It is not independ-
ence which constitutes the freedom based 
on God the Creator, but on the contrary, 
it is that freedom which is identical with 
complete dependence.l 
Thus, the relation between God and man is not to be under-
stood primarily as to how finite existence is both depend-
ent-on and independent of God. Rather, it has been 
pointed out that·Brunner says that in the I-Thou relation 
between God and man man recognizes that he is totally 
dependent upon God and that he is free to resist or to 
obey God's commands. How this relation is maintained is 
incomprehensibleo~ Why this relation is maintained is 
comprehensible and meaningful. God maintains finite ex-
istents because he wants finite existents freely to 
lrbid., p. 150. 
304 
respond to his love. God wants finite creatures to re-
spond freely to God's love and freely love God in return,, 
thereby manifesting God's nature among all finite creatures. 
D. Summary -- God created the world 0ver against 
himself, he placed it in the position of being a real ex-
istence possessing freedom. However, in and through the 
creature's independence God preserves the creature by his 
will. God places.the creature through his creating 
activity "overagainst" himself and ye~ preserves it. What 
exactly is the relation between God and the world? Brunner 
says that it is a personal one. Thus God's relation to 
his creatures must be interpreted in terms of why God 
preserves creatures and not in terms of how he does it. 
God communicates himself to his creatures and gives his 
love because he wants all creatures to respond with trust, 
obedience, and love. Unless creatures were overagainst 
God in relative independence and ft.eedom they could not 
respond to God's address. Thus, God and the world are 
related like a person is related to God. 
4) God's Redeeming Activity 
Not only does God create the world, continue in his 
creating activity, and preserve what he has created, but 
also he redeems his creatures. God, it has been shown, 
preserves the creature because he is seeking to realize 
his purposes in the creature. Furthermore, it has been 
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shown that God is seeking to draw the creature into a 
right relation with him. God wants the creature to enter 
into a personal relation with him. To this end God works. 
Brunner contends that the created cosmos as is now known 
by man will have an end. This end will come when God has 
attained his goal in the creature. Brunner says, 
The fact that Time has a beginning 
is just as important as the other fact, 
that it has an end. Its end coincides 
with the end of created existence. This 
end, however, is not 'nothingness,' but 
it is the Goal which is both the end and 
the completion of the created universe. 
God Himself is the End of Creation, but 
this does not mean that He will be once 
more without a creation, as at the 
beginning; but it means that He will 
glorify Himself in the Creation, and 
give Himself to it, in such a way, that 
it will shatter the framework of the 
created universe as we know it.l 
From this statement it is clear that the basis of God's 
redeeming activity is his Holy Will and his Love. God 
wills to glorify himself in the creature, that is, he 
wills to communicate himself to the creature so that the 
creature can respond to the Creator with love. Thus, 
God's redeeming activity is ground in God's Holiness and 
Love. God seeks to draw all creatures into a personal 
relation with himself. The consummation of this redemp-
tive activity will come when God has achieved his goals 
lrbid., p. 16. 
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in his creatures. 
5) Answer to Metaphysical Problems 
Brunner faces two philosophical views of the relation 
of God to the world: Yantheism and Deism. Pantheism 
teaches that since God is being and has both perfe~t power 
and only he can effect anything, then creaturely freedom 
is swallowed up, rendered meaningless. Deism teaches that 
God created the world and set it apart from himself, a 
well oiled, self-sufficient machine. In this view God 
has no ~eaningful continuous relation to the world. Brunner 
gives two answers to these problems: (1) the concepts 
underlying these two systems are inadequate to function 
as foundations for the systems built upon them, and (2) 
because of the inadequacy of these philosophical concepts 
t0 function as foundations for these systems Brunner 
develops a new set of categories in terms of which the 
relation of God to the world can b~ understood. 
The first answer Brunner giv.es to Deism and Pantheism 
is that the concept~ underlying them are not capable of 
bearing the weight of the structure placed upon them. 
Essentially the answer is that knowledge involves not 
only the sensi~g and perceiving of data but also the con-
ceptualizing of that data. In the conceptualizing process 
the knower is constantly aware of data which refuse to be 
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conceptualized. There is always in the knowledge situa-
tion an awareness of a limiting fact0r, data that are but 
that remain elusive to the conceptualizing process. This 
datum X sets limits to knowledge. Through itself and by 
its own means the rational function of man is unable to 
conceptualize or rationally to know being. No concept 
available to man is capable of allowing 9eing to be con-
ceptualized. This means, then, that the concepts of 
causality and analogy are incapable of allowing one 
knowle~ of being. Applied to Pantheism and Deism, Bru~'s 
critique of knowledge means that being or God cannot be 
comprehended ·either as First Cause or as being similar 
to the world. Man cannot comprehend God as First Cause. 
Such comprehension is beyond his capacity. Man, also, 
cannot comprehend God through an analogy with anything 
in the world. F0r example, God cannot be comprehended as 
Designer or Cause by means of one's experience of design 
and cause in the cosmos. Thus, because of the incapacity 
of man's rational capacity to comprehend being through 
the concepts available to him, Brunner contends that not 
only are Deism and Pantheism internally inadequate but 
also the difficulties posed by these two positions no 
longer possess the force they would have had had their 
positions been firmly grounded. This means that Pantheism 
and Deism cannot demonstrate as they claim that in fact 
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there is such a causal relation between God and them as 
they purport there is. If this cannot be demonstrated, 
then one is not bound to either system. One may seek a 
more adequate position. It has been shown that this is 
exactly what Brunner does in his development of -a new set 
of categories in terms of which he attempts to indicate 
the nature of God's relation to the world. 
The second answer Brunner gives to Deism and 
Pantheism is that because impersonal, abstract rational 
concepts are inadequate to furnish an adequate foundation 
for the metaphysical systems built on them, he is free ·to 
develop a set of categories in terms of which he can make 
meaningful the relation of God to the world. The preced-
ing discussion of the nature and function of creation is 
in fact an analysis of this new set of categories developed 
by Brunner. With these categories Brunner is attempting 
to overcome the problems found in Deism and Pantheism. 
The concepts and methods they used were inadequate to 
allow the relation between God and the world to be 
rendered meaningful. Through his set of categories 
Brunner attempts to obviate this difficulty. Fundamentally 
the relation between God and the world is that between 
Creator-Subject and created subjects, between I and Thou. 
Involved in this relation are these categories: Lord, 
Holy, and Love. These are the conditions for the 
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possibility of God's creating the world and 0f there being 
any relation whatsoever between God and the w0rld. Thus, 
despairing of the capacity of rational concepts or.con-
cepta .. dealing with abstract, impersonal relations t0 allow 
knowledge of reality, Brunner attempts to understand the 
relation between God and the world in terms of the relation 
between persons. 
6} Summary 
While working out the implications of that which is 
recognized in the relation of personal correspondence, 
God's manifestation of himself to the person who responds 
with faith, Brunner shows that the relation of God to the 
world must be understood in terms of the relation of God 
as Absolutely Free Subject to the creature as a dependent/ 
independent free existing subject. Oreatio ex nihile is 
a doctrine about the relation of the Creator and the crea-
ture and about why Ged creates. God creates in order to 
make himself known through the creature, and the creature 
is relatively independent of the Creator. Recognizing 
that creatio ex nihilo is not rationally intelligible and 
that how God creates is-inconceivable, Brunner says that 
God creates by an act of his will in terms of his rational 
nature. God's will is understood in terms of God's 
Holiness and his maintenance of that Holiness through the 
activity of his Will. God's rational nature is grasped 
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in terms of God's constant Will, constancy in maintaining 
the creature until God's purposes and goals for the 
creature are realized. 
That which God created is overagainst himself. Even 
that which he creates after the initial "calling into 
being the universetr is overagainst God. As overagainst 
God the creature is real and free. The degree to which 
the creature is free determines its place in the structure 
of created existence. Through this independence, .however, 
God preserves the creature. Apart from God's will in its 
preserving activity the creature wo'uld not be. The 
creature's independence/dependence relation to God must be 
grasped in terms of a personal relation. God's Holiness 
is the sufficient condition for the otherness of the 
creature, and God's Holy Will and Love to communicate him-
self is the sufficient condition for the dependence of the 
crea~ure and the "why" of God's creating activity. 
God strives to redeem that which he has created. 
Thus he actively works to draw man into fellowship with 
tiim. When God has accomplished his purposes he will bring 
the creature to a consummation. 
From this discussion o~ the nature and function of 
creation in Brunner's system it is clear that he is attempt-
ing to reinterpret the Biblical statements about creation 
in terms of the relation between God as· Absolute Subject 
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and creatures as limited subjects. Despairing of the 
capacity of rational concepts to grasp reality Brunner 
seeks to understand God and his relation to the world in 
terms of the idea of creation and the personal relation-
ship. Thus, it is in terms of the notion of creation and 
the notion -of interpersonal relations that Brunner attempts 
to overcome the problem involved in Deism and Pantheism. 
Can Brunner's notion of creation be further clarified? 
Can the idea of creation be clarified through an analysis 
of the analogical underpirnnng.s of Brunner's system? 
6. Root Analogy of Creation 
1) Introduction 
What does the idea of creation mean in Brunner's 
system? Can a root analogy be appealed to as a way of 
delineating what Brunner means by creation? In order to 
answer these questions the nature and function of the 
fundamental analogy of creation in Brunner's thought must 
be considered. When these questions have been answered 
and the meaning ef Brunner's idea of creation is clarified 
then a critique of Brunner's approach to the doctrine of 
creation will be made. First, what is the nature and 
function of the root analogy in Brunner's system? 
2) Nature and Function of Root Analogy in Brunn~r's 
System 
A. Nature of Root Analogy -- In the thought of Plato 
312 
and Augustine there is an underlying root analogy in terms 
of which they devel0p their ideas of creation. Hewever, 
~n Brunner's system the root analogy ef God's creating 
activity is allowed to function in a different way than 
in Plato's and Augustine's systems. In order to under-
stand the nature of the basic analogy as employe~ by 
Brunner one must first review the definition of the root 
analogy used in Plato's and Augustine's positions and then 
delineate Brunner's use of analogy. When this has been 
accomplished, the function of the root analogy in Brunner's 
system will be discussed. 
The root analogy underlying Plato's and Augustine's 
systems is defined by Pepper in the following way: 
A man desiring to understand the world 
looks about for a clue to its comprehen-
sion. He pitches upon some area of com-
mon sense fact and tries if he cannot 
understand other areas in terms of this 
one. This original area becomes then 
his basic analogy or root metaphor. He 
describes as best he can the character-
istics of this area, or, if you will, 
discriminates its structure. A list of 
its structural characteristics becomes 
his basic eoncepts of explanation and . 
description. We call them a set of cat-
egories. In terms of these categories 
he proceeds to study all other areas of 
faet whether uncritized or previously 
criticized. He undertakes to interpret1 all facts in terms of these categories. 
lstephen c. Pepper, World Hypotheses {Berkeley, 
California: The University of California), p. 91. 
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The underlying assumption of this kind of roet analogy is 
that reason interpreting experience through the means of 
an analogy is capable of knowing and delineating the 
nature and structure of reality. It is clear from the 
preceding discussion of Brunner's attack on speculative 
knowledge that he discounts the possibility of reason 
through any concept to allow one knowledge of b@ing's 
nature and structure. Thus, the root analogy as defined 
by Pepper and employed by Plato and Augustine is not an 
adequate foundation for a world view from Brunner's 
point of view. What is an adequate foundation for a 
world-view1 Brunner finds a foundation in his under-
standing of revelation. It is in terms of Brunner's view 
of revelation that the nature and function of the root 
analogies in his system must be understood. 
For Brunner revelation is God's speaking or address-
ing man who responds with trustful obedience. This means 
that God's Word is given to man and man understands it 
and responds with faith. In and through this relation-
ship of personal correspondence man knows that God is 
Absolute Subject, is Person. This means that man knows 
that there is at least a likeness between God and man; 
otherwise, man would not be able to recognize God when 
God comes to man. Furthermore, through this personal 
dialogical relationship man knows what God is, that God 
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is not only Person but also Lord, Holy, and Love. Men who 
have this relation with God do not come to this relati~n 
through the means of reason interpreting experience throug~ 
a root analogy, and they do not need analogies to clarify 
it. However, if one who does not have this relationship 
enquires about it Brunner is able to point to the inter-
personal relationship as the best analogy of the personal 
correspondence relation. Thus, the root analogy for 
Brunner does not function as an analogical foundation in 
terms of which a world-view is erected. Rather, it is a 
means of suggesting t.o the person who does not have an 
I-Thou relation with God the nature and structure of the 
relation between God and the world. The best analogy of 
this relati0n is the relationship between persons. In 
light of Brunner's reinterpretation of the function of a 
root analogy what is the nature and structure of the 
interpersonal relation in terms of which the relation of 
personal correspondence between God and man can be under-
stood by one who has not had this experience? 
The primary analogy Brunner uses tb~illustrate his 
system ia the interpersonal relationship. Regarding the 
relation betwe·en persons Brunner notes these structural 
aspects: (1) the one who manifests himself is. a person, 
(2) the one who manifests himself does so by addressing 
or speaking to another person, (3) the one who manifests 
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himself controls his self~discl0sure to the person recog-
nizing the self-manifestation, (4) the person who manifests 
himself to another person is other than that person, (5) 
the one to whom the manifestation is given is a person, 
and (6) the receiver of the manifestation acknowledges the 
self-manifestation through an understanding of the self-
manifestation. 
How does this structure function in Brunner's system? 
In terms of these aspects one is able to show a parallel 
between the relation between God and man and the relation 
between persons. The experience of a person's manifesting 
himself as a person to another pe·rson is parallel to a 
person's recognition in the divine-human encounter that 
God is Person. One's experience of a person's manifesting 
.himself as a person by means of speaking is parallel to 
the experience of God as being-for-us, as one who speaks 
to a person. God is Love. Parallel to the experience 
that the person manifesting himself to another person 
completely controls his self-manifestation is the ex-
perience that God gives his Name to a person ahd he con-
trols the giving of it. God is Absolute Power. The 
person receiving a revelation of another person is totally 
dependent on that person for this revelation. This is 
parallel to Brunner's contention that out of one's aware-
ness of one's dependence on God·for his revelation one 
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recognizes that one is totally dependent on God for one's 
existence. God as Absolute Power is also God the Creator. 
Both the person receiving God's self-manifestation and 
the person receiving another person's self-manifestation 
are dependent on the giver of the manifestation. 
Further, the pers0n of faith recognizes that God is 
other than the one to whom God gives his disclosure, and 
the person receiving another person's disclosure re-
cognizes that the giver is other than the receiver. God 
is other than the one sp0ken to. The rec0gnition that 
the receiver of a person's self-disclosure 'is a person 
is parallel to the recognition that the receptor of God's 
revelation is a person .• 
Finally, parallel to the person's acknowledgment 
of another's revelation is the acknowledgment of the 
person who receives God's self-manifestation. The 
acknowledgment of the receptor of God's revelation is 
that of understanding and faith. Thus, Brunner's 
illustrative root analogy is the interpersonal relation-
ship. This analogy is the basic analogy of Brunner's 
understanding of G0dts relation to the world. Involved 
in this analogy is the analogy of God's creating 
activity. How does this analogy arise and what is its 
structure and function? 
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The analogy of creation becomes clear when one asks 
what are the conditions for the possibility of the initia-
tion of the interpers.onal relationship? It is obvious 
that one person must communicate with another person. The 
act of speaking does in many instances initiate the rela-
tionship between the persons. It is this analogy of 
speaking that parallels Brunner's understanding of God's 
creating activity. 
It has been shown that one's recognition that one 
is totally dependent on another person for the self-
manifestation of that person is parallel to the person's 
recognition not only that God completely controls his 
self-revelation but also that the person is totally depend-
ent on God for his existence. The structure of the act 
of speaking is based on the experience of one's depen-
dence on another person for that person's self-manifestation. 
In light of the foundation of the analogy of the act of 
speaking, what is the structure of this analogy? 
In order for the relationship between persons to 
begin the one desiring to communicate himself to the other 
by speaking must speak, address the listener. What are 
the conditions for the possibility of the initiation of 
communication -by speaking? First, the communicator must 
be a person. Second, the communicator must will to speak, 
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to communicate himself. This means he must have a purpose, 
a reason f0r communicating to the communicatee. Third, the 
communicator must have something he desires to communicate, 
and herein one sees the purpose of the communicator in his 
communicating. Now, in order to speak intelligibly and 
meaningfully the communicator must speak in terms of what 
he knows. This means that he must have ideas he desires 
to make known to the other person. Fourth, the communicamr 
is other than the person to whom he is speaking. If they 
were the same persG:ms no communication could or would 
need take place. .Fifth, the person spoken to must desire 
to be communicated with. He must be attentive to the 
communicator. Obviously he must be in some sense like 
the communicator in order for communication to take place. 
The communicant must be able to realize meaning. Finally, 
the communicator must actually speak, address the person 
who listens and the communicant must appropriate that 
which was spoken. The f0undation and structure 0f the 
analogy, the act of speaking, has been outlined. In terms 
of this delineation what is the function of the analogy 
of God's creative activity? 
B. Function of Root Analogy -- The analogy·, the 
act of speaking, functions in Brunner's system as an 
illustrative parallel to the understanding the man of 
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faith has of God's nature in the personal carrespondence 
relation with God. Exactly how the analogy, the act of 
speaking, functions can be understood through a considera-
tion of the parallels between the structure of the analogy 
and the inferences the man of faith draws of God's nature. 
Parallel to the recognition that in communication between 
two persons the communicator is a person is the awareness 
that God is a Person who enters into an I-Thou relation 
with finite persons. The recognition that when a person 
speaks he wills to communicate is parallel to the re-
cognition that when God speaks to the man of faith He 
wills to communicate Himself. This means· that the person 
desiring, seeking to communicate does so for a purpose. 
God likewise is purposive in his act of speaking. Further, 
the recognition that when a person communicates with 
another· person the communicator has something he wills to 
communicate, he has ideas in terms of which he wills to 
speak, is parallel to the recognition that when God wills 
to communicate he has something, ideas, he wills to con-
vey to the man of faith. Next, the experience that the 
communicator when he communicates with another person is 
other than the one to whom he is speaking is analogous to 
the awareness that God is wholly Other than the person to 
whom he speaks. Finally one is aware that a person desir.fug 
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to communicate with another person must actually speak 
through an act of will and in terms of his ideas. This 
is parallel to the recognition that when God speaks he 
speaks by means of an act of his Will and in terms of 
his ideas. It has been pointed out above that the man 
of faith experiences a total dependence upon God for his 
existence. This means that apart from God man would not 
exist. This also means that in order for God to 
communicate with a person there must first be a person. 
Thus, in the initial act of speaking, God created the 
person and through his continual speaking he creates 
creatures with whom he has communion. However, it is at 
the point in which God creates the one with whom he 
communicates that the illustrative analogy employed by 
Brunner breaks down. It does not illustrate how God 
creates. It does, however, illustrate why God creates. 
Thus far the discussion has centered around God's 
creating man and having communion with him. What about 
the rest of the world? Was it and is it created? By 
inference from one's experience of one's total dependence 
upon God one understands that the world is also created 
by God's act of speaking. God is known as being in his 
revelation to man and man concludes that since the world 
is not experienced as being self-dependent it also is 
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dependent on being. The basis of this inference is the 
experience of being totally dependent upon God and the 
knowledge that God is Person, Will, Thought, wholly Other, 
and One who addresses man. 
The function of Brunner's root analogy is to 
illustrate and to describe the kind of relation the man 
of faith is aware of in his experiences with God in the 
divine-human encounter. Through its nature, structure, 
and function the root analogy vividly delineates for the 
person who has not undergone the experience of personal 
correspo~dence the idea of the nature and function of God's 
act of creating in Brunner's system of thought. 
3} Summary 
Brunner's attack on the use of analogy in traditional 
metaphysics forces him to refuse to use a root analogy as 
they are employed in Plato's and Augustine's systems. He 
employs a root analogy as a useful illustrative tool. Thus, 
though he does not understand the root analogy to play a 
significant part in the actual development of his system, 
he does use it as a means of clarifying his position to 
one who has ~ot experienced God in the I-Thou relation. 
7. Critique of Root Analogy 
1) Introduction 
Brunner develops a view of creation based on 
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his interpretation of revelation. Through God's self-
disclosure Brunner determines the categories of God, a 
set of ontological categories. In terms of these cate-
gories, he attempts to understand his experience. The 
result of his endeavors is a world-view. Because of his 
contention that being cannot be known through the limited 
rational capacity of man, Brunner looks to revelation. 
Revelation for Brunner means a personal correspondence 
with man in which God gives to man a knowledge of him-
self. This knowledge is understood by reason and by 
faith, by trustful obedience when one enters into an I-
Thou relation with God. Whatever is known about being 
is either fully known through revelation or incorrectly 
known through the created world. The result of this 
approaeh to a world-view is that the root analogy in the 
system is placed in an illustrative position. This means 
that Brunner considers that he has no fundamental analogy 
in terms of which he develops his system. However, 
through a careful critique of his doctrine of experience 
it will be shown not only that he must have a root analogy 
underlying his system but also that without this analogy 
he would be unable to develop his doctrine of creation. 
Briefly, in review, what is Brunner's doctrine of 
revelation? First, revelation is something that 
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happens. 1 That which happens is God's self-manifestation. 
God manifests himself as "Thou, 11 as "God-for-.us. n2 God 
gives himself to man. Further, God's coming into history 
means that God and Life, being and actuality are combined 
and are one in his Word, Jesus Christ.3 God speaks to 
man and man understands and an "I-Thou" relation between 
God and man is established.4 Finally, this self-manifesta-
tion of God in the personal encounter is appropriated by 
man in "an act of personal surrender and deci.sion.n5 
Through these acts of understanding, trust, and obedience 
man knows the truth, he knows God by being in, living in, 
and doing the truth. In the maintenance of this personal 
relation man knows God, not in a purely rational sense, 
but in a situation-lived-in, "personal correspondence" 
sense in which the whole person is involved. Thus God 
manifests himself to the thinking, tru~ting, obedient man 
and a communion is established in which man lives truth 
and being lives through man; there is, then, a "personal . 
correspondence" between God and man. 
What is Brunner doing when he talks about the rela-
tion of "personal correspondence" just described? 
lBrunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 369. 
2rbid., p. 370 3rbid., p. 371. 
4Ibid. 5Ibid. 
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Fundamentally he is saying s·omething about a certain kind 
of experience he and many other persons attest to be under-
going. When something is said about this experience 
whether descri~tively, interpretatively, or evaluatively, 
one is making statements. Whatever else is involved in a 
statement it is clear that a statement involves the use 
of words and thus concepts. What is a concept but an inter-
pretation of an experience? Brunner's understanding of 
God 1 s'address is a reasonable interpretation of the ex-
perience undergone. To attempt to avoid using concepts, 
to avoid interpreting one's experience is to vanquish 
even the possibility of having meaning. The upshot of 
this review_is simply that Brunner's attempt to understand 
his religious experience does involve concepts, a reason-
able interpretation of his experience. 
2) Reinterpretation of Nature and Function of Root 
Analogy of Creation 
Given that Brunner does interpret his religious ex-
perience, what does this have to do with the nature and 
function of the analogies in his system? Because Brunner 
does in fact interpret his religious.experience he must 
employ an analogy in order to build a world-view in terms 
of his ex~erience. 1 A root analogy as defined by Pepper 
and employed by Plato and Augustine provides a perspective 
lcf. Charles W •. Kegley ( ed.), The Theology of Emil 
Brunner (New York: The Macmillan co:;-1962), p. IU3:---
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and a structure, a set of categories or princ~ples of ex-
planatiGn, in terms of which one can understand one's 
experience. In order to underst~nd his religious ex-
perience Brunner does in fact (whether he is cognizant of 
it or not) cast about and find a root analogy. The 
encounter experience is open to interpretation only by a 
particular kind of analogy. No analogy involving an 
I-it relation would suffice. The categories and per-
spective involved in the I-it analogy would not allow 
one to interpret meaningfully the date in a~ I-Thou 
relation. For this reason Brunner employs the analogy 
of the interpersonal relation. This root analogy pro-
vides both a perspective and set of categories which 
render meaningful his religious experience. It is clear, 
then, that Brunner does employ a root analogy in building 
his theory of creation. 
The root analogy, the interpe-rsonal relationship, 
does underlie Brunner's creation view. If this is the 
case then the secondary analogy, the act of speaking, is 
part of the root analogy and actually does underlie the 
how of God's creating activity. God's creating ac-
tivity, creatio ~ nihilo, is incomprehensible in terms 
of the analogy, the act of speaking. Nevertheless this 
analogy is employed by Brunner and suggests an hypothesis, 
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the categories of which, function as the conditions for 
the possibility of the creative activity of God. 
3) Summary 
When Brunner attempts to understand his encounter 
with God he interprets it. In the act of interpreting 
it he employs a root analogy, the act of speaking, which 
provides a perspective and principles of explanation in 
terms of whieh the experience can be understood. A 
fundamental analogy, the interpersonal relation, under-
lies the creation view, and an analogy, the act of speak-
ing is held to be a relevant exposition of what happens 
in God's creating activity. Although Brunner discounts 
the use of analogy as a tool for understanding reality, 
he does in fact employ it in his view of God's creating 
activity. 
8. Contrast with Plato and Augustine. 
Through the discussions of Brunner's, Plato's, and 
Augustine's ideas of creation, one is able to grasp three 
different approaches to the problems they confront and 
three different answers to these problems. With these 
approaches and answers to problems in mind, one is ready 
to investigate the simila~ities in views these men share 
and the differences in views that singae out their in-
dividualities. 
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1) Similarities 
A. Ro0t Analogy Employed -- In Brunner's theught 
the root analogy functioned as an illustrative analogy for 
the experience of men in their relation of personal corres-
pondence with God. In the preceding critique of Brunner's 
' 
use of the root analogy it was shown that he does in fact 
interpret his experience and that he uses~ a roet analogy 
to guide him in his interpretation. He uses the medel in 
the same way that Augustine and Plato employed it. Each 
man has some area of experience he wants to interpret. 
Thus each brings to this data a root analogy to help him 
make intelligible the data under scrutiny. 
B. Kind ef Analogy in Brunner and Augustine 
Both Augustine and Brunner employ the analogy, the nact 
of speaking,n in developing their respective positions 
about creation. The above critique of Brunner's position 
reveals that in fact he does employ the same analogy as 
<ioes Augustine. 
2) Differences 
A. Starting·· point of Enquiry -- Each man has a 
different p0int of departure in developing his world-
view. Plate starts with permanence of inner experience 
and the change of sense experience. Augustine, on the 
other hand, initiates his enquiry not only with the sense 
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experience of change and the inner experience of "per-
manent" ideas but also with the data of the Biblical 
faith, the Scriptures. Brunner finds his point of 
departure in the "I-Thou" experience between man and God. 
B. Relation of God to the World -- Plato contends 
that the Demiurgos persuades the Receptacle to take into 
itself quantitative determination and become what is best. 
The realm of becoming which results from God's persuading 
activity is because it participates in the realm of Ideas. 
This means that Plato is attempting to indicate that there 
is a comprehensible relation between God, the world, and 
the Ideas. God envisages the Ideas and persuades the 
Receptacle to take into itself a likeness of the Ideas, 
to participate in the Ideas and develop toward what is 
best. Augustine contends that God created the world 
without the use of pre-existing materials and that the 
world which is created is both because God wills that it 
be preserved and because it participates in the ideas 
residing in God. The implication of this is that there 
both is and is not a rational continuity between God and 
the ereated world. The created world is other than God. 
Nevertheless it is related to God through the world's 
participation in the ideas in God's mind. For Brunner, 
God creates without using pre-existing materials a world 
A' 
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which is other than God and which remains only because God 
wills that it remain. There is a radical rational dis-
continuity between God and the world in Brunner's thought. 
l 
He attempts to understand the relation between God and the 
world as one which exists between the Absolute, Free Sub-
ject and relatively independent subjects. In Plato there 
is evident a strong demand for comprehensibility. 
Augustine's Nee-Platonism demands rational continuity but 
his Biblical faith demands a rational discontinuity be-
cause of the idea of God's creating activity, creatio ex 
nihilo. Brunner breaks completely with any demand for 
rational continuity and seeks to understand the relation 
between God and the world in terms of the human inter-
personal relationship. 
c. Creatio Continua -- Augustine teaches that God 
created everything all at once when he created the world. 
Newness in the world is explained in terms of the develop~ 
ment of the seminal reasons created in a potential state 
and placed in the four elements when God created the 
cosmos. Brunner teaches that God created the world in the 
beginning~ but he accounts for newness in the world in 
terms of God's continuous creating activity. 
3) Summary 
Through the thought of Plato, Augustine, and Brunner 
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one finds a gradual breaking away from the demand for 
comprehensibility in a world view and a moving towards 
a purely Biblical world view. Brunner attempts to take 
the categories witnessed to in the Bible and recognized 
in the tri-Thou" relation and to build a world-view in 
terms of them. Augustine does this to some extent but he 
is still tied to sense experience and the Greek demand for 
rational continuity. This breaking away from Greek thought, 
its methods and its goals, is implicit in Augustine and 
explicit in Brunner in terms of the data they attempt to 
interpret, the root analogies of creation they employ, 
and the relation of God to the world they understand. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF PLATO'S, AUGUSTINE'S, 
AND BRUNNER'S VIEWS OF CREATION 
1. Introduction 
Plato's~ Augustine's, and Brunner's views of creation 
have been explicated and evaluated in the three preceding 
chapters. In the light ofthis exposition can a view of 
creation be advanced which would circumvent the problems in 
these positions; embody their strengths; render meaningful 
Biblical statements regarding God's creative activity and 
some Christians' report that they have a relationship with 
and are dependent upon God; and render meaningful temporal 
experience? The purpose of this final chapter is to 
suggest and to explore a possible view of creation which 
would accomplish these goals. 
What procedure will be followed in suggesting lines 
of development for such a view of creation? 
data to be interpreted will be delineated. 
First, the 
Second the 
root analogies of Plato, Augustine, and Emil Brunner will 
be examined as possible suggestions for an hypothesis 
capable of allowing a consistent and comprehensive inter-
pretation of the data. Finally as a result of the analysis 
of the root analogies i~ Plato's, Augustine's, and Brunner's 
systemsan analogy will be suggested and examined regarding 
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its fruitfulness to suggest an hypothesis to interpret not 
only the Biblical statements about God's creative activity 
and the finite person's awareness of his dependence upon 
God but also the finite person's tempor~l experiences. 
First, then what are the data to be interpreted? 
2. Data to be Interpreted 
The data to be interpreted by means of an hypothesis 
of creation are some Christians' reported recognition that 
they have a relationship with and are dependent upon God, 
the Biblical statements regarding God's creative ability, 
and one's temporal experiences. However, before these 
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data are examined one must deal with the reasons for attempt-
ing to interpret this particular material and not other 
data. When this problem has been considered the data will 
be described. 
1) Reasons for Considering Data 
The reason for the concern about the Biblical 
statements regarding creation must be understood in light 
of the reasons for the concern about the meaning of a 
reported relationship with God. Some Christians report 
that they have a relationship with God which has made a 
significant difference in their perspective of themselves 
and their world. Because of the difference made by this 
relationship some Christians seek to understand it. 
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Involved in this relationship with God which some Christians 
report and seek to understand is an awareness, a recognition 
that they are dependent on God. Again, ·some Christians 
want to understand what "dependence" means. In their attempt 
to understand their dependence upon and relationship with 
God some Christians turn to the Bible. There many state-
ments are found regarding this relationship and dependence. 
But the most extraordinary passage is Genesis 1 and 2. 
But though statements about God's creating activity may 
speak to the experiences some Christians report they are 
left with the problem of interpreting Genesis 1 and 2. What 
does God's creativity mean? Thus, the reason why some 
Christians seek to understand these particular areas of 
data is that they are involved in a relation with God which 
has made a fundamental difference in their lives. 
Why should one examine temporal experiences and not 
other kinds of experiences? The reason is si¢ply that in 
some theistic positions God is understood as eternal and 
the created order as temporal. The problem arises as to 
the relation of the temporal and the eternal. How well do 
Augustine's and Plato's systems handle this problem? Can 
temporal experience be interpreted in such a way that the 
problem of eternal versus temporal does not arise? Thus, 
the reasons for dealing with temporal experience is that 
it poses a difficult problem for most theistic positions. 
Thus time will be considered along with some Christians' 
reported religious experience and the Biblical statements 
about God's creative activity. What precisely is the data 
to be interpreted? 
2) Nature of·Data 
The data some Christians want to understand are 
disruptive experiences reported to have occurred in worship. 
These disruptive experiences refer beyond themselves to 
something which breaks into a finite person's experience. 
Neither objects nor finite persons can be appealed to as 
causes of this experience. Further, in this experience 
the finite person is aware that he is dependent upon that 
to which his experience refers. As he attempts to under-
stand the nature of that which he expe~iences he a~so 
attempts to understand the meaning of his recognition of 
dependence. How is the awareness of dependence to be 
understood? What does dependence mean? Further, what is 
that which brings about a disruption of a finite person's 
experience? 
The second class of data the Christian attempts t0 
understand are the Biblical statements about God's crea-
tive activity. Genesis 1-2 are the central passages about 
creation. Representative of these is Genesis 1:1-3: 
In the beginning God created the heavens 
and the earth. The earth was without 
form and void, and darkness was upon the 
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faee of the deep; and the Spirit of God 
was moving over the face of the waters. 
And God said, nLet there be light"; and 
there was light.l 
What does this passage mean? Although scholars are not 
agreed about everything this passage means2 some points 
are clear and are agreed upon. First,this passage does 
say that "God is the complete and sole source of the world 
which, by his creation, exists as a reality outside of him-
self."3 Further, this passage says that "world reality is 
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a result of a creation, not a reshaping of existing matter.rr4 
Finally, this passage says that 1'beginning" is an eschato-
logical concept. 5- This means that "beginning" is not to 
be understood necessarily as the first stage in a time 
sequence. Rather, it means that God is working in history 
to accomplish his pur:pQses, that the final explanation for 
history is to be found in God's will.9 God is absolutely 
sovereign "over his creation!''Z The passage quoted above 
lRevised Standard Version. 
2Bernard s. Childs Myth and Reality in the Old 
Testament (Naperville, Illinois: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 
1900), pp. 30-42. 
3Ibi~., p. 40. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 
6Th. c. Vriezen, An Outr"ine of Old Testament 
Theology·(wageningen, Holland: H.~eenman and Zonen N.Y., 
1960) ' p. 3 70. 
tchilds, Myth and Realitv, p. 42. 
may mean (1) that God is transcendent to the world he 
created, (2) that God freely created the world ex nihilo, 
and (3} that the world is ultimately dependent upon God 
for its existence, but the question arises: What do 
these statements mean? What is the meaning of "areation," 
"transcendence," "dependence," "free'.'?1 These words compose 
the second area of data to be interpreted. 
The third area of experience to b~ interpreted is 
temporal experience. Fundamentally temporal experience 
means that the experience of a person is a duration.l 
Whatever else one may say about experience one must say 
that it endures. Take away duration and one must also 
take away experience. But what is the place of temporal 
experience in onets world-view? How can temporal ex-
. 
perience be explained? Thus, the third a~ea of data to 
be accounted for is temporal experience. 
Thus, the data to be interpreted are these: {1) the 
nature of that which brings about a disruption in a finite 
person's experience, {2} the awareness of a dependence 
upon that which breaks. into a finite person's experience, 
(3) the Biblical statements regarding Godts relation to 
the world, and (4) temporal experiences. How are these 
lE. s. Brightman, Person and Reality, ed. P. A. 
Bertocci, J. E. Newhall, and R. S. Brightman {New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1958), p. 103. 
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data to be interpreted? How valuable are the root anal-
ogies in Plato's, Augustine's, and Brunner's views of 
creation as suggestions for an hypothesis which would 
render meaningful these data? 
3. Analysis of Plato's, Augustine's, and 
Brunner's Views of Creation. 
How successful are the root analogies in Brunner's, 
Augustine's, and Plato's systems in suggesting hypotheses 
capable of interpreting the data here under consideration? 
Plato's analogy will be examined first. 
1) Plato's View of Creation 
The root analogy of Plato's view of creation is 
craftsmanship. Structurally understood this analogy is 
composed of a person, an idea or ideas, and a malleable 
stuff. Viewed dynamically, however, this analogy functions 
in the following manner: the person motivated by his de-
sire to make an object as good as possible envisages the 
pattern of what he intends to make and then attempts to 
form the stuff into a likeness of the idea. This analogy 
suggests a cosmological hypothesis whose structure is 
made up of a cosmic mind, eternal patterns, and a cosmic 
stuff. In the hypothesis viewed dynamica~ly the cosmic mind 
motiY.ated by the purpose of making all things to be as 
good and perfect as possible persuades the stuff of the 
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universe to take into itself a likeness of the eternal 
patterns. The result is movement toward what is best. 
This movement is caused by the cosmic mind functioning as 
an efficient cause and the eternal patterns operating as 
a final cause. How successfully can this hypothesis 
interpret the data under consideration? 
How well does Plato's hypothesis of creation inter-
pret the finite person's religious awareness of being re-
lated to and dependent upon something other than himself? 
No category or compos·ite function of categories in Plato's 
hypothesis can account for this awareness of being re-
lated to and dependent upon God. The Demiurg~in Plato's 
system is a cosmic efficient cause. In fact the only 
possibility would be the Demiurgos. He is the only 
dynamic cosmic principle in the revised cosmology. The 
Demiurgos is a cosmic efficient cause. He functions te 
account for movement toward what is best. If this is the 
function of the Demiurgos in Plato's later system could 
this cosmological category explain the kind of experience 
reported by some Christians? The Demiurgos principle 
could account for this experience only by doing violence 
to Plato's metaphysics. Plato understands all aspects of 
existence in terms of three principles: the Receptacle 
accounts for flux, the Patterns account for permanence, 
and the Demiurgos accounts for the mixture of these two 
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principles and for movement toward the Good. Ontologically 
the finite person is dependent upon three principles for 
his existence, none of which have any reason to break into 
his experience. In fact the Patterns and the Receptacle 
are n0t agents which could cause the kind of experience 
~eported. If only the Demiurgos is called upon to account 
for some Christians' rep0rted experience of something 
breaking into their experience and upon which they re-
cognized they were dependen~ then one has overlooked the 
ontological function of the Receptacle and the Patterns. 
On Plato's hypothesis all existence is dependent upon all 
of these principles and not upon one only. At this point 
Plato's hypothesis does not interpret the data. Can his 
hypothesis interpret the Biblical statements regarding 
God's creating~ nihilo, God's transcendence to the 
creature, and the creature's dependence upon God? 
It is obvious that Plat0's hypothesis is not 
capable of interpreting all of the Biblical statements. 
Plato's hypothesis calls for a metaphysical pluralism, 
God, the Receptacle, and the Patterns. God in Plato's 
system creates, then, with the use of pre-existing 
materials. But the Biblical statements refer to creation 
without the use of pre~existing materials. Furthermore, 
God in the Biblical statements is not limited by anything 
outside of himself. What is is explained ultimately in 
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terms of God. Plato's Demiurgos, on the other hand, is 
limited both by the Receptacle and by the Patterns. What 
exists is explained in terms of the Patterns, the Demiurgo9, 
and the Receptacle. However, Plato's hypothesis does 
apply to at least one of the Biblical statements. God is 
transcendent to the created order and cannot be identified 
with it. Nevertheless, Plato's hypothesis is inadequate 
to account for most of these data. It lacks both pre-
cision and scope. 
What about the capacity of Plato's hypothesis to 
explain the finite person's temporal experience? Through 
the composite functioning of the categories of Plato's 
hypothesis a realm of existence is made. Part of this 
realm is finite persons. They are experiencers. If they 
experience at all their experience is temporal, it 
endures. Time for Plato, then, is finite. But what is 
the relation of time to the eternal Forms, to the Demiurgos? 
At this point one is in the middle of the fundamental 
difficulty in Plato's metaphysics, the relation of being 
to existence. No category or composite functioning of 
categories in Plato's system is able to make this re-
lation comprehensible. Again, Plato's hypothesis lacks 
the precision and scope to render meaningful the data 
and the implications of the data. How capable is 
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Augustine's root analogy to suggest an hypothesis capable 
of interpreting the data? 
2) Augustine's View of Creation 
The r0ot analogy of Augustine's view of creation is 
the person speaking. "Speaking" presupposes a finite 
mind composed of memory, understanding, and will. When 
0ne speaks one has an idea or some knowledge one wants to 
communicate, one is thinking about this idea, and one 
wills to communicate that idea. This suggests the 
hypothesis of a cosmic person who has memory, understand-
ing and will. This person is God. In God's memory are 
the ideas, the eternal forms. He contemplates these with 
\ 
his understanding. Motivated by his will and with a view 
of the eternal forms,God.speaks and creates a world like 
the eternal forms he contemplates. The result of God's 
speaking is a world which is other than God bu~ which is 
dependent on God for its existence. How successfully 
does this hypothesis of creation interpret the data under 
consideration? 
Does Augustine's hypothesis account for some 
Christians' reported awareness both of something breaking 
into the stream of their experience and of their dependence 
upon this something? On the basis of Augustine's 
hypothesis God creates a universe in the likeness of his 
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eternal ideas. Part of this universe is composed of 
finite persons. In the mind of each finite person.· are 
the images of the eternal forms. God is known by the 
finite person's contemplation of the unchanging, universal 
norms in one's mind. God's breaking into the stream of a 
finite person's experience would perform no epistemic 
function in Augustine's position. God is in the finite 
mind in the sense that the images of the eternal forms 
residing in God are in the finite person's mind. God to 
be known must only be contemplated. G6d gives to man a 
knowledge of God, but this knowledge is bestowed upon man 
at creation. Thus the hypothesis of God's speaking in 
Augustine's system does not account for the kind of ex-
perience about which the Christian speaks. Does Augustine~ 
hypothesis function more successfully when confronted with 
the Biblical statements about God's creative activity and 
his relation to the creature? 
The composite functioning of the components of 
Augustine's hypothesis does apply to the Biblical state-
ments that the universe is dependent upon God, that God 
created the universe without the use of pre-existing 
materials, and that God is the sole explanation of the 
existence of the universe. But this hypothesis encounters 
difficulty when it attempts .to interpret the Biblical 
statements regarding the relation between God and the 
Universe. 
In Augustine'~ hypothesis when God speaks he creates 
a universe which is in the image of the eternal forms. In 
an attempt to specify the relation between the eternal 
forms and the universe as a likeness of the forms Augustine 
claims that the universe is to the extent it participates in 
the ideas of God. But if the universe is because it 
participates in the eternal forms then creatio ex nihilo 
is meaningless. Resulting from the functioning of his 
hypothesis Augustine has two incompatible principles of 
explanation: creation~nd participation. If the creative 
activity of God is the explanation for the fact of the 
universe then the universe is because God creates it. If 
participation is the explanation of the universe then the 
universe is because it participates in the eternal ideas. 
Because of this formidable problem ire Augustine's view of 
creation his hypothesis cannot account for the Biblical 
statements that God is transcendent to the created universe. 
Does Augustine's hypothesis account for temporal 
experience, of time? In so far as God creates ~ nihilo 
all finite existence and in so far as time is nothing 
apart from the finite person's experience then God also 
creates time. The creation of time can be accounted for 
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on Augustine's system. However, what is the relationship 
between the non-temporal God and the temporal world? 
Augustine's hypothesis is unable to render this relation 
comprehensible . 
. Augustine's hypothesis and consequently the root 
analogy suggesting the hypothesis is only partially 
successful. His hypothesis applies to the Biblical state-
ments regarding the dependence of the creature on the 
Creator, creatio ~ nihilo, and God's being the only ex-
planation of existence. But it does not account for the 
Christian's experience of God's breaking into his ex-
perience and his recognition that he is dependent upon 
God. Further Augustine's hypothesis cannot explain the 
Biblical statements regarding the relation of God to the 
universe. Finally, Augustine's hypothesis does not account 
for the relation of time and eternity in this system. 
Plato's and Augustine's hypothesis of creation have been 
examined and found to be inadequate to interpret most of 
the data to be explained. What can be said of Brunner's 
view of creation? 
3) Brunner's View of Creation 
Brunner consciously employs no analogy to suggest a 
possible answer to the problems he confronts regarding 
the relation of God to the world. Analogy functions as 
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an illustration in his system and not as a means of develop-
ing his system. However, if the-criticism of Brunner's 
view of creation made in the preceding chapter holds then he 
did use an analogy even though it no doubt was not used 
deliberately. The criticism advanced was that if Brunner 
recognizes that he interprets his religious experience 
then he must also recognize that he does and indeed must 
employ a root analogy in his interpreting activity. The 
root analogy that Brunner in fact uses in developing his 
system is the interpersonal relationship. The analogy of 
the creative activity of God, based on the interpersonal 
relationship analogy, is the person speaking. However, 
Brunner does not consciously and deliberately employ 
these analogies in developing his system of theology. 
Thus, one cannot legitimately examine the analogies upon 
which Brunner builds his system because he does not intend 
to use any analogies. 
4) Summary of Views of Creation 
Before analogies are advanced as avenues of approach 
for an explanation of some Christians' reported religious 
experience, Biblical statements about creation, and the 
ontological status of time the discussion of Plato's and 
Augustine's analogies must be summarized. Plato's analogy 
suggests a cosmological hypothesis which does not apply 
to the reported religious experience of some Christians. 
Further, this hypothesis .suggests an ontological pluralism. 
No Biblical statement refers to an ontological pluralism. 
In fact they discount it by referring to God as the sole 
explanation of all that is. Nevertheless, Plato's view 
does account for God's transcendence. Augustine's analogy 
suggests an hypothesis which is a cosmological hypothesis 
and cannot account for some Christians' reported experience 
of God's breaking into their experience and upon which 
they are aware of being dependent. Besides God is known 
in Augustine's system thr0ugh the finite person's contem-
plation of the universal, unchanging norms in his mind. 
Further, Augustine's hypothesis cannot apply to all 
Biblical statements about creation. These statements 
indicate that God is transcendent to the.created order. 
Augustine, however, contends that the created 0rder was 
created in the image of the eternal forms in God and that 
the created order is to the degree that it participates in 
the eternal forms. There is a coptinuity of being in all 
existence extending from God to the meanest form of being. 
God, thus, cannot be understood:as being transcendent to 
the created order. Augustine's hypothesis is not capable 
of interpreting the data considered above. Nevertheless 
it does account for the dependence of the creature on the 
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Creator, creatio ~ nihilo, and that· God is the sole ex-
planation for the universe. Finally, Brunner does not 
employ an analogy suggesting an hypothesis to account for 
these data. Thus, his view of creation cannot fairly be 
considered in the same way as was Plato's and Augustine's. 
However, in the light of the critique of Brunner's use of 
analogy the analogies he uses illustratively ·can be con-
sidered apart from his system and examined as possible 
suggestions for hypotheses to account for the data under 
scrutiny in this chapter. 
4. Suggestions for_a View of Creation 
From the foregoing analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the positions of Plato, Augustine, and 
Brunner possible analogies have been considered. Brunner's 
position suggests that· the analogies of the interpersonal 
relationship and the act of speaking could suggest an 
hypothesis which not only would embody the strengths of 
Plato's and Augustine's views, and give Brunner's position 
a more solid theoretical foundation but also would inter-
pret the data being considered here. What are the natures 
of these analogies and the hypotheses they suggest and how 
effective are they in interpreting the data not only of 
some Christians' reported religious experience and the 
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Biblical statements about creation but also of temporal 
experience? 
1) Nature of Suggested Analogies and Hypotheses 
The structure and function of the interpersonal re-
lationship analogy, though complex, is essentially that a 
person who has some idea he wants to communicate speaks 
by·an act of the will and in terms of the knowledge or in-
formation he wants to communicate. The person spoken to 
in response receives the data and through his interpreta-
tion of it understanrnwhat is spoken to him. Through this 
communicative endeavor a relationship between persons is 
established. The relationship is an I-Thou relationship. 
The interpersonal relationship analogy suggests the 
hypothesis that God speaks to a finite person; the finite 
person responds, receives the data, recognizes that God 
is speaking to him, and recognizes that he is dependent . 
. 
upon this Power which has addressed him. The analogy of 
the person speaking suggests the hypothesis that God 
creates by speaking. God by an act of his will and in 
terms of his thought speaks and the universe is the result • 
. Having created the universe and while upholding it by his 
will God enters into an I-Thou relation with his creatures. 
How successful are these hypotheses in interpreting the 
Biblical statements, some Christians' repor4ed religious 
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experllience, and temporal experience? 
2) Function of Suggested Hypotheses 
A. Religious Experience -- The data reported by 
s0me Christians in their religious experiences can be 
interpreted in terms of the hypothesis of the I-Thou 
relation between God and finite persons. The experience 
of something breaking into one's religious experience can 
be accounted for in terms of God's speaking to the finite 
person and the finite person's response and his recogni-
tion that that which is breaking into his experience is 
Person or God and that he is dependent upon Person for 
his existence and his meaningfulness. Does the hypothesis 
of the I-Thou relation and God's speaking interpret the 
Biblical statements regarding God's relation to the world? 
B. Biblical Statements -- The Biblical statements 
about God's relation to the world are that God is the 
ultimate explanation of the universe, that the universe is 
a result of God's creative activity and not of his dealing 
with existing matter or stuff, and that God is other than 
the created universe. Are the hypotheses "interpersonal 
relationship" and God's "act of speaking" capable of 
rendering meaningful these data? The hypothesis of the 
act of speaking is that God has will and thought and that 
by an act of his will and with a view of his th0ught he 
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speaks and the universe is the result. That which God 
creates is not himself, is not shaped from another, but 
is because God spoke. How can God speak and the universe 
result? It is nncomprehensible. No analogy and con-
sequently no hypothesis is capable of rendering God's 
creative act comprehensible. However, the force of the 
Biblical statements is not upon the act of creating it-
self but upon the relatioh which obtains between God and 
the universe he creates. What is God's relation to that 
which he creates? 
God is both transcendent to and immanent in the 
universe. The universe cannot be reduced to God. The 
universe is other than God. However, it is also dependent 
upon God. By virtue of its being created it is dependent 
upon something other than itself for its own existence. 
In what sense can the universe be both transcendent to and 
dependent upon God? What kind of relation exists here? 
This question involves a discussion not only of the nature · 
of the relation itself but also of the relation between 
God and the kind of things one recognizes in one's world 
such as newness and continuity. 
The kind of relation that exists between God and 
the universe must be understood in terms of the hypothesis 
of interpersofial relationships. If this hypothesis renders 
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meaningful the religious experience some Christians report 
and if it is the case that in this experience one has one's 
most direct relation with God then it is to this relation 
and to this hyp0thesis that one must turn in order to 
understand the kind of relation that obtains between God 
and the created order. The relation between God and the 
finite person is understood as an interpersonal relation 
in which God and a finite person communicate and iri which 
a finite person recognizes that even though in one's free-
dom for decision one is other than God and not coerced by 
anything outside of oneself in making decisions one is 
nevertheless dependent upon God for one's existence. If 
this is the kind of relation that obtains between God and 
the finite person then God is related to the whole universe 
in essentially the same manner. This means that the 
universe is composed of person-like existents possessing 
freedom in some sense and related to God and to one another 
in an interpersonal manner. However when one attempts to 
explain one's experience of dependence upon God one will 
no doubt refer to God's will as the cause which maintains 
one's existence. But one must admit that how God does 
this is not comprehensible. However, the ultimate meaning 
of the relation is not to be found in an how explanation. 
The fundamental meaning is in why, the purpose of this 
relationship. God creates the universe in order to 
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accomplish some goal whether to communicate or to make 
himself known. 1 
What about the finite person's recognitiom of new-
ness and of continuity in the world? What is God's 
relation to these aspects of the universe? Essentially, 
newness such as a new born child can be accounted for 
by appealing to God's creative activity. Since newness 
is repeatedly appearing in the universe one must also 
allow that God continuously creates. What kind of re-
lation 0btains between God and that which has been 
created and now is such as a full grown man? God's will, 
.the dynamic aspect of God, must be sought to account for 
the continuity in the created universe. How does God 
create ex nihilo? How does God maintain creatures by the 
constant power of his will? These functions of God are 
incomprehensible. But, again, how G0d does what he does 
is not the only or the most satisfactory kind ef ex-
planation f0r the event. Another approach at an explanation 
lcf. Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1959), 
pp. 64-75. Gilkey contrasts how explanations and why 
explanations. He maintains that in order for one t0 
account for finite freedom one must resort to why ex-
planations. How explanations involve structure-ind a 
thoroughgoing statement of the structure of the universe 
would leave no room for non-compelled decisions on the 
part of finite persons. Freedom demands an element of 
indetermi·nancy and structure demands full determination. 
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of these aspects of the universe is to ask why are these 
new existents in the universe and why is there continuity 
in the universe. On the basis of the hypothesis of God's 
act of speaking one can say that newness and continuity 
are in the universe because God is accomplishing a purpose 
in them. Of course one must delineate the purpose God 
is attempting to accomplish. Neverthe~ess, this is 
suggestive of an approach to the problem. 
Thus the hypotheses "interpersonal relationshipu 
and "act of speaking" are capable of giving a cogent 
interpretation of some Christians' reported religious 
experience and the Biblical statements about God's creative 
activity. How capable are these hypotheses to interpret 
temporal experiences? 
c. Time -- In the attempt to interpret time in 
terms of the hypotheses of interpersonal relationships 
and the act of speaking one fundamental problem must be 
considered. What is the ontological status of time when 
considered from the perspectives and categories of these 
hypotheses? 
Time has been defined as duration. All finite 
persons' experience endures. Apart from its duration 
experience would not be. What is the ontological status 
of time understood in this fundamental sense? 
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The interpersonal relationship hypothesis was ad-
vanced in an effort to explain some Christians' reported 
experience of something breaking into their experience and 
upon which they are aware they are dependent. This ex-
perience is understood through this hypothesis as being 
God's addressing a finite person:~ and the finite person's 
response to God's address and recognition that he is 
dependent upon God. It is in terms of this experience of 
the dependence of the finite person 0n God that one must 
understand the ontological status of time. 
In this I-Thou encounter with God the finite person 
is aware that he is dependent upon God for his existence. 
It is obvious to any finite person that for his existence 
he is not self-dependent and that he is not solely 
dependent for his existence upon either other persons or 
nature. He is aware of the ground of his existence, how-
ever, in the I-Thou encounter with God. An aspect of the 
nature of a finite person is his experiencing function. 
This means that he is a creature who experiences, who is 
temporal. Temporality is a fundamental aspect of the 
finite person. If this is the case, and the finite per-
son is aware that he is dependent upon something other 
than himself for his own existence, then time is also 
dependent upon something other than itself for its 
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existence. The ontological status of time is that it is 
finite, that it is dependent upon God for its existence. 
But what is the nature of this relation of dependence of 
finite time on God? 
In the reported religious experiences of some 
Christians they are aware of something breaking into their 
experience. They are also aware that their experience 
refers to something other than itself for its explanation. 
The interpersonal relationship hypothesis accounts for 
this "breaking inton one's experience by referring to God 
who addresses the finite person. If it is the case that 
only a person could bring about some Christians' reported 
religious experience and if the cause of the religious 
experience is understood to be God then God is Person. 
What does person mean apart from a subject experiencing? 
If God is to be understood as Person then he must at 
least be understood as Person experiencing. But if one 
says that God experiences what is his experience apart 
from temporality? Thus God must be temporal. God must 
endure. If this is the case do God as temporal and 
~ 
finite persons as temporal refer to the same kind of tempo-
rality? 
It was argued above that finite enduring experience, 
must be understood as being dependent upon something other 
than itself for its existence. That upon which it is 
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dependent is God. God also experiences; God's experience 
endures. But God is the ground 0f being. This means 
that his experience is not dependent upon anything other 
than itself for its existence. God as temporal is self-
dependen~ whereas, finite persons as temporal are dependent. 
The kinds of temporal experience of God and of finite 
persons are different. However, they are both duration. 
It follows, then, that the temporal experience of God and 
the temporal experience of finite persons are not identical 
experiences but are nevertheless experiences characterized 
by duration. What is the relation between God's time and 
man's time? 
The relation is best understood by referring to the 
interpersonal relationship. In the interpersonal relation-
ship two persons are related in a communicative manner. 
Each does not get outside of his own experience. Each 
one's experience endures in its own manner. There is 
similarity between each person's experience but each has 
his own experience. The time for one person is not the 
same time for the other person, even though they may agree 
on clock time or some measurement of duration. If this 
is the case in the relation between two finite persons 
then why not this kind of relation betwee~ God and the 
finite person in his temporal experience? The finite 
person is fundamentally related in his temporal experiences 
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to God like he is related in his temporal experiences to 
other persons. God is not dependent upon anything other 
than himself for his own existence but finite persons are. 
Nevertheless God endures and so does man. God endures as 
the ground of all being and man endures as dependent upon 
that ground for his existence. 
When it is said that God endures does this mean that 
God knows succession _as~ man knows succession? What 
could an enduring experience be if it were not dependent 
upon something other than itself for its own existence? 
Finite persons know no such experience. What can be said 
of that kind of duration which is not dependent, that is, 
God's experience? The crucial point in the above analysis 
is the word like. Mants temporal experience is finite. 
He cannot experience non-finite time, that is, God's time. 
Nevertheless, if it is the case that God and man enter 
into an interpersonal relationship then God and finite 
persons are alike in some sense. God endures in some 
sense like man endures. Just as the finite person must 
use analogies to speak about the nature of God he must 
use analogies to speak about the experience of God. In 
fact, apart from the analogical function of knowing the 
finite person cannot claim any kind of metaphysical 
knowledge. To be more explicit is only to indulge in a 
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more thorough analysis of the analogies. The purpose of 
this chapter is to suggest lines along which a view of 
creation can be developed. To push the analysis of the 
problem of time would be to go beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
3) Summary 
The analogies ninterpersonal relationship" and nact 
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of speaking" are capable of suggesting hypotheses to account 
for the reported religious experience of some Christians, 
the Biblical sta~ements regarding God's creative activity, 
and the finite experiences of time. The hypotheses in their 
composite functions refer to the data under examination 
and render them meaningful. 
5. Conclusion 
The fundamental purpose of this chapter has been 
to suggest a view of creation which would circumvent the 
problems found in Plato's, Augustine's, and Brunner's 
views of creation; to include the strengt~s of these 
positions; and to allow this view of creation to function 
in interpreting three ar~as of data: (1) the reported 
religious experience of some Christians, (2) Biblical 
statements about God's creating activity, and (3) time. 
An analysis of Plato's "craftsmanship" and Augustine's 
ttGodts act of speaking" indicated the inability of these 
. 
hypotheses to interpret and relate the data. Plato's 
hypothesis does not allow him to overcome the problem of 
the relation of the temporal to the eternal, to account 
for some Christians 1 .reported religious experience, and 
to hold to the creatio ~ nihilo view suggested by Biblical 
statements. Hewever, Biblical statements point to a God 
transcendent to or other than the world. Plato's God is 
transcendent to the created order. Henc~ at this point 
Plato's hypothesis applies to the data. Augustine's 
hypothesis does not allow him to explain some Christians' 
reported reli~ious experiences, God's transcendence to the 
world made in his image and participating in liim for its 
existence, and the relation of time and eternity. However, 
his hypothesis does allow an interpretation of the Biblical 
statements about God's creating without using pre-existing 
materials. 
Brunner does not deliberately employ an hypothesis 
to develop his theological system. However, the analogies 
implicit to his system are the interpersonal relationship 
and the act of speaking. These were then suggested as 
possible alternatives to Augustine's and Plato's views and 
as the theoretical foundation of Brunner's theology. After 
an analysis of these analogies and the hypotheses they 
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silggest was completed they were (_allowed to function to 
explain the data under consideration. Each area of data 
can be interpreted and related through these hypotheses. 
Difficulties occur, however, when one attempts to explain 
how God creates ex nihilo and what kind of' time God ex-
periences as over against the kind of time finite person's 
experience? It was suggested that why explanations are 
satisfactory ones, and that when one attempts to give why 
explanations one must speak about God and must do so 
analogically. The upshot of this discussion is that the 
analogies "interpersonal relation"'and nact of speaking" 
suggest hypotheses which can provide a fruitful line of 
metaphysical enquiry. 
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THE IDEA OF CREATION IN PLATO> 
AUGUSTINE, AND EMIL BRUNNER 
Thomas Oliver Buford, Ph.D. 
Boston University Graduate School, 1963 
Major Professor: Dr. Peter A. Bertocci 
The purpose of this dissertation is tb,examine the 
views of creation that Plato, Augustine, and Brunner ad-
vance to deal with problems involved in God's relation to 
the world. 
Divine craftsmanship seems to be the model in 
Plato's view of creation. His view of Pattern, Demiurgos, 
and Receptacle are advanced in order to deal with such 
problems in this theory of Ideas as the relation of 
permanence to change, of perfection to imperfection, and 
of the one to the many; and the fact that all movement 
tends toward what is best. Plato submits that the 
Demiurgos initiates all movement in becoming toward what 
is best by persuading the Receptacle to take into itself 
a structure like the Pattern. To create is to persuade 
a recalcitrant "material" to bring perfect being into 
existence as far as possible. Plato's hypothesis does 
seem to account for movement in becoming toward what is 
best, but it does not rende,r sufficiently comprehensible 
,, 
i· . the relation of perfect be~ng to ex~stence. 
f 
Augustine advances his view of creation, creatio 
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~ nihilo, to deal with such problems as how can the finite 
soul achieve lasting happiness and ultimabe meaningfulness, 
how make intelligible the relation between two modes of 
duration and of being, and how maintain the free will of 
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the finite person. Augustine contends that God, contem-
plating his ideas and motivated by his Goodness, by his 
desire to perfect the creature, and by his will, speaks and 
the world is the result. This world, created by God without 
using pre-existing materials is both contingent and inde-
pendent. It is contingent by virtue of God's having created 
it and its participation in God's ideas. The world is 
independent in that it is a different mode of being than 
God and values achieved in it are lasting. Augustine's 
hypothesis renders intelligible permanence and change but 
not how God creates. 
Brunner appeals to an I-Thou relation between God and 
man to understand Biblical statements about creation and to 
answer questions. How can being be known? How account for 
human freedom? How account for both God's creating some-
thing not himself and the relation between God and the world? 
Brunner says that God is known because he wills to reveal 
himself in the I-Thou encounter. In this encounter the 
finite person recognizes his dependence upon God and is 
' 
given knowledge of God as Creator. The finite person 
recognizes that God, by an act of his will and with a view 
to his thought, speaks and the world is created ex nihilo. 
As Creator God is both transcendent to and immanent in the 
world. In this way human freedom and God's control of the 
universe are maintained. Analysis reveals, however, that 
Brunner's knowledge of God and God's creative activity is 
a rational hypothesis even though he claims that.knowledge 
of God is given non-rationally in the I-Thou encounter. 
Weaknesses in Plato's, Augustine's, and Brunner's 
views of creation emphasize the need for developing a view 
which deals more effectively with their problems and renders 
intelligible some Christians' experience of encounter, 
Biblical statements regarding God's creative activity, and 
finite temporal experience. Making use of analogies from 
interpersonal relationships and finite speech-communication, 
it may be suggested that God creates finite persons by an 
act of speaking because he wills to communicate himself. 
Again, using the suggested analogies as a clue, it might 
be further suggested that God's relation to the world as a 
whole is personal. Finally, using these analogies it might 
be suggested that both finite persons and God are temporal. 
This hypothesis is unable to specify how God creates, but 
is specific as to why God creates, he wills to reveal him-
self. 
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